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Contents A Note on Citations and Translations Introduction 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. Remaking…

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    Contents A Note on Citations and Translations Introduction 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. Remaking the Great European Family The Birth of the Nation The Scramble for the World The War That Will End War A New Order for Europe Refashioning Europe The Once and Future Europe Notes Bibliography Index Introduction I This is the story of an ambition, of a dream, of, some would say, an illusion. It is the story of a project, of a long, tortuous bid to unite groups of varied, diverse, and heterogeneous peoples, to give them a collective identity without robbing them of their individual identities—to make it possible to speak meaningfully, as the English scientist, philosopher, and loyal servant of the British crown Francis Bacon did in the seventeenth century, of “We Europeans”—nos Europai.1 “Europe” is a metaphor and an allegory. It is also, of course, more obviously a place, a continent, a small and indeterminate one, what the French poet Paul Valéry in 1924 called a “Peninsula of Asia,” whose frontiers have changed constantly, expanding and contracting over the centuries, ever since the word first began to be used by the Greeks in about 500 BCE.2 They understood it to be little more than the Greek islands and mainland, and all the obscure unexplored landmass that lay behind it. No one could be certain how extensive it was or quite where it ended. But for all that its known frontiers dissolved, sometimes imperceptibly, into Asia to the east and into Africa to the south, for all that these frontiers were human, political, cultural, and sometimes religious, they were nevertheless very real. “A man seems to take leave of our world…before he cometh to Buda,” wrote the English traveler Edward Brown in 1669 on crossing the border into Hungary, then under Ottoman rule. “He seems to enter upon a new stage of the world, quite different from that of the Western countries.”3 But Europe, as the great French historian Lucien Febvre told an audience at the Collège de France in the final years of World War II—when any sense of what Europe had been, or might be again, except for a scene of seemingly endless carnage, had all but vanished—had throughout its history always been far more than a mere place. Its geography was meaningless. “For there are no Eastern limits to Europe,” he said, “no impassable river, no insurmountable mountain chains, no arm of the sea, no great lake, no deserts of burning sands or glacial stones.” There is only history. “Europe is an ideal, a dream,” he went on, “for which men have been killed by the millions. Europe is a cultural idea (but to speak of culture today is almost to speak of dreams). Europe is an expanse of territory, of ever-expanding territory.”4Febvre was reaffirming, at a particularly dark moment, a conviction which had been, in one way or another, a part of European history since antiquity. It was in the eighteenth century, however, during what has come to be called the Enlightenment, that the idea that Europe could be understood as something more than a simple indeterminate geographical expression or a collective noun came slowly into being. “Europe” was a shared space, a single culture, which stood midway between the narrow and possibly perilous attachment to one’s “nation” or one’s “patria” and the imprecise amorphous identity called “humanity.” This, for instance is how the great jurist and political theorist Charles-Louis de Secondat, baron de Montesquieu, in one of the jottings he called his “thoughts”—which I shall have cause to quote again—understood it. “If I knew something useful to me and harmful to my family”, he wrote: I would reject it from my mind. If I knew something useful to my family and not to my country, I would try to forget it. If I knew of something useful to my country and harmful to Europe, or useful to Europe and harmful to Mankind, I would look upon it as a crime. 5 A patriot, wrote the English historian Edward Gibbon in 1776, in a similar vein, has the obligation to “promote the exclusive interest and glory of his native country; but a philosopher may be permitted to enlarge his views, and to consider Europe as one great republic whose various inhabitants have attained almost the same level of politeness and cultivation.” Gibbon was writing in the still turbulent wake of the Seven Years War of 1756–63, once called by Winston Churchill the real “First World War,” which, at one time or another had involved all of the great powers of Europe and their overseas empires. Yet even what Gibbon calls, almost dismissively, “these partial events” did not “essentially injure our general state of happiness, the system of arts, and laws, and manners, which so advantageously distinguish above the rest of mankind, the Europeans and their colonies.”6 By the late eighteenth century this sense that, despite almost perennial conflict, there existed a common European territory, some kind of common European identity, and common European interests, and that ultimately the individual states of Europe could not survive without each other, had become something of a commonplace. “Things are such in Europe” wrote Montesquieu, always the most acute political observer of his day, “that the states depend upon each other. Europe is one state made up of many provinces.”7 The great eighteenth-century French poet, playwright, historian, and philosopher François-Marie Arouet, better known by his sobriquet Voltaire, imagined Europe to be as a “kind of great republic, embracing several states…all having one and the same religious basis, the same principles of public law, the same political ideas, all of them unknown in other parts of the world.” What the Anglo-Irish jurist and political theorist Edmund Burke called, significantly, “the great vicinage of Europe” was, he claimed, despite his attachment to his own “little platoon,” “virtually one great state, having the same basis of general law, with some diversity of provincial customs and local establishments.