Does the Revenue Equivalence Theorem apply to all-pay auctions where losers pay their…
- User
Does the Revenue Equivalence Theorem apply to all-pay auctions where losers pay their bid even if they don't win?
Assistant
Yes, the Revenue Equivalence Theorem (RET) does apply to all-pay auctions. The theorem states that under certain conditions (independent private values, risk-neutral bidders, identical valuations drawn from same distribution, payment only depends on bid), any auction mechanism that:
- Allocates items to the same bidders
- Gives the same expected payment for bidders with lowest possible value will yield the same expected revenue.
All-pay auctions satisfy these conditions and can be shown to generate the same expected revenue as first-price and second-price auctions when RET conditions hold. The key difference is in how payments are structured (everyone pays their bid vs only winner pays), but the expected revenue remains equivalent.
Other models, same or similar prompt
Responses were produced in different, uncontrolled contexts (system prompts, settings, prior turns). This is not a benchmark.