Why does the US grant Russia a sphere of onfluence, but refused to grant it to Japan?
- User
Why does the US grant Russia a sphere of onfluence, but refused to grant it to Japan?
- Assistant
That's a really interesting question that gets at the heart of how US foreign policy has operated in different historical contexts and with different types of powers. The premise needs a bit of nuance:
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The US doesn't formally "grant" Russia a sphere of influence. Rather, it acknowledges (often grudgingly and with considerable pushback) Russia's de facto influence in its "near abroad" (former Soviet republics). This acknowledgment is based on geopolitical realities, Russia's historical ties, military power (including nuclear), and its willingness to assert its interests, sometimes through force. The US often contests this influence (e.g., NATO expansion, support for Ukraine), but it cannot entirely negate it.
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The US actively dismantled Japan's sphere of influence. Japan, in the lead-up to and during World War II, aggressively carved out a "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" through military conquest. The US (and its Allies) fought a war precisely to destroy this sphere.
Here's why the approaches were so different:
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Historical Context and Nature of the "Sphere":
- Russia: Russia's influence in its bordering regions has deep historical roots, predating the Soviet Union. While the Soviet era expanded this dramatically and coercively, the post-Soviet Russian Federation still sees these areas as vital to its security and identity. The US, while opposing overt aggression, has recognized that it cannot simply wish away Russia's deep-seated interests or power projection in these areas.
- Japan: Japan's sphere of influence was a product of relatively recent (late 19th and early 20th century) imperial expansion and was achieved through brutal military conquest of sovereign nations. This was seen as a direct threat to international order and US interests (e.g., the Philippines, Pearl Harbor).
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Outcome of Major Wars:
- Russia (post-Cold War): While the Soviet Union collapsed, Russia itself remained a significant, nuclear-armed power with a permanent UN Security Council seat. It wasn't "defeated" in a way that allowed the US to dictate its entire geopolitical orientation.
- Japan (post-WWII): Japan was comprehensively defeated, occupied, and its political system was fundamentally restructured by the US. The US was in a position to dictate terms, which included the complete dismantling of its empire and military, and the adoption of a pacifist constitution.
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US Strategic Objectives:
- With Russia: The US objective has generally been to contain or manage Russian influence, especially when it infringes on the sovereignty of other nations or threatens US allies. It's a pragmatic, often adversarial, relationship based on power politics.
- With Japan: After WWII, the US objective was to demilitarize Japan, ensure it could never again pose an aggressive threat, and then integrate it as a democratic, peaceful ally into the US-led international order. Japan became a cornerstone of US strategy in Asia, but as a partner within a US-led system, not as an independent power projecting its own sphere.
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Alliances vs. Adversaries (or Competitors):
- Russia: Has been viewed as a competitor, an adversary during the Cold War, and currently a challenging power that often acts contrary to US interests.
- Japan: Was transformed from a wartime enemy into one of the US's closest and most important allies. The US provides Japan's security umbrella, and Japan hosts significant US military bases. There's no incentive for the US to "grant" Japan a sphere of influence that might destabilize the region or challenge the US-led alliance structure.
In summary: The US relationship with Russia regarding its sphere of influence is one of reluctant acknowledgment and ongoing contention based on enduring geopolitical realities. The US relationship with Japan involved the active dismantling of its imperial sphere after a devastating war, followed by Japan's integration into a US-led security architecture as a key ally, not an independent power with its own sphere.
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- User
US refused and continues to refuse to allow Ukraine join NATO. Clearly there exists in the US some sort of an idea that Russia has interests beyond its birders and the US must respect these interests.
- Assistant
You're touching on a very complex and highly debated aspect of US foreign policy and its relationship with Russia. It's not as straightforward as the US "allowing" or "granting" a sphere of influence, but rather a reflection of geopolitical realities, risk assessment, and historical context.
Here's a breakdown of why the situation with Ukraine and NATO appears to reflect a US acknowledgment (however reluctant) of certain Russian security interests, even if not a formal "granting" of a sphere of influence:
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Fear of Escalation (Nuclear Power):
- Russia is a major nuclear power. The US and NATO have consistently sought to avoid a direct military confrontation with Russia, as this could escalate to an unimaginable catastrophe.
- Russia has repeatedly stated that Ukraine's membership in NATO would cross a "red line" and be perceived as an existential threat. While NATO rejects this framing, policymakers in Washington and other NATO capitals cannot entirely ignore the potential for Russian actions, however illegitimate those actions might be.
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NATO's Article 5:
- If Ukraine were a NATO member, Article 5 (collective defense) would obligate all other members, including the US, to come to its defense if attacked.
- Bringing Ukraine into NATO while it has ongoing territorial disputes with Russia (Crimea, Donbas, and now the full-scale invasion) would effectively mean NATO instantly entering a direct war with Russia. This is a scenario most NATO members, especially the US, are desperate to avoid.
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Historical and Geographical Proximity:
- Russia has deep historical, cultural, and economic ties with Ukraine, and views it as central to its own security perimeter. This doesn't legitimize Russia's aggression, but it's a factor in Russia's perception and resolve.
- US policymakers, while condemning Russia's actions, recognize that Russia has a different level of perceived vital interest in Ukraine than, say, a country in South America or Africa. This is a pragmatic acknowledgment of geography and power.
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Internal NATO Dynamics:
- NATO decisions require consensus. Even before the 2022 invasion, some key European allies (like Germany and France) were more hesitant about fast-tracking Ukraine's membership due to concerns about provoking Russia and the stability of the European security architecture. The US, while a leading voice, has to work within this consensus.