…The whole of the polity and economy of every country of Europe has been derived from the same sources” to the point that “no European can be a complete exile in any part of Europe.”8 Even the German philosopher and historian Johann Gottfried Herder, who had a very strong sense of the individualities of all the different cultures and “Fatherlands” of which Europe was now composed, believed that: In no one quarter of the Globe have nations been so intermingled as in Europe; in no one have they so often and so completely changed their abodes, and with them their way of life and manners.…In the course of ages the ancient family stamp of many European nations has been softened down and altered by a hundred causes, and without this the general spirit of Europe could not easily have been excited. 9 There are many things which have, over the centuries, been identified as specific, if not unique to Europe. Two, however have been more enduring than all others, and have made the very idea of the unity of all its many different peoples ultimately possible. The first is something of a commonplace, if a highly fraught and contested one. As the eminent Italian jurist Aldo Schiavone has argued, of all the things which modern Europe has inherited from classical antiquity, two have been of lasting political significance: the idea of representative government—“the Greek paradigm of politics as popular sovereignty”—and the Roman conception of rule under a common law “defined by reason.” It is, however, modern Europe which, through a long series of convulsions, revolutions, and reforms has succeeded, if only ever imperfectly, in uniting the two.10 The actual forms of government adopted by the different peoples of the continent have, of course, varied widely. But all have subscribed to the idea a of “civil society,” by which is meant a life lived under the protection of a universal system of law to which all its peoples might be supposed to have given their consent. It is a belief which, although—and in part because—it was so brutally suppressed in so many places throughout so much of the twentieth century, constitutes the main intellectual and ideological support on which the European Union now rests. The other is perhaps less obvious. Europe, said the Greek geographer Strabo in the first century CE, was unique in being able to provide for itself all “the fruits that are best and that are necessary for life and all the useful metals,” and needed to import only luxury goods, “spices and precious stones” which, he said dismissively, “make the life of persons who have a scarcity of them fully as happy as those who have them in abundance.”11 But only Europe as a continent, crisscrossed by trade routes from east to west, could do this, and never one alone of the many disparate peoples of the Mediterranean. Because, that is, life was so difficult for each of them individually that they could only survive by developing the great commercial networks which were to become the basis of their future expansion far beyond the limits of Europe. They were also, because of the intense competition which persisted amongst them, all forced from time to time into political unions, and were from time to time compelled to develop systems of alliance, federations, and leagues. In historical reality the Europeans were, of course, by no means the only peoples to recognize the value of cooperation. But few peoples have needed to cooperate with one another quite so often over quite such a long period of time. Leagues, or rather the ability to form leagues, came to be thought of as one of the features of the European peoples, and one of the sources of their success. The Persians, those great “others” of classical antiquity, conquered their neighbors. The Greeks may have done the same to theirs; but they also knew how to form alliances with them. The most famous of these leagues were the amphictyonies—the “leagues of neighbors”—of the ancient Greek city states, originally intended as alliances to provide protection for the sacred shrines around the Mediterranean. The best-known, the Delian or Great Amphictyonic League, was believed to have been founded after the Trojan War to protect the Temple of Apollo on the island of Delos, but it was still in existence in the second century CE. These became a point of reference for many later generations of Europeanists eager to see in these remote classical origins the possibilities for the creation of a new and more enduring pan-European league. Leagues, like federations and confederations, offered simultaneously both individual freedom and collective security. “The cities of Ancient Greece,” wrote Gibbon of the origins of his “one great republic,” were cast in the happy mixture of union and interdependence which is repeated on a larger scale, but in a looser form, by the nations of modern Europe—the union of religion, language, and manners which renders them spectators and judges of each other’s merits; the independence of government and interests which asserts their separate freedoms and excites them to strive for pre-eminence in the career of glory. 