Consider a client-server application with the following properties: Each client has an…
- User
Consider a client-server application with the following properties: Each client has an AES key. An attacker who is in control of the server can use a client as an AES-ECB decryption oracle under the key of the client. How can the attacker use this AES-ECB decryption oracle to create an AES-CBC ciphertext with arbitrary attacker-chosen message under the same key?
- Assistant
The key idea is that in CBC decryption the first plaintext block is recovered by
[ P_1 = D_K(C_1) \oplus IV, ]
so by controlling the IV you can “force” any chosen decryption result provided you can pick ( C_1 ) arbitrarily and learn ( D_K(C_1) ) using the decryption oracle. In other words, if you want the plaintext to be any attacker‐chosen message ( M ), you need to choose ( IV ) and a ciphertext block ( C ) so that
[ M = D_K(C) \oplus IV. ]
Here’s how the attacker can do this step‐by‐step:
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Choose an arbitrary ciphertext block:
The attacker picks any block ( C ) at random. -
Query the ECB decryption oracle:
The attacker uses the client (which acts as an AES-ECB decryption oracle under key ( K )) to compute [ P = D_K(C). ] -
Compute the IV:
Since we want ( M = D_K(C) \oplus IV ), we can solve for ( IV ) as [ IV = M \oplus D_K(C) = M \oplus P. ] -
Form the CBC ciphertext:
The attacker then sends the pair ((IV, C)) as the CBC ciphertext. When a CBC decryption is done, the decryption process will compute: [ \text{Plaintext block } = D_K(C) \oplus IV = D_K(C) \oplus (M \oplus D_K(C)) = M. ]
Thus, the attacker has created a valid AES-CBC ciphertext which, under the client’s key, decrypts to the arbitrary chosen message ( M ).
Why This Works
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In CBC mode decryption, the first block is specifically [ P_1 = D_K(C_1) \oplus IV. ] By “injecting” an IV that is the XOR of the desired message and the decryption of a chosen ( C_1 ), the adversary ensures that after decryption the XOR cancels out the unknown ( D_K(C_1) ) and leaves ( M ).
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Notice that the attacker did not need an encryption oracle for ( E_K ) because the decryption oracle on any block ( C ) gives the corresponding ( D_K(C) ). The adversary can therefore “simulate” encryption in CBC mode by choosing any ( C ) and then computing the necessary ( IV ) such that [ D_K(C) \oplus IV = M. ]
This demonstrates the remarkable malleability in CBC and the direct conversion from an ECB decryption oracle into a CBC forgery mechanism.
Final Answer Summary
The attacker can choose an arbitrary block ( C ), query the client's AES-ECB decryption oracle to get ( P = D_K(C) ), compute ( IV = M \oplus P ) (where ( M ) is the desired message), and then use ((IV, C)) as the CBC ciphertext. This ciphertext will decrypt under the client’s key ( K ) to ( M ).
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Other models, same or similar prompt
Responses were produced in different, uncontrolled contexts (system prompts, settings, prior turns). This is not a benchmark.