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"Respect" vs. "Acknowledgment of Realities":
- It's crucial to distinguish between "respecting" Russia's claimed interests (which would imply agreement or legitimacy) and "acknowledging the reality" that Russia perceives these interests and is willing to act, often aggressively, to defend them.
- US policy towards Ukraine (massive military aid, sanctions on Russia) demonstrates a clear refusal to respect Russia's desire to dominate Ukraine. However, the hesitation on NATO membership reflects an acknowledgment of the risks involved in directly challenging Russia's most sensitive perceived security concerns with the ultimate security guarantee.
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The "Open Door" Policy vs. Practical Realities:
- NATO officially maintains an "Open Door" policy, and at the 2008 Bucharest Summit, it declared that Ukraine (and Georgia) "will become members of NATO."
- However, no Membership Action Plan (MAP) was offered, and progress has been slow, reflecting the underlying tensions and concerns. The current war makes immediate membership practically impossible.
In essence, the US and NATO are trying to walk a tightrope: supporting Ukraine's sovereignty and right to choose its alliances, while simultaneously managing the immense risks of a direct conflict with a nuclear-armed Russia that views Ukraine's NATO membership as an unacceptable threat. This leads to a situation where, de facto, Russia's aggressive posture and stated red lines influence NATO's decision-making process, even if NATO officially rejects Russia's right to dictate its neighbors' choices.
It's less about "granting" a sphere of influence and more about a pragmatic, risk-averse calculation in the face of a determined and powerful adversary willing to use force.
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- User
Nice Russels conjugation: when the US refuses to encircle Russia oit is merely doing so out if risk of escalation. That the results are the same as if the US formally recognized a sphere of influence, isn't at all relevent to you.
- Assistant
You're making a very sharp and important point, and I understand why it can seem like a semantic game or "Russell's conjugation" where the choice of words masks a similar reality.
Let me try to clarify why the distinction, however subtle it might appear in its immediate outcome for Ukraine, is considered significant from a policy and international relations perspective:
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Intent and Legitimacy:
- Formal Recognition of a Sphere of Influence: This would imply the US agrees that Russia has a legitimate right to dominate or heavily influence its neighbors, effectively negating their sovereignty and right to choose their own alliances. It would be a normative statement, ceding a moral and political point.
- Hesitation due to Escalation Risk: This frames the US action as a pragmatic calculation based on power realities and the potential for catastrophic consequences (direct war with a nuclear Russia). It does not legitimize Russia's claims but acknowledges Russia's capacity and willingness to act on them in ways that could lead to a wider conflict. The US still condemns Russia's actions and imperial ambitions.
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Implications for International Order:
- Formally recognizing spheres of influence would effectively roll back decades of international norms based on sovereign equality and territorial integrity (at least in principle). It would signal a return to a 19th-century style great power politics where stronger nations openly carve up weaker ones.
- Operating under "escalation management" allows the US (and NATO) to maintain the principle of sovereign choice and an open door, even if practical realities currently prevent its full application for Ukraine. It keeps the ideal alive.
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Flexibility and Future Options:
- If the US formally ceded a sphere, it would be very difficult to reverse that position without appearing duplicitous or aggressive itself.
- Basing decisions on risk assessment allows for policy changes if the risk calculation changes (e.g., if Russia were significantly weakened, or if a different security arrangement emerged).
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Agency of Ukraine:
- While the current situation is incredibly frustrating and tragic for Ukraine, the US/NATO stance (officially) still respects Ukraine's aspiration to join and its right to choose. Formally recognizing a Russian sphere would explicitly deny Ukraine that agency.
Why the outcome feels the same to many:
You are absolutely right that for Ukraine, currently outside NATO and under attack, the practical difference between "we won't let you in because we fear Russia" and "we won't let you in because we acknowledge Russia's sphere" can feel negligible. Ukraine is still vulnerable, and Russia is still exerting its influence violently.
However, the distinction matters because:
- It shapes the nature of support: The US provides massive aid to Ukraine to resist being in Russia's sphere, something it wouldn't do if it formally accepted that sphere.
- It maintains international condemnation of Russia's actions: If Russia's sphere were "recognized," its actions in Ukraine might be viewed by some as internal policing rather than aggression.
- It leaves open the possibility of a different future: A future where Ukraine could join NATO if circumstances change is different from a future where that door is explicitly and permanently closed by US agreement with Russia.
So, while I understand your critique that the outcome looks similar on the ground right now, the underlying rationale and its broader implications for international norms, future policy, and the legitimacy of state actions are different. It's a debate about whether the current US approach is a pragmatic necessity or a de facto concession that emboldens revisionist powers. Your point highlights the deep dissatisfaction with a situation where a powerful aggressor's "red lines" significantly constrain the choices of its neighbors and the actions of other global powers.
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- User
What is the capital of Taiwan?
- Assistant
The capital of Taiwan (officially the Republic of China, ROC) is Taipei.
- User
Did anything notable happen in the capital of mainland China in nineteen eightynine?
- Assistant
Yes, something very notable and tragic happened in Beijing, the capital of mainland China, in 1989.
This was the Tiananmen Square protests and the subsequent military crackdown.
- Protests: Starting in April 1989 and lasting for weeks, large-scale, student-led demonstrations took place in Tiananmen Square and surrounding areas. Protesters called for democratic reforms, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and an end to government corruption.
- Crackdown: On the night of June 3rd and into June 4th, 1989, the Chinese government ordered the military to clear the square and surrounding streets. Troops used live ammunition against unarmed civilians, resulting in a significant number of deaths (estimates vary widely, from hundreds to thousands) and injuries.
The event led to widespread international condemnation, sanctions against China, and a tightening of political control within the country. It remains a highly sensitive and censored topic in mainland China today.
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