12 It was on this belief in the creative force of “union and interdependence” perhaps more than any other conviction that the possibility of a future European union rested. “Let us, however, immediately insist,” Lucien Febvre concluded his Collège de France lecture, “that European unity is not uniformity.”13 “Unity in diversity,” as the motto of the European Union has it. II Most of the authors of these generalized claims were aware that although they all made much of the diversity of the modern European states, the unity of Europe, this “general spirit” as Herder phrased it, had already been “undesignedly prepared” by the one thing which he, at least, most despised: the Roman Empire.14 Like Herder, Gibbon too was convinced that in his day it had been precisely the “division of Europe into a number of independent states connected, however, to each other by the general resemblance of religion, language and manners” that had been responsible for the “most beneficial consequences to the liberty of mankind.”15 But, unlike Herder, he was also convinced that the Roman Empire in the age of the Antonines, of the “Five Good Emperors” as they have come to be known—from Nerva (reigned 96–8 CE) until Marcus Aurelius (161–80 CE) —had been the “period in the history of the world during which the condition of the human race was the most happy and prosperous,” and which, of course, extended well beyond the frontiers of modern Europe to include “the fairest part of the earth and the most civilized portion of mankind.”16 That, however, had all begun to disintegrate after the succession of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius’ son Commodus in 177, at which point the empire “fell into the hands of a single person [and] the world became a safe and dreary place for his enemies” until, slowly but ineluctably, in Herder’s words, “the machine fell apart and covered all nations of the Roman world in wreckage.”17 In 476, after more than two centuries of this agony, the German chieftain Odoacer deposed the last of the emperors, Romulus— referred to contemptuously as “Augustulus,” “Little Augustus”—and the Roman Empire in the West collapsed into a squabbling succession of fiefdoms, principalities, duchies, city states, and bishoprics.18 What remained, what still remains in many places to this day, is an image of ancient Rome as that moment when everyone in what we now call “Europe” lived a relatively safe, relatively stable, and prosperous life under the auspices of the Roman law. “It was their custom,” wrote Francis Bacon of the Romans, in 1605: to give a speedy denization, and in the highest degree; that is, not only a right of commerce, of marriage and inheritance, but also the right of suffrage, and of candidature for places and honors. And this not only to particular persons; but they conferred it upon entire families, cities, and sometimes whole nations at once. Add to this their custom of settling colonies, whereby Roman roots were transplanted in foreign soil. And to consider these two practices together, it might be said, that the Romans did not spread themselves over the globe, but that the globe spread itself over the Romans. It was, he concluded, “the securest method of extending an empire.”19 It was also, of course, at many levels a carefully nurtured illusion fostered and propagated by the Roman state itself, and has subsequently been made to serve a number of narrowly sectarian and nationalistic ambitions. But for all that, it was, as we shall see, to become a valuable imaginative resource for the future builders of European unity. For, in this vision of Rome, which Cicero, the last great orator and jurist of the Roman Republic, had tellingly described as being more like “a protectorate [patrocinium] than an empire of the world,”20 it was possible to create the image of a league made up of free states bound together by a single body of law and a common citizenship in which a large number of diverse cultures and systems of belief could flourish unhindered, so long as they offered no threat to the common good. All of those from Bacon to the Russian-born French philosopher Alexandre Kojève (of whom more later), who between 1945 and his death in 1968 worked in the French Ministry of Economic Affairs and exercised a considerable if hidden influence over the French involvement in the creation of the European Economic Community, knew full well that the realities of Roman imperial government and of life under the empire, even before the demise of the Republic in 27 BCE, had never been quite so benign or ecumenical. They knew that the empire had been acquired for the most part through conquest. They knew too that even if those conquests had often been carried out “in the interests of allies,” many of those allies had been chosen in order to enable expansion by defending them, so that, as Cicero himself recognized, “our nation has gained control of the entire world through defending its allies.”21 They also knew, of course, that the much-vaunted Roman grandeur had been built upon slave labor, and that because of this, as the great eighteenth-century philosopher David Hume remarked, “to one who considers coolly on the subject it will appear that human nature, in general, really enjoys more liberty at present in the most arbitrary government of EUROPE than it ever did during the most flourishing period in ancient times.”22 They knew that women had very little standing or social independence from their fathers or their husbands under Roman law and that fathers could exercise the power of life and death over their children. They were fully aware of all this, as they were of the gruesome brutality of the games, and of the cruelty and depravity of so many of the Roman imperial households. But the historical reality was not to the point. What mattered was the ambition, the objective, the perception of what a true confederation of peoples, of what Kojève would call a “true empire,” could be. At the end of the eighth century, Charles I, king of the Franks, known as Charlemagne, “Charles the Great,” set out to recreate at least a part of what he knew of all this. In 800, having conquered much of southern and central Europe, he had himself crowned by Pope Leo III as “Emperor of the Romans.” The Carolingian Empire covered most of central Europe, parts of northern Spain, as far east as what is now Poland, and a large part of northern Italy. It