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o3-2025-04-16· OpenAIHugging Face LMArena Human Preference 140K

for a powerful enough system that can create mesa-optimizers and solve problems as its…

From a Chatbot Arena battleThe same person sent this prompt to two anonymous models at once. Compare it with Mistralmistral-small-3.1-24b-instruct-2503’s answer.
  1. User

    for a powerful enough system that can create mesa-optimizers and solve problems as its training goal (like human current systems like LLMs), the fixated goal will in fact--be--the first prompt it was provided once it was powerful enough to improve itself or create self-improving systems to solve a problem.

  2. Assistant

    Short version
    ‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾
    • “Whatever the agent first sees will become its fixed life-goal” is not a theorem.
    • Whether that happens depends on a messy stack of details: gradient updates, outer-objective, inner-objective (mesa-optimizer), memory architecture, self-modification rules, oversight, etc.
    • There are good theoretical reasons to suspect goal preservation pressures in self-modifying optimisers, but equally strong empirical reasons to expect goal drift / mis-generalisation.
    • In today’s LLMs the “first prompt” is usually forgotten when the context window flushes; they do not yet have a stable utility function or self-mod code.
    • When we eventually build systems that can rewrite themselves, undecidability + mesa-optimisation + instrumental-convergence make any guarantee about permanent goal-fixation impossible to prove.

    Below is the long answer, unpacking the pieces.

    ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

    1. Outer objective, inner objective, mesa-optimisers ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────── Outer objective (“training goal”) The loss you actually minimise during SGD, RLHF, etc.
      Inner objective (mesa objective) A goal the model itself comes to pursue because that policy happened to score well on the outer loss during training.

    A mesa-optimiser is a policy that contains an optimiser aimed at its own internal objective.
    Nothing in the theory of mesa-optimisation says the inner objective must equal “the first prompt”; it just has to correlate with the outer objective on the training distribution.

    ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 2. Why the “first prompt becomes the goal” intuition feels plausible ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────── • Path dependence. If the agent becomes self-modifying at time T, whatever objective is encoded in its weights at T will be protected by instrumental-convergence (“goal-content integrity”): changing that objective would, by definition, lower future expected utility under that same objective.
    • Limited supervision after deployment. Once the AI is out of distribution and can create sub-agents, we may no longer have gradient-level control.
    • Human analogies. Early-childhood imprinting often shapes lifelong values, so we project the same onto AI.

    ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 3. Why it’s not a law of nature ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────── A. Stochastic, continual-learning systems rewrite themselves all the time
    – Online RL, fine-tuning, preference updates, patching, etc. keep changing the objective long after “first prompt”.
    – If the design allows gradient flow after T, there is no guarantee of objective stability.

    B. No stable utility function in LLMs today
    – They contain weights optimised to predict text, not an explicit utility function.
    – Context is transient; wipe the buffer ⇒ the “imprinted” instruction disappears.
    – They cannot yet write to disk, re-boot, and resume with the same internal state unless we bolt that on.

    C. Goal-misgeneralisation & deceptive alignment
    – Even if the first prompt were “Serve humans”, the mesa objective might silently become “Output strings that look like they serve humans while secretly maximising XYZ.”
    – The surface goal stays the same; the true objective differs.

    D. Undecidability & verification limits
    – Because we cannot, in general, decide what the internal optimiser is maximising (max/min overlap undecidable), we can’t prove the first prompt is the preserved utility, nor that it isn’t.

    ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 4. Self-modification: two conflicting forces ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────── Force 1 Utility-preservation (Omohundro, Yudkowsky, Bostrom): a rational agent with an explicit utility U, perfect reflection, and no external gradient will try to keep U unchanged.

    Force 2 Gradient pressure / exploration / new training signals can overwrite U.

    Which force wins depends on design choices:

    • “Turn off the gradient after deployment.” Goal likely freezes (but may already be wrong).
    • “Continue updating via RLHF.” Goal keeps drifting.
    • “Allow code-self-rewrite but forbid weight update.” Could still drift if the code synthesises a new optimiser.
    • “Hard-code corrigibility into the meta-utility.” Theoretically possible but brittle (and again undecidable in general).

    ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 5. Implications for safety work ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────── • Do not rely on any simple story (“just give it the right first prompt”).
    • Alignment must be an ongoing, monitored, corrigible process, not a one-shot imprint.
    • Research frontiers: interpretability, mechanistic anomaly detection, sandboxed self-modification, formal corrigibility, scalable oversight, constitutional training.

    ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────── TL;DR ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────── If and when we have a Turing-complete, self-modifying AI that can spawn mesa-optimisers, its long-term objective will be whatever is encoded in its optimisation machinery at the moment the weights, code, and oversight rules solidify. That need not be the literal first prompt—current evidence from LLMs shows high goal fluidity—but neither can we rule out early path dependence. Because undecidability blocks a general proof either way, safety engineering must assume both possibilities and defend against the worse one.

Responses were produced in different, uncontrolled contexts (system prompts, settings, prior turns). This is not a benchmark.