Explain third-degree price discrimination. Conditions: market power, ability to segment,…
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Explain third-degree price discrimination. Conditions: market power, ability to segment, prevention of arbitrage. Show graphically how different prices in markets with different elasticity maximizes surplus.
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Explaining third-degree price discrimination with graphs
Third-degree price discrimination occurs when a seller with market power charges different prices in separate markets based on demand elasticity, requiring ability to segment markets and prevent resale. Graphically, two panels show distinct market demands—one steep (inelastic) and one flat (elastic)—with corresponding marginal revenue curves intersecting a common, typically horizontal marginal cost curve. The firm sets quantities where each MR equals MC, leading to higher prices in the inelastic market and lower prices in the elastic one. The inverse relation between price and elasticity is captured by the Lerner index formula: (P - MC)/P = 1/|E|, ensuring prices reflect elasticity differences. This discrimination increases the firm's profit and total output compared to uniform pricing, though effects on total welfare can vary. Under “third‑degree” price discrimination a single seller faces two or more distinct groups of buyers with different demand conditions and is able to quote a different tariff to each group. The firm is not customising the product, it is simply segmenting the market and exploiting the fact that willingness to pay and price sensitivity differ across segments.
Three practical conditions have to be met for it to be feasible:
- The seller must have some market power; under perfect competition you cannot choose price freely.
- The seller must be able to sort customers into groups with different demand elasticities (e.g. by age, location, time of purchase).
- Resale between groups must be impractical or prevented, otherwise low‑priced units would flow to the high‑price segment and undermine the scheme.
Once markets are separated, the profit‑maximising rule is the same in each segment: choose the quantity in that segment such that marginal revenue equals marginal cost. Because marginal cost is common across segments, this implies [ \text{MR}_A(Q_A)=\text{MR}_B(Q_B)=\cdots = \text{MC}. ] The markup in each market is inversely related to the elasticity of demand there: [ \frac{P_i - MC}{P_i} = \frac{1}{|\varepsilon_i|}. ] So in the segment with more elastic demand the optimal price is closer to marginal cost, and in the less elastic segment the optimal price is higher.
A standard way to illustrate this is with two panels, one for each segment. In each panel put price on the vertical axis and quantity on the horizontal. Draw the segment’s demand curve (D) and its marginal revenue curve (MR) beneath it. Assume a constant marginal cost (MC), shown as a horizontal line:
Market A (inelastic demand) Market B (elastic demand) P | \ P | \ | \ | \ | \ D_A | \ D_B | \ | \ | \ | \ | \ | \ | \ | \ +---------------- Q +---------------- Q MR_A intersects MC MR_B intersects MCBecause (D_A) is steeper, (MR_A) is steeper and crosses (MC) at a lower quantity. The profit‑maximising quantities (Q_A^*) and (Q_B^*) are where each (MR) meets (MC). Reading up to the demand curves gives the corresponding prices (P_A^*) and (P_B^*). You will find (P_A^* > P_B^*): the firm charges a higher price in the inelastic market and a lower price in the elastic one.
Compared to a single uniform price, discriminating this way allows the firm to expand output in the elastic segment without having to cut the price for the inelastic buyers, increasing its profit. Total surplus can rise or fall depending on how discrimination changes total output, but the pricing rule itself is what maximises the seller’s surplus given the segmented demands.
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