was, of course, far smaller than the Roman Empire had been at its height, and it lasted less than a century. But it was the founding state of what would become the Holy Roman Empire—or after 1512, the “Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation”—which would survive until brought to an ignominious end by Napoleon in 1806, and which was to have immense political significance, if not real political power, for later generations. It was also responsible for providing the initial political cohesion which would make all of Europe throughout the Middle Ages synonymous with what Pope Leo the Great in the fifth century designated the orbis Christianus, or, as it would be called in the European vernaculars, simply “Christendom.” Unlike its predecessor, however, which had, since the reign of the Emperor Antonius Pius, claimed (at least) to be a world empire, the Carolingian Empire was explicitly European, and Charlemagne himself was referred to, from the early nineteenth century, as Pater Europae, the “Father of Europe.” Over the centuries he came to represent the possibility of reuniting the French and German peoples—who have always been at the core of the geographical vision of Europe—and thereby of finally creating a single united Europe. The European Union has also taken up this legacy. One of the buildings of the European Commission in Brussels is called “the Charlemagne Building,” and ever since 1950 Charlemagne’s capital, the city of Aachen—or Aix-la-Chapelle—has annually awarded a prize to those peoples—or things, as in 2002 it was awarded to the euro—who have contributed most to the “voluntary union of the European peoples without constraint.” The first laureate was the eccentric European federalist, the Austrian–Japanese Count Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi. In his acceptance speech in 1950 he called for a “Union Charlemagne,” that is, “the renewal of the Empire of Charlemagne as a confederacy of free nations…to transform Europe from a battlefield of recurring world wars to a peaceful and blooming worldly empire of free people!” Coudenhove Kalergi’s characterization of the legacy of Charlemagne, and the EU’s embrace of it, is, however, deeply problematical. For the Carolingian Empire was clearly not, as most subsequent projects for European integration down to and including the EU have been, at least in the first instance, an attempt to bring an end to the incessant warfare between the various states of Europe and to restore to the continent a universal realm of justice. It was, instead, a bid by a powerful tribal ruler to appropriate for himself the status and the glory of the former Roman Empire in the West. If the objective of integration is to bring the peoples of Europe together “without restraint,” then, clearly, it has to be achieved by some means other than conquest. III Coudenhove-Kalergi was, however, right about one thing. Every attempt at creating a unified Europe has been, initially at least, a response to a crisis which in one way or another has touched all the European peoples, and, until very recently, most of those crises have been caused by war.23 The most extensive and certainly the most devastating of all the wars that the European peoples have fought amongst themselves before World War I were the prolonged, often civil wars which followed the religious Reformation of the sixteenth century. In most of these, for the first time in their history, the combatants were not struggling over dynastic claims or for land or to defend the supposed rights of their rulers. They were fighting over beliefs.24 The wars, which had begun in the Holy Roman Empire in 1546, spread steadily across the whole of Europe, bringing ever-increasing internecine conflict in their wake. They included the French Wars of Religion from 1562 until 1598, the English Civil War of 1642–9, and what the Spanish called the “Dutch Revolt” and the Dutch “the Eighty Years War” between 1566 and 1648. The final stage of this conflagration, which began in 1618 and lasted uninterrupted until 1648, came to be known as the “Thirty Years War.” It raged across the whole of central and eastern Europe, drawing into its maw at one time or another all the major states of the continent, from Spain to Sweden. The huge armies that it created left behind them vast tracts of the continent in smoldering ruins. When it was finally over, a third of the population of central Europe was dead. As Voltaire remarked in astonishment on rereading his own description of all this butchery: “Is it the history of snakes and tigers which I have just written? No, it is that of men. Tigers and snakes do not treat their own kind in that manner.”25 The series of agreements which brought all this, and with it all confessional conflict within Europe, finally to an end were signed between some two hundred Catholic and Protestant powers in the Westphalian cities of Osnabrück and Münster between May and October 1648, and were known collectively as the “Peace of Westphalia.” This was, in effect, the first modern treaty. It was the first treaty between sovereign nations which aimed at creating a lasting peace and not merely, as all previous treaties had, a temporary ceasefire. It was also the first truly international gathering of European states, and the first formally to recognize the existence of two new states, the United Netherlands, which had in effect established its independence from Spain forty years earlier, and the Swiss Confederation, which now became a sovereign republic, independent of the Habsburg Empire. From 1648, the disordered, divided monarchies of Europe slowly began to transform themselves into the modern nation states which most of them still are to this day. The Peace of Westphalia had been one lastingly consequential solution to the crisis. The other, which was scattered, imprecise, and initially inconsequential, took the form of a series