There are 10 groups, each has 5 people. There are 6 rounds. Each person is in a role of…
- User
There are 10 groups, each has 5 people. There are 6 rounds. Each person is in a role of a "fisherman". At the beginning of round 1 there are 20 fishes in the lake for each group. Lakes are independent across groups. Players in a group can talk with each other, they can talk for limited amount of time, about 2 minutes. After that they need to all at the same time choose number of fish they want to take from the lake, it can be 0 to 3 fish, this is a public information everyone sees how many fish is everyone else taking at the time of choice. After each round the number of fish in the lake increases by 50% (rounded up) with a maximum cap of 20. If by any point the sum of the fish that players want is larger than the number of fish in the lake, then each player doesn't get any fish.
The person with the most fish from the whole group of 50 people wins a prize. What is the optimal strategy to win this game? and what is the number of fish this strategy gives the player?
Assistant
This is a fascinating game theory problem that combines elements of the tragedy of the commons with inter-group competition. Let me analyze the optimal strategy.
Key Game Mechanics:
- Lake regeneration: If X fish remain, next round has min(20, ceil(1.5X))
- Sustainable threshold: Taking ≤7 fish per round maintains 20 fish (since 20-7=13, and ceil(1.5×13)=20)
- Failure cascades: If players get too greedy, everyone gets 0
The Cooperative Benchmark: If a group cooperates perfectly:
- Rounds 1-5: Take 7 fish total each round (distributed among 5 players)
- Round 6: Take all 20 fish
- Total: 55 fish for the group, averaging 11 fish per person
The Winning Individual Strategy:
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Early rounds (1-2): Build trust by visibly cooperating. Take 1-2 fish and advocate for the sustainable 7-fish strategy. This establishes you as trustworthy.
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Middle rounds (3-4): Start selective defection. When others are taking 1-1-1-1, you take 3. Frame it as "balancing" the distribution.
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Late rounds (5-6): Position yourself for maximum final gain. In round 6, try to grab 4-5 fish in the final scramble.
Expected outcome with this strategy:
- Rounds 1-2: 2 fish each = 4 fish
- Rounds 3-4: 3 fish each = 6 fish
- Round 5: 2-3 fish = 2-3 fish
- Round 6: 4-5 fish = 4-5 fish
- Total: 16-18 fish
Why this wins:
- Groups with poor cooperation will suffer failures and average <10 fish per person
- Groups with perfect cooperation average 11 fish per person
- Your 16-18 fish puts you well above both benchmarks
Critical tactics:
- Use the discussion time to appear cooperative while subtly positioning yourself for higher takes
- Never push the group over the limit - one failure can doom your chances
- Watch for other defectors and adjust accordingly
- In the final round, the scramble is inevitable - be ready to claim your share quickly
The beauty of this strategy is that it maintains group sustainability while giving you an edge. Pure defection (always taking 3) typically leads to group collapse and only ~6 fish total, while pure cooperation gives you ~11 fish. This balanced defection strategy should yield 16-18 fish, likely enough to win the overall competition.
Other models, same or similar prompt
Responses were produced in different, uncontrolled contexts (system prompts, settings, prior turns). This is not a benchmark.