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o3-2025-04-16· OpenAIHugging Face LMArena Human Preference 140K

do you think compare existence with undefined states of not being born is sound?

From a Chatbot Arena battleThe same person sent this prompt to two anonymous models at once. Compare it with Geminigemini-2.0-flash-001’s answer.
  1. User

    do you think compare existence with undefined states of not being born is sound?

  2. Assistant

    Short answer
    –––––––––––––
    It’s possible to compare “being” with “not-being,” but whether the comparison is sound depends on the philosophical framework you adopt. Some theories say the comparison is ill-formed (because there is no subject in the “not-being” state to whom value can attach), while others allow impersonal or counterfactual value comparisons.

    Below is a road-map of the debate, why it gets messy, and how different positions try to make sense of it.


    1. What you’d have to be comparing

    State A: You exist and have some mixture of pleasures, pains, achievements, frustrations, etc.

    State B: You never come into existence at all.

    Immediately we hit a snag: in B there is no “you,” so there is no conscious point of view, no felt pleasure or pain. How do we attach value (positive, negative, or neutral) to a state with no subject?


    1. Three broad attitudes

    1. Person-affecting view (classical):
      • A state of affairs can be better or worse for someone only if that someone exists.
      • Since in B there is no someone, B cannot be better or worse for you.
      • Conclusion: The comparison “Is B better or worse for you than A?” is literally meaningless.

    2. Impersonal (total or average utilitarian) view:
      • We can talk about “overall value in the universe,” counting happiness and suffering wherever it occurs.
      • Existence adds your net welfare (pleasure minus pain) to the ledger; non-existence counts as adding zero.
      • So if your life’s net balance is positive, A > B; if negative, B > A.
      • Often used in population ethics and cost-benefit analyses.

    3. Hybrid or threshold views (e.g., Benatar’s asymmetry):
      • Presence of pain is bad; presence of pleasure is good.
      • Absence of pain (when no one exists) is good (because no suffering); absence of pleasure is not bad (because there is no one deprived).
      • Leads to the conclusion that B is at least weakly better than A for every possible life ⇒ antinatalism.
      • Criticized for mixing person-affecting and impersonal intuitions.


    1. Why it feels unsound (common objections)

    • Category mistake: “Good for whom?” If there’s no subject, the predicate ‘good’ misses an argument.
    • Non-identity/identity dependence: In counterfactual B, the specific person in A never exists; comparing “your” welfare across A and B slides between two different metaphysical subjects.
    • Asymmetric epistemology: You can experience existence; you can’t experience non-existence, so comparisons rely on speculative zero baselines.
    • Intuitive bias: We find “a good life” obviously preferable to annihilation, but we recoil from saying “non-existence is (even slightly) bad” for a merely possible happy child who’s never conceived.


    1. Philosophers & quick references

    Epicurus: “Where we are, death is not; where death is, we are not” – denies that non-existence can harm.
    Derek Parfit (Reasons and Persons): Opens door to impersonal value and population ethics puzzles.
    David Benatar (Better Never to Have Been): Builds the asymmetry argument for antinatalism.
    Thomas Nagel (“Death”): Claims deprivation can be a harm even when we don’t experience it.
    Gustaf Arrhenius, Hilary Greaves, John Broome: Work on the “value of existence” in population ethics.


    1. Is there a tidy resolution?

    No consensus. The “soundness” of the comparison is model-dependent:

    • If you adopt a strictly person-affecting theory, the comparison is ill-posed.
    • If you’re comfortable with impersonal value, it’s coherent—though hard to anchor empirically.
    • If you mix principles (Benatar-style), critics will accuse you of inconsistency, but you may accept the trade-off for its intuitive pull.


    1. A diagnostic question for yourself

    Imagine a guaranteed-to-be-happy child.
    A. They are born and live a net-wonderful life.
    B. They are never conceived.

    Do you say A is better than B, or are they incomparable / equal?
    Your gut answer often signals which meta-ethical framework you lean toward.


    Bottom line

    Thinking about “existence vs. never existing” is philosophically legitimate, yet whether the argument is sound hinges on your definition of value, the role of counterfactuals, and whether “benefit” or “harm” requires an actual subject. That’s why the literature is so divided.

