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Design a capability-based access framework for internal tools using WebAuthn, OAuth, and…
- User
Design a capability-based access framework for internal tools using WebAuthn, OAuth, and token-bound sessions with least-privilege audits.
- Assistant
Capability-Based Access Framework for Internal Tools
Overview
This framework provides fine-grained, capability-based access control (CBAC) for internal tools, leveraging:
- WebAuthn for phishing-resistant, passwordless authentication.
- OAuth 2.0 (with JWT access tokens) for issuing tamper-proof capabilities as scoped, time-bound tokens.
- Token-bound sessions to cryptographically tie short-lived sessions to capabilities, preventing token theft/reuse.
- Least-privilege audits via continuous monitoring, usage analytics, and automated revocation.
Key Principles:
- Capabilities: Unforgeable, revocable tokens (JWTs) encoding specific permissions (e.g.,
tool:db-read#projectX). - Least Privilege: Capabilities issued on-demand with minimal scope; no standing privileges.
- Zero Trust: Every access requires fresh proof; no long-lived sessions.
- Auditability: Immutable logs with anomaly detection.
Architecture (Text Diagram):
[User/Browser] <--> WebAuthn Auth | v [Auth Server (AS)] --issues--> Capability Token (JWT) | v (OAuth Resource Server flow) [Internal Tool RS1] <--presents--> Capability + Proof | (e.g., DB Tool) (Token-bound Session) | v [Audit Service] <--logs all--> Immutable Ledger (e.g., Kafka + Elasticsearch)Components
1. Auth Server (AS)
- Handles WebAuthn registration/challenges.
- Policy Engine (e.g., OPA/Rego) evaluates requests for capability issuance.
- Issues OAuth JWT capabilities signed with AS private key.
- Revocation list (RL) for instant capability invalidation.
Capability Token Structure (JWT Claims):
{ "iss": "https://as.internal", "sub": "user:alice-webauthn-cred-id", "aud": "tool:db-reader", "scope": "db:read#projectX:table-users", // Fine-grained capability URI "exp": 3600, // 1hr max "jti": "unique-cap-id", // For revocation/audit "cnf": {"jwk": {"kty":"EC","crv":"P-256",...}}, // Confirmation: WebAuthn public key "bound_session_hash": null // Populated on session binding }2. Internal Tools (Resource Servers - RS)
- OAuth-compliant: Validate JWTs via AS JWKS endpoint.
- Issue token-bound sessions upon capability presentation.
- Enforce capability scope (e.g., parse URI for exact perms).
3. Client (Browser/App)
- WebAuthn API for auth.
- Stores capabilities in memory (not persistent storage).
- Presents capabilities + fresh WebAuthn assertion for session binding.
4. Audit Service
- Collects logs via event streaming.
- Least-privilege enforcement:
- Usage Profiling: Track cap usage; flag/recommend revocation if underused (>90 days) or overused (exceeds policy baseline).
- Anomaly Detection: ML-based (e.g., isolation forest) on access patterns.
- Periodic Audits: Cron jobs query logs, generate reports, auto-revoke via AS RL.
Access Flow
Step 1: WebAuthn Authentication & Capability Request
1. Client: GET /tools/db-reader (Discovery) 2. RS1: 302 Redirect to AS /authorize?client_id=tool-db-reader&scope=db:read#projectX&state=... 3. Client: POST AS /par (Pushed Auth Req - RFC 9126) - Includes WebAuthn assertion (fresh challenge response). 4. AS: Validate WebAuthn (RP ID check, user verification). - Policy check: Does user have role/entitlement for scope? 5. AS: Issue Capability Token (access_token) via token endpoint.Step 2: Token-Bound Session Establishment
6. Client: POST RS1 /session - Authorization: Bearer <capability_jwt> - WebAuthnAssertion: Fresh assertion signed by user's private key. - SessionIntent: {duration:300, actions:["query"]} 7. RS1: a. Validate JWT (sig, exp, aud, RL check). b. Verify WebAuthn assertion against JWT's "cnf" public key. c. Compute binding: session_hash = BLAKE3(cap_jti + webauthn_challenge + client_nonce) d. Sign session cookie: {session_id, bound_hash, exp} signed by RS1 key. e. Log: {cap_jti, user, action:"session-bind", ts, ip, user-agent} 8. Client: Receives Set-Cookie: tool_session=...Step 3: Tool Access
9. Client: GET RS1 /api/query?table=users - Cookie: tool_session 10. RS1: a. Validate session sig/exp. b. Re-derive bound_hash; require cap proof every N requests or expiry. c. Enforce scope: Parse "db:read#projectX:table-users" → allow if matches. d. Log access.Step 4: Refresh/Revocation
- Sessions expire fast (5min); refresh requires re-presenting cap + fresh WebAuthn.
- AS revokes cap → publishes to RL (Redis + Bloom filter for fast checks).
- Client polls /userinfo or uses token introspection.
Security Features
Feature Mechanism Benefit Phishing Resistance WebAuthn RP ID + UV (User Verification) Hardware-bound auth. Token Theft Protection Token-bound hash + WebAuthn proof Stolen tokens useless without private key. Fine-Grained AuthZ Capability URIs (e.g., res:action#context)No broad scopes; parse/enforce at RS. Replay Prevention Fresh challenges, jti + nonce Ephemeral proofs. Delegation (Optional) Macaroon caveats in JWT (e.g., time/3rd-party limits) Attenuation for sub-caps. Revocation CRL/JTI list + short TTL Instant kill-switch. Least-Privilege Audits
Audit Pipeline:
- Logging: Structured events to Kafka:
{"event":"access","cap_jti":"uuid","user":"alice","scope":"db:read#projectX","success":true,"ts":1720000000} - Storage: Elasticsearch for queries.
- Analytics (e.g., via Spark/ELK):
- Baseline: Per-user/tool: expected accesses/day.
- Alerts: Slack/email if usage >2x baseline or unused caps.
- Revocation Workflow: Auto-revoke low-usage caps; human approval for high-risk.
- Compliance Reports: Quarterly: % of accesses within least-priv, revocations triggered.
Implementation Tip: Use
capability-urislibrary (or custom parser) for scopes.Implementation Stack (Reference)
- AS: Node.js/Express +
simplewebauthn,oauth4webapi, OPA. - RS: Similar + Redis for sessions/RL.
- Client: JS with WebAuthn polyfill.
- Audit: Kafka → ES → Kibana + Python ML scripts.
- Deployment: Kubernetes with Istio mTLS for AS-RS comms.
This framework scales to 100s of tools/users, with <100ms auth latency. For prototypes, start with AS + 1 RS. Questions?
Other models, same or similar prompt
Responses were produced in different, uncontrolled contexts (system prompts, settings, prior turns). This is not a benchmark.