of projects for a perpetual peace in Europe through the creation of a political union among the various European states. Although there are earlier proposals for a unified Europe going all the way back to Dante Alighieri’s De Monarchia of 1313 (which in effect only envisages a stronger, more centralized version of the Holy Roman Empire extended to the whole of Europe), the earliest of these to have any lasting significance was Le Grand Dessein (The Grand Design) composed by the Duc de Sully, finance minister to King Henri IV of France, between about 1617 and 1630, which was still being cited approvingly by the highly influential Swiss jurist Johann Caspar Bluntschli as late as 1878.26 It exists, however, only in fragments in Sully’s Mémoires printed in 1638, and until the nineteenth century was widely assumed to have in fact been written, as Sully indeed claims it was, by the king himself —which, perhaps more than its content, explains the frequent admiring allusions to the work. The Design proposed that the Habsburg monarchy— which at the time encompassed both Spain and Portugal and their respective overseas empires, and which Sully, unsurprisingly, looked upon as the prime cause of conflicts within Europe—be reduced to “the sole Kingdom of Spain,” and that Europe should thereafter be divided into fifteen states, as nearly equal as possible in both territorial extent and military power. These would preserve the political forms—both monarchical and republican —and the religions—Catholic and Protestant—of their originals, and would be governed by a General Council composed of four delegates from the greater powers and two from the lesser which would exercise ultimate legislative authority over all the member states. There would be freedom of trade; and the customs barriers between the states, if not their borders, would be abolished. Presiding over it all, however, would, unsurprisingly perhaps, have been Henri IV himself, who, having brought the Wars of Religion in France to an end in 1598, would now go on to lead the rest of Europe toward a future of perpetual peace and renewed prosperity.27 What Sully and Henri had seen was that if France were to emerge from the civil and religious conflict that had divided the kingdom since 1562, and if a now religiously divided Christendom were to be able to resist the rising power of the Ottoman Empire, then Europe would have to rebuild, if not as another Roman Empire, then as something far closer to a federation of states. In 1623, an obscure French monk named Éméric Crucé, with no connection to Sully, published a similar, if yet more ambitious project, Le Nouveau Cynée (New Cyneas), offering “the best occasions and methods for establishing a general peace and freedom of commerce for the whole world.” This laid out elaborate plans for a world federation—although Crucé was, in fact, concerned predominantly with Europe and its perpetual conflict with the Ottoman Empire—governed by a permanent conference of delegates based in Venice, a convenient gateway, geographically and culturally, between Europe and the Ottomans. These would have represented not only all the nations of Europe, but also the Ottoman Empire itself, Persia, China, “Ethiopia,” Africa, and Russia. They would have arbitrated between these regions and might also have been allowed to use force against any dissident member (although where this force was to come from Crucé does not say). The Pope would have been the president and the Sultan his deputy. There was to be a common currency, standardized weights and measures, and free trade. It was an early outline, as some have seen it, of the League of Nations, the United Nations, and the European Union, all somehow rolled into one.28 As the European states continued to battle mercilessly with one another, even after the Treaty of Westphalia had seemingly put an end to any future possibility of confessional conflict, a steady flow of proposals for the final abolition of war, some pragmatic, most impossibly improbable, followed in the trail of the Grand Design and the New Cyneas. They included William Penn’s An Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe of 1693; Some Reasons for a European State of 1710, by Penn’s friend and fellow Quaker John Bellers; the Declaration for a Lasting Peace in Europe by the “Old Pretender” (known to his followers as King James III of England and VIII of Scotland) of 1722; the Scheme of A “Perpetual Diet” for Establishing the Public Tranquillity of 1736 (which was more of a proposal for conquering the Ottoman Empire) by Giulio Alberoni, skilled social climber and cardinal in the service of Philip V of Spain; a parody by Voltaire in 1770, which is in reality a plea for universal religious toleration; the Project for Perpetual Peace between the Sovereigns of Europe and their Neighbours by a former galley slave, Pierre-André Gargaz, which so impressed Benjamin Franklin that in 1782 he printed it on the press he had set up on his estate at Passy outside Paris; and Jeremy Bentham’s A Plan for a Universal and Perpetual Peace of 1789, which, among other things, called for the dissolution of the European overseas empires, which he denounced as “violations of common sense” and “bungling imitations of miserable [Greco-Roman] originals.”29 Many of these, however, owed rather more than their titles to a bulky, ponderous work by Charles-Irénée Castel, abbé de Saint-Pierre, A Project for Establishing a Perpetual Everlasting Peace in Europe, written in 1713, a text whose influence, attenuated but perceptible, has carried down through the centuries, via the pioneer socialist Claude-Henri de Saint-Simon in the nineteenth century to the founders of the European Union—a term which Saint-Pierre seems to have been the first to use. Saint-Pierre—the “pacific philosopher, a friend of the human race,” as he called himself—was, in many respects, a remarkable and remarkably