what do you think of this idea; This dissertation investigates the dynamics of social…
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what do you think of this idea;
This dissertation investigates the dynamics of social norm change when group interests conflict. Standard models of norm change frequently depict transitions between equilibria as welfare-improving for all. However, many real-world social changes, such as advancements in gender equality or civil rights, create winners and losers, with minority groups often instigating change against the preferences of a majority.
My original contribution is to develop and analyse a game-theoretic threshold model that explicitly incorporates these conflicting interests. The model features two groups; a majority preferring a status quo norm and a minority preferring an alternative norm. Each agent has an adoption threshold, derived from their utility maximisation problem, that dictates the proportion of others who must adopt the alternative norm before they too are willing to switch.
The research will explore how parameters such as minority group size, the intensity of conflicting preferences, and intra-group preference heterogeneity affect the likelihood of social change, the stability of norms, and the nature of equilibria. Through initial simulations of the model, I have identified potentially counterintuitive effects of policy interventions. For instance, policies aimed at making the status quo more tolerable for the minority may instead prevent a welfare-enhancing shift to the alternative norm, particularly when the system is near a tipping point.
- Assistant
This is a strong and original dissertation idea that addresses a significant gap in the literature on social norm change. Here’s why it stands out and how it could be further refined:
Strengths of the Proposal
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Novel Contribution to Norm Change Theory
- Most models of norm change (e.g., Young, 2015; Bicchieri, 2006) assume Pareto-improving transitions, but your focus on conflicting group interests is more realistic for many real-world cases (e.g., civil rights, gender equality, labor reforms).
- By explicitly modeling majority vs. minority preferences, you capture the political and social friction that often accompanies norm shifts.
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Game-Theoretic Rigor with Policy Relevance
- The threshold model is a natural fit for studying norm adoption (similar to Granovetter’s threshold models of collective behavior).
- The idea that policy interventions can backfire (e.g., making the status quo more tolerable for minorities) is fascinating and aligns with real-world observations (e.g., how incremental reforms can delay radical change).
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Potential for Counterintuitive Insights
- The finding that small policy tweaks near tipping points can prevent welfare-enhancing change is theoretically rich and could have implications for activism and policymaking.
- This could lead to testable hypotheses about when gradual vs. disruptive change is more effective.
Areas for Refinement & Expansion
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Clarify the Mechanism of Norm Adoption
- How exactly do agents decide to switch? Is it purely based on the proportion of adopters, or are there network effects, signaling, or coordination costs?
- Could you incorporate learning or adaptive expectations (e.g., agents updating beliefs about future norm adoption)?
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Define "Welfare-Enhancing" More Precisely
- If the minority prefers the alternative norm but the majority does not, is the shift truly welfare-enhancing? Or is it a redistributive change?
- Could you model heterogeneous welfare effects (e.g., some majority members might benefit from the new norm despite initial resistance)?
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Explore Dynamic vs. Static Equilibria
- Are you assuming a one-shot adoption decision, or is there a dynamic process where norms evolve over time?
- Could you model path dependence (e.g., small initial shocks leading to irreversible change)?
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Policy Implications & Robustness Checks
- The idea that making the status quo more tolerable can prevent change is compelling—could you test this in a behavioral experiment or with historical case studies?
- Are there asymmetric effects (e.g., does the minority’s intensity of preference matter more than the majority’s)?
Potential Extensions
- Network Structure: How does the connectivity between groups (e.g., segregated vs. integrated societies) affect norm adoption?
- Information Cascades: Could misinformation or signaling (e.g., fake adoption by some agents) accelerate or hinder change?
- Institutional Resistance: What if the majority can actively suppress the minority’s norm (e.g., through laws or social punishment)?
Final Thoughts
This is a highly promising dissertation topic that bridges theoretical game theory, social dynamics, and policy analysis. The key will be to:
- Formalize the model clearly (e.g., specify utility functions, adoption thresholds, and equilibrium conditions).
- Derive testable predictions (e.g., under what conditions does the minority succeed in changing the norm?).
- Connect to real-world cases (e.g., civil rights movements, gender norms, or corporate culture shifts).
If executed well, this could be a significant contribution to both economics and sociology. Would love to see how the simulations develop!
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Other models, same or similar prompt
Responses were produced in different, uncontrolled contexts (system prompts, settings, prior turns). This is not a benchmark.