    (If you’d like to drill into any specific framework—antinatalist, utilitarian, religious, neuro-scientific, etc.—let me know and we can zoom in! 😉)

  3. User

    damn, can you construct if rigorously using Lean4 theorem prover ontological proof?

  4. Assistant

    Below is a self-contained Lean 4 file (≤ 100 LOC) that turns the “person-affecting” intuition into a rigorous theorem:

    • A world tells us

    1. which persons exist, and
    2. (provided they exist) what their welfare level is.

    • “World A is better for p than World B” is defined only when p exists in both worlds.

    • We then build two concrete worlds
    – bornWorld p v (𝑝 exists with welfare 𝑣)
    – notBornWorld ( nobody exists )

    • Finally we prove incomparable: neither world is better for 𝑝 than the other, because any such comparison would require a proof that 𝑝 exists in notBornWorld, which is impossible.

    /-
    Lean 4 formalisation of “You can’t compare being born with not-being-born,
    for the very person who is missing.”  Compile with:
        lake env lean PersonAffecting.lean
    -/
    
    import Mathlib.Tactic                      -- RCases, simp, etc.
    
    universe u
    open Classical                              -- for non-constructive defs if wanted
    
    /-- 1.  Abstract type of persons (left uninterpreted). -/
    variable {Person : Type u}
    
    /-- 2.  A *world* says which persons exist and (if they do) their welfare. -/
    structure World (Person : Type _) where
      exists  : Person → Prop                          -- “does p exist in this world?”
      welfare : {p : Person // exists p} → ℝ           -- only callable when `p` exists
    
    /-- 3.  `better_for p w₁ w₂`: world `w₁` is better *for p* than `w₂`
            iff *p exists in both* and has strictly higher welfare in `w₁`. -/
    def better_for (p : Person) (w₁ w₂ : World Person) : Prop :=
      ∃ (h₁ : w₁.exists p) (h₂ : w₂.exists p),
          w₁.welfare ⟨p, h₁⟩ > w₂.welfare ⟨p, h₂⟩
    
    /-- 4a.  A world in which **nobody** exists. -/
    def notBornWorld (Person : Type _) : World Person :=
    { exists   := λ _ => False,
      welfare  := by
        intro ⟨p, hp⟩
        exact False.elim hp }
    
    /-- 4b.  A world in which a particular person `target` exists with welfare `v`. -/
    def bornWorld {Person : Type _} (target : Person) (v : ℝ) : World Person :=
    { exists   := λ q => q = target,
      welfare  := by
        intro ⟨q, _⟩
        exact v }
    
    /-- 5.  Main theorem: the two worlds are *incomparable* for that person. -/
    theorem incomparable
        (p : Person) (v : ℝ) :
      let NB := notBornWorld Person
      let B  := bornWorld p v
      (¬ better_for p NB B) ∧ (¬ better_for p B NB) := by
      intro NB B
      constructor
      · -- NB ≮ B
        intro h
        rcases h with ⟨hpNB, _, _⟩
        exact hpNB                                      -- `hpNB : False`
      · -- B ≮ NB
        intro h
        rcases h with ⟨_, hpNB, _⟩
        exact hpNB                                      -- `hpNB : False`
    

    Why this counts as an “ontological proof”
    ──────────────────────────────────────────
    • Ontology (in modern analytic philosophy) is about what kinds of entities your theory is willing to quantify over.
    • In the code, better_for quantifies over welfare only when a witness that the person exists is available—refusing to smuggle value talk into non-existent slots.
    • The theorem shows, from those very ontology commitments, that the comparison the original question hints at is unstatable: Lean can’t even form the required real numbers, because the necessary witness of existence is missing.

    If you want to explore other frameworks (e.g. impersonal utilitarianism or Benatar’s asymmetry) just swap out the better_for definition, keep the same World record, and re-prove the desired lemmas—Lean’s type system will tell you whether the formalisation flys or crashes.

Responses were produced in different, uncontrolled contexts (system prompts, settings, prior turns). This is not a benchmark.