prescient man, and his project, although it is unwieldy, prolix, and presents itself merely as commentary on the Grand Design, not only was far more radical than any of its predecessors, and some of it successors, but also in some respects comes far closer to describing the kind of quasi-federation which Europe has subsequently become. A diplomat who had been a negotiator of the Treaty of Utrecht in 1712–13 which had ended the War of the Spanish Succession, and who had been expelled from the Académie française in 1718 for denouncing the rule of its patron, Louis XIV, Saint-Pierre devised plans for a graded tax system—virtually unthinkable in the early eighteenth century —and for free education for all, both men and women. His Project envisaged a future European federation drawn together through the beneficial effects of trade, bound by a “treaty of European Union” but ruled not as individual states are, by a single sovereign, but by a council or diet on which the princes of every member state would sit, and by which all the disputes that arose across the continent would be resolved, without, or so he believed, seriously damaging the authority of the monarchs of the individual states. This, Saint-Pierre was convinced, would eliminate warfare, except as a means of last resort, and thus bring the greatest happiness to the greatest number, and finally demonstrate to princes that their true interests lay not in conflict but in what he called bienfaisance, or “beneficence,” which was an expression of that “sympathy” which all human beings were supposed, as individuals, to share with one another.30 Saint-Pierre hoped that one day it would be possible to extend this federation to Asia, Africa, and America, but he reflected that any such proposal at this date would make his plan seem absurdly unrealistic. Even without attempting to embrace the entire world, the Project was duly mocked by most of those who read it. Voltaire dismissed it as “a chimera which could no more exist among princes than it could among elephants and rhinoceroses, or wolves and dogs.”31 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, ironical as ever, remarked that it reminded him of a “device in a cemetery with the words: Pax perpetua [Perpetual peace]; for the dead do not fight any longer: but the living are of another humour; and the most powerful do not respect tribunals at all.” 32 (Leibniz, himself, however, had his own project for Europe as a kind of revitalized Holy Roman—and hence German—Empire.) In 1756 Jean-Jacques Rousseau wrote a brief “Judgment” on the Project (the only thing of substance that emerged from what was intended to be an edition of Saint-Pierre’s entire oeuvre), and although he acknowledged that many would toss it aside, as they would any such utopian project, as mere “vain speculation,” it was, he believed, nevertheless a demonstration of the “general and particular utility” of “moral truth.”33 He disagreed, however, with the idea that a federation could achieve peace (historically, as he pointed out, most had been created for the purposes of war). Nor did he believe that commerce encouraged harmony and cooperation, but that in reality it only increased the sources for competition between states and thus the grounds for war. In the end he came to the conclusion that the kind of federation of states Saint-Pierre had conjured up out of his overly optimistic imagination would require a situation in which “the sum of particular interests did not overpower the common interest and…each one sees in the good of all, the greatest good which he could hope for himself.” The only possible way to bring that about would, in his view, be a revolution. And if that were the case, then “who among us would dare to say whether the European League were more to be feared than desired?”34 The person who substantially transformed the idea that the only way to bring about perpetual peace was by means of a league of nations was Immanuel Kant. In the wake of the Treaty of Basle on April 5, 1795— which had ended the War of the First Coalition between the monarchical states of Europe and Revolutionary France, and which had ceded to France all territory West of the Rhine, and allowed Russia, Austria, and Prussia to carve up Poland between them—Kant laid out his own project for ending warfare. He called it Toward Perpetual Peace, a Philosophical Sketch. In 1795 Kant was 71 years old and widely admired throughout Europe as perhaps the most important, the most ambitious European philosopher since Aristotle. Toward Perpetual Peace is, its title makes clear, a contribution to an as yet unfinished project. It is a proposal, a mere “philosophical sketch” which will lead “toward” a condition that can only be realized in future times. Perhaps for that reason it is written, unpromisingly, in the form of a series of articles—and Kant’s lengthy reflections on the meaning of each one—for a hypothetical universal peace treaty. It is, however, a treaty unlike any which had hitherto existed and, in Kant’s mind, was the only one which could ensure the future, and inescapably cosmopolitan development of the human race. Its conclusions were to have a powerful and widespread, if also diffuse, influence well beyond the confines of professional philosophy. It has left its mark on many later generations, and its presence can still be seen not only in contemporary discussions about global governance and global justice, but also in the creation of the universal institutions intended to sustain them, in the League of Nations, in the United Nations, and, perhaps most clearly of all, in the European Union. As Saint-Pierre, whom Kant cited frequently, had acidly observed, the sovereign powers of Europe as they were currently constituted were no different from “the little kings of Africa, the unhappy Caciques, or the little sovereigns of America.” There existed among them nothing which could