Who would agree with this statement? »Guess what in physical reality there is nothing…
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Who would agree with this statement? »Guess what in physical reality there is nothing that can predict these things that appear random except the totality of this physical reality itself, it makes no pragmatic difference if these things are pseudorandom, but somehow predictable in the sense you're describing, or random«
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The statement in question reflects a nuanced perspective on randomness, determinism, and the limits of prediction in physical reality. Several thinkers and schools of thought might align with this view, depending on the emphasis placed on different aspects of the statement. Here's a breakdown of potential candidates:
1. Chaos Theorists (e.g., Edward Lorenz, Mitchell Feigenbaum)
- Key Alignment: Chaos theory emphasizes that deterministic systems (like weather) can exhibit behavior that appears random due to extreme sensitivity to initial conditions. Even if the system is fully deterministic, the practical impossibility of measuring all variables makes prediction infeasible. This aligns with the idea that "the totality of physical reality" is required for prediction, as small-scale uncertainties propagate unpredictably.
- Relevance: The "butterfly effect" and computational irreducibility (as discussed by Stephen Wolfram) mirror the statement's claim that practical prediction requires full knowledge of the system.
2. Computational Theorists (e.g., Stephen Wolfram)
- Key Alignment: Wolfram’s concept of computational irreducibility argues that some systems (e.g., cellular automata) cannot be predicted without simulating them step by step. This implies that even deterministic systems are effectively random in practice, as their behavior cannot be shortcutted.
- Relevance: The statement’s assertion that pseudorandomness and true randomness are indistinguishable pragmatically resonates with Wolfram’s view that complexity defies simplification.
3. Pragmatists (e.g., William James, John Dewey)
- Key Alignment: Pragmatism prioritizes practical consequences over metaphysical distinctions. The statement’s claim that "it makes no pragmatic difference" between pseudorandomness and true randomness aligns with pragmatist philosophy, which focuses on utility rather than abstract definitions of randomness.
- Relevance: A pragmatist might argue that the distinction between pseudorandom and truly random processes is irrelevant if both are equally unpredictable in practice.
4. Determinists with a Focus on Complexity (e.g., Laplacian Thinkers)
- Key Alignment: While classical determinists like Laplace envisioned a "demon" capable of predicting the universe given complete knowledge of its state, the statement acknowledges that such knowledge is practically unattainable. This reflects a realistic determinism that accepts the limits of human computation and observation.
- Relevance: The idea that "the totality of physical reality" is the only predictor mirrors the deterministic framework, tempered by the intractability of computation.
5. Philosophers of Science (e.g., Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn)
- Key Alignment: Popper’s emphasis on falsifiability and Kuhn’s focus on paradigm shifts highlight the limits of scientific prediction. While not directly addressing randomness, their work underscores the role of uncertainty and the practical challenges of modeling complex systems.
- Relevance: The statement’s focus on practical unpredictability aligns with their critiques of absolute certainty in science.
6. Quantum Mechanics Interpreters (e.g., Niels Bohr, Werner Heisenberg)
- Key Alignment: While the statement allows for both pseudorandomness and true randomness, quantum mechanics introduces inherent indeterminacy (e.g., the Copenhagen interpretation). However, the pragmatic equivalence of pseudorandom and quantum randomness might resonate with those who prioritize empirical outcomes over metaphysical debates.
- Relevance: The statement’s neutrality between deterministic and indeterministic models could appeal to those who focus on observable phenomena rather than underlying mechanisms.
Conclusion
The statement’s core ideas—practical unpredictability, the intractability of full-system prediction, and the irrelevance of pseudorandom vs. true randomness—are best aligned with:
- Chaos theorists (e.g., Edward Lorenz) and computational theorists (e.g., Stephen Wolfram), who emphasize the limits of prediction in complex systems.
- Pragmatists (e.g., William James) who prioritize practical consequences over metaphysical distinctions.
- Determinists who acknowledge the infeasibility of complete knowledge, even in a deterministic universe.
These thinkers would likely agree that, in practice, the distinction between pseudorandom and truly random processes is negligible, and that the entire physical reality is the only viable "predictor" due to the complexity of natural systems.
Other models, same or similar prompt
Responses were produced in different, uncontrolled contexts (system prompts, settings, prior turns). This is not a benchmark.