What is the 'duty to act in a manner that is not for the purpose of making a piggyback…
- User
What is the 'duty to act in a manner that is not for the purpose of making a piggyback registration right' for corporate directors?
- Assistant
The phrase appears to originate from specific contractual provisions in venture capital financing documents, preferred stock certificates of designation, or registration rights agreements (common in U.S. corporate practice, especially Delaware corporations). It is not a statutory fiduciary duty under general corporate law (e.g., DGCL §141 or Model Business Corporation Act), but rather a contractual covenant binding directors—often those designated by preferred investors—to uphold investor protections without abusing corporate resources.
Key Elements of the Duty:
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Piggyback Registration Rights Recap: These are contractual rights granted to certain shareholders (e.g., VC funds holding preferred stock) allowing them to "piggyback" (include) their shares in a company-initiated public registration statement (e.g., for an IPO or follow-on offering on SEC Form S-1/S-3). Unlike "demand" rights, piggyback rights are passive—they automatically attach when the company files for its own securities.
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The Duty Itself: Directors covenant not to cause or authorize corporate actions where the primary purpose is to "make" (i.e., trigger, facilitate, or enable the exercise of) a piggyback registration right.
- "Making" interpreted: This means filing (or causing to file) a registration statement, achieving S-3 eligibility (e.g., via public float), or structuring transactions primarily to let holders sell via piggyback—without a legitimate independent business purpose for the company (e.g., raising capital).
- Rationale: Prevents directors (especially investor-appointed ones) from:
Risk Addressed Example Violation Self-dealing / Loyalty breach Filing a costly S-1 just so VCs can exit early, diluting common shareholders or wasting company funds. Expense abuse Pursuing minimal public float solely for S-3 "short-form" piggyback eligibility (SEC rules require ~$75M float for full S-3). Improper purpose Timing offerings to benefit specific holders, violating duty of good faith (e.g., Stone v. Ritter, Delaware law).
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Enforcement & Remedies:
- Contractual: Breach allows investors to seek specific performance, damages, or acceleration of other rights (e.g., demand registration).
- Fiduciary Overlap: Reinforces Delaware duties of loyalty/care/good faith. Courts scrutinize under business judgment rule but shift burden if primary purpose is suspect (Revlon/Unocal tests if defensive).
- Typical Language (from sample NVCA/term sheets):
"Each director... covenants and agrees... to act in a manner that shall not have as one of its primary purposes the making available of a Piggyback Registration Right..."
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Exceptions/Carve-Outs: Often allows actions with "bona fide" business purposes (e.g., genuine capital raise) or if approved by disinterested board majority.
This duty balances investor liquidity rights with directors' overarching fiduciary obligations to the corporation and all shareholders. If from a specific agreement/case, provide more context for deeper analysis!
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Other models, same or similar prompt
Responses were produced in different, uncontrolled contexts (system prompts, settings, prior turns). This is not a benchmark.