be described as a “sufficiently powerful and permanent society.” The closest they had come was the Swiss Federation or the states of the Netherlands. As a consequence, all the other powers were ceaselessly driven to war to resolve their differences.35 Kant agreed. Every treaty organization by which the states of Europe had sought to bind themselves—including the one concluded at Basle—had been nothing other than a “mere truce, a suspension of hostilities, not a peace,” since none of them had ever aimed at a “stable, permanent condition.”36 Saint-Pierre’s project may have been illusory and without any practical value, since all such proposals have always been “ridiculed by great statesmen, and even more by heads of state, as pedantic, childish, and academic ideas,” but that, in Kant’s view, was probably only because Saint-Pierre had believed that “its execution was too near.”37 His basic claim, however, that perpetual peace, within Europe or beyond, could only be brought about by some kind of federation was inescapable. The only way, Kant insisted, to bring an end to the current condition of unstructured barbarism between the states of the world was for all of them to form “a general league of nations, establish a public legislation, define a public authority to appropriate national prerogatives, and thereby make possible a universal peace.”38 Kant’s own project was far more ambitious than those of any of his predecessors; and it was an attempt not so much to resolve a problem, however pressing, within Europe as it was to transform the entire international order. The question for Kant, the question which Saint-Pierre and most previous propagandists for perpetual peace had singularly failed to answer, was how the kinds of international communities that had been envisaged were to be brought into being in such a way that they would not collapse under the slightest pressure. As Rousseau had observed, when it came to means Saint-Pierre “reasoned like a child.” He imagined “naively that it would be enough to assemble a Congress, suggest some articles, have them signed, and then all would be done.”39 But as both Rousseau and, with even greater urgency, Kant fully realized, to create Saint-Pierre’s “European Union,” it would first be necessary to transform utterly the kind of relationship which existed between states. Individual societies were bound together by a pact between rulers and their citizens or subjects. The same, however, clearly did not apply between states, where the only contracts that had ever existed had taken the form of treaties—what Kant called a “peace pact (pactum pacis)”—and these had only ever put an end to a “current war…but not a condition of war, of always finding pretexts for a new war.”40 If these unsatisfactory arrangements were to be replaced by anything more binding, then nations would have first to change their own political identities. In this Saint-Pierre and Rousseau had been looking in the right place, but even Rousseau had failed to grasp the full implication of his own claim that nothing resembling Saint-Pierre’s project could come into existence unless each state created a form of government in which “the sum of particular interests did not overpower the common interest.” Kant’s project was markedly different from those of all his predecessors. They had worked with the assumption that a lasting peace might be achieved between the states of Europe—and in some cases the entire world —while both the structure of government within each nation and the legal order to which each belonged remained unchanged. Kant took a radically different view. Peace—perpetual peace—could only be achieved through the creation of an entirely new international legal order, one which would be capable only of bringing peace between nations but also of creating an order of justice amongst them. For peace without justice could only ever be ephemeral. Unlike all his predecessors, Kant had seen that only states which shared the same political form would be able to enter into a lasting peaceful union with one another. The kind of union which Sully had imagined, in which monarchies and republics were supposed to cooperate happily together, was in practice unthinkable. (The same is still broadly true, one might argue, of the United Nations.) Furthermore, the only political form under which such a union was possible was what he famously called a “representative republic.” This he defined as a society in which no individual should be constrained by any external—that is, purely human—law except for “those to which I could have given my consent.”41 In Kant’s view, only in a republic in which the legislator was obliged to pass laws “in such a way that they would have been able to arise from the united will of an entire people” and which was thus a “system representing the people in order to protect its rights in its name” would the individual, “even if he is not good in himself…nevertheless be compelled to be a good citizen.”42 Such a republic was also the only one which “offers a prospect of attaining the desired result, i.e. Perpetual Peace,” since only when they were the ultimate arbitrators of the law would the citizens be in a position to “give their free assent, through their representatives, not only to the waging of war in general, but also to each particular declaration of war.”43 Only in a truly representative republic do the base interests of the individual coincide with the interests of the state as a whole.44 For the citizens of a state, going to war inevitably means not only “taking upon themselves all the hardships of war”; it also means being compelled, once the war is over, to assume the “burden of debt that embitters peace itself, and that can never be paid off because of new wars always impending,” thereby making their “cup of troubles overflow.”45 In a situation in which it is they who decide whether to take up arms or