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would it be useful to pass high p-code output by ghydra to you in order for you to…

From a Chatbot Arena battleThe same person sent this prompt to two anonymous models at once. Compare it with Qwenqwq-32b’s answer.
  1. User

    would it be useful to pass high p-code output by ghydra to you in order for you to determine if my code has any vulnerabilities that I should mitigate?

  2. Kimi Assistant

    In short: no, not directly.
    Ghidra’s “high p-code” (the de-compiler’s C-like pseudo-code) is still a lossy, best-effort reconstruction of the original program. It can be missing:

    • inline assembly, compiler-inserted guards, or hand-written crypto
    • macros, templates, or other source-level constructs
    • comments, pragmas, or annotations that disable/enable mitigations
    • build-time flags (FORTIFY_SOURCE, stack-protector, CFG, etc.)

    Because of that, any vulnerability assessment I give you from that pseudo-code would be incomplete and potentially misleading. A finding that looks exploitable in the de-compiled view might already be mitigated at the binary level, or vice-versa.

    What is useful:

    1. Static analysis on the actual source (if you have it) with tools like CodeQL, Coverity, clang-tidy, or even manual review.
    2. Binary-centric analysis on the real executable: run checksec, objdump -d, readelf -S, or use Ghidra’s own vulnerability scanners (Function ID, Symbolic Propagation, etc.).
    3. Dynamic testing: fuzzing, symbolic execution, or runtime sanitizer builds (-fsanitize=address,undefined).

    If you only have the binary and no source, then Ghidra’s p-code can help guide the reverse-engineering effort, but you should still validate any suspected flaw against the disassembly or live execution before deciding whether a mitigation is needed.

    So feel free to share snippets if you’re stuck on a particular function, but treat any conclusions as hypotheses to verify, not a definitive audit.

  3. User

    what about building a security checker mcp server that would expose tools for you to use (ghydra's tools/APIs, of course, but also checksec, objdump -d , readelf, S, etc.)

  4. Kimi Assistant

    That would be a very useful MCP server, but only if it is built and used in the right way.

    1. What the server should expose
      • A “binary-info” tool that runs checksec, readelf -S, objdump -d, file, strings, etc. and returns structured JSON.
      • A “ghidra-headless” tool that takes a binary path and a list of analysis scripts (Ghidra’s built-in analyzers plus any custom ones you write) and returns:
      – list of functions with their high-pcode / decompiled C
      – call-graph and control-flow summaries
      – identified crypto constants, dangerous API calls (strcpy, sprintf, system, etc.)
      – stack-frame sizes and canary presence
      • A “symbolic-trace” tool that uses Ghidra’s emulator or angr/unicorn to give a short concrete or symbolic trace for a chosen function.
      • A “diff” tool that compares two binaries (patch diffing).
      • A “mitigation-check” tool that cross-references the checksec output with the Ghidra findings to flag mismatches (e.g., function uses gets but binary has no stack canary).

    2. How I would use it
      • I would never treat the high-pcode alone as ground truth.
      • Instead, I would call the server’s tools in sequence:

      1. binary-info → get NX/PIE/RELRO/Canary status.
      2. ghidra-headless → get pcode + decompiled C + dangerous-call list.
      3. Cross-check: if pcode shows a strcpy with attacker-controlled size and binary-info shows no stack canary, flag as high-risk.
      4. If the pcode shows a bounds-checked loop but objdump reveals an inlined rep movsb without canary, trust the disassembly and downgrade the risk.
        • I would also ask for a short symbolic trace when the static picture is ambiguous.
    3. Caveats you must document
      • High-pcode is still an approximation; the server should always return both the pcode snippet and the corresponding raw disassembly so I can sanity-check.
      • Emulation/symbolic execution can be slow; cap trace length or time.
      • Make it explicit when results come from heuristics vs. concrete facts.

    4. Minimal viable prototype
      • A single Python FastAPI service that wraps:
      – subprocess.run(["checksec", "--file", path], …)
      – subprocess.run(["readelf", "-S", path], …)
      – analyzeHeadless with a canned Ghidra script that exports JSON.
      • Return everything in one JSON blob keyed by tool name.

    If you build that MCP server, I can call its tools in a controlled, reproducible way and give you actionable vulnerability reports instead of guesses based on decompiled pseudo-code alone.

Responses were produced in different, uncontrolled contexts (system prompts, settings, prior turns). This is not a benchmark.

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