would it be useful to pass high p-code output by ghydra to you in order for you to…
- User
would it be useful to pass high p-code output by ghydra to you in order for you to determine if my code has any vulnerabilities that I should mitigate?
Assistant
In short: no, not directly.
Ghidra’s “high p-code” (the de-compiler’s C-like pseudo-code) is still a lossy, best-effort reconstruction of the original program. It can be missing:- inline assembly, compiler-inserted guards, or hand-written crypto
- macros, templates, or other source-level constructs
- comments, pragmas, or annotations that disable/enable mitigations
- build-time flags (FORTIFY_SOURCE, stack-protector, CFG, etc.)
Because of that, any vulnerability assessment I give you from that pseudo-code would be incomplete and potentially misleading. A finding that looks exploitable in the de-compiled view might already be mitigated at the binary level, or vice-versa.
What is useful:
- Static analysis on the actual source (if you have it) with tools like CodeQL, Coverity, clang-tidy, or even manual review.
- Binary-centric analysis on the real executable: run
checksec,objdump -d,readelf -S, or use Ghidra’s own vulnerability scanners (Function ID, Symbolic Propagation, etc.). - Dynamic testing: fuzzing, symbolic execution, or runtime sanitizer builds (
-fsanitize=address,undefined).
If you only have the binary and no source, then Ghidra’s p-code can help guide the reverse-engineering effort, but you should still validate any suspected flaw against the disassembly or live execution before deciding whether a mitigation is needed.
So feel free to share snippets if you’re stuck on a particular function, but treat any conclusions as hypotheses to verify, not a definitive audit.
- User
what about building a security checker mcp server that would expose tools for you to use (ghydra's tools/APIs, of course, but also checksec, objdump -d , readelf, S, etc.)
Assistant
That would be a very useful MCP server, but only if it is built and used in the right way.
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What the server should expose
• A “binary-info” tool that runschecksec,readelf -S,objdump -d,file,strings, etc. and returns structured JSON.
• A “ghidra-headless” tool that takes a binary path and a list of analysis scripts (Ghidra’s built-in analyzers plus any custom ones you write) and returns:
– list of functions with their high-pcode / decompiled C
– call-graph and control-flow summaries
– identified crypto constants, dangerous API calls (strcpy,sprintf,system, etc.)
– stack-frame sizes and canary presence
• A “symbolic-trace” tool that uses Ghidra’s emulator or angr/unicorn to give a short concrete or symbolic trace for a chosen function.
• A “diff” tool that compares two binaries (patch diffing).
• A “mitigation-check” tool that cross-references thechecksecoutput with the Ghidra findings to flag mismatches (e.g., function usesgetsbut binary has no stack canary). -
How I would use it
• I would never treat the high-pcode alone as ground truth.
• Instead, I would call the server’s tools in sequence:binary-info→ get NX/PIE/RELRO/Canary status.ghidra-headless→ get pcode + decompiled C + dangerous-call list.- Cross-check: if pcode shows a
strcpywith attacker-controlled size andbinary-infoshows no stack canary, flag as high-risk. - If the pcode shows a bounds-checked loop but
objdumpreveals an inlinedrep movsbwithout canary, trust the disassembly and downgrade the risk.
• I would also ask for a short symbolic trace when the static picture is ambiguous.
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Caveats you must document
• High-pcode is still an approximation; the server should always return both the pcode snippet and the corresponding raw disassembly so I can sanity-check.
• Emulation/symbolic execution can be slow; cap trace length or time.
• Make it explicit when results come from heuristics vs. concrete facts. -
Minimal viable prototype
• A single Python FastAPI service that wraps:
–subprocess.run(["checksec", "--file", path], …)
–subprocess.run(["readelf", "-S", path], …)
–analyzeHeadlesswith a canned Ghidra script that exports JSON.
• Return everything in one JSON blob keyed by tool name.
If you build that MCP server, I can call its tools in a controlled, reproducible way and give you actionable vulnerability reports instead of guesses based on decompiled pseudo-code alone.
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Other models, same or similar prompt
Responses were produced in different, uncontrolled contexts (system prompts, settings, prior turns). This is not a benchmark.