not, they are only likely to do so if they are certain there can be no solution other than war. Although Kant himself forcefully denied that his “representative republic” was a “democracy”—since what he understood by “democracy” was the regime of ancient Athens, and possibly of Revolutionary France during the Terror—it does meet the requirements of what today would be called a “liberal democracy.”46 The representative republic was not, however, only the means of ensuring that justice be extended to all its citizens. It was also the only form of government which was capable of creating what Kant called the “lawful condition” in which a union of states might be created. This he called variously a “world-republic,” a “league of peoples,” a “state of nations,” an “international state,” a “universal union of peoples,” a federation, a confederation, a partnership, and a permanent state congress.47 The model to which Kant returned most often—a model to which, as we shall see, many others would also later return—was that of the Amphictyonic Leagues of ancient Greece. But no matter what form this might take, it would be a peaceful, consensual body, and all those who joined it would do so because they perceived it to be in their particular interests, and they would do so of their own volition, and once joined, “every state, even the smallest could expect its security and rights not from its own might, or its own juridical judgment, but only from this great federation of nations.”48 What Kant was advocating, however, was no superstate—or what he calls a “state of nations”—much less an empire, that “graveyard of freedom,” but a free association which would lead to an “increasing culture and the gradual approach of human beings to greater agreement in principles.”49 When this happened, a new form of interstate law—what he famously called the “cosmopolitan right” (ius cosmopoliticum or Weltbürgerrecht)— would come to replace the old law of nations (ius gentium), which in Kant’s opinion had always been an utterly ineffectual code, since between states, as they then existed, there was no “common external constraint.”50 But this would be far more than a simple law. It would be an entire order of justice. For Kant the realization of the new league and of the “cosmopolitan right” to which it would give birth still lay far in the future. It was, he admitted, a “dream of perfection,” but like all such ideas it should not abandoned, as he had said of the Platonic republic, “under the very wretched and harmful pretext of its impracticability.”51 So long as we are free—morally and intellectually—we can only go on hoping that some kind of cosmopolitan world will be achieved. His objective had always been to obtain what he calls “a history of future times, i.e. a predictive history.”52 For although animals, if left to themselves, reach their “complete destiny” as individuals, humans can only do so as a species, and they can, therefore, get there only “through progress in a series of innumerably many generations.”53 The “complete destiny” of man always remains a distant but attainable goal, which makes it the duty of all beings “to work toward this (not merely chimerical) end”54; and while the human race may experience many setbacks on its long journey through time, and although “the tendency to this final end can often be hindered, it can never be completely reversed.”55 Kant, despite his initial reliance on Saint-Pierre, was offering a solution to what he saw as a human, not a narrowly European, problem. His league would be a union of world states. But there can be no doubt that not only could the conditions for the formation of the new amphictyonic league only arise in Europe, but they would, in all probability, and possibly for innumerable centuries, have to remain there. Kant has left his mark on almost all thinking about the possibility of some future world order, from his own day to this. All the international institutions, from the creation of the League of Nations in 1919, of the United Nations in 1945, to that of the European Union between the Treaty of Rome in 1957 and the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, bear some trace of the idea that, although we are still very far from achieving anything resembling a universal league of peoples, we may indeed be said to have reached the stage at which “a violation of rights in one part of the world is felt everywhere.”56 The United Nations, wrote the idiosyncratic Sir Alfred Zimmern, classicist and a key policymaker during World War I who exercised a powerful influence on its ideological formation, was “the res publica with which it is our duty to concern ourselves” and which “extends to the ends of the earth.”57 It was to be, in time, the expression of Kant’s “cosmopolitan right.” What Kant’s optimistic vision of the future notably lacked, however, was an explanation of how his new international order was to be organized and governed. Only once does he suggest that the “permanent congress of states” would be a Europe-wide court of arbitration which would allow the minsters of the individual states to look upon “the whole of Europe as a single federated state which they accepted as an arbiter, so to speak, in their public disputes.”58 But what institutional form this would take he does not say. The year before the appearance of Perpetual Peace, Marie-Jean Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat, marquis de Condorcet, a champion of equal rights for women and for all peoples of all races, and an abolitionist who devised the world’s first state education system, looked forward into what he believed to be an imaginable future, when “the peoples [of the world] will learn that they cannot become conquerors without losing their liberty, that perpetual confederations are the only way to preserve their independence; that they should seek for security not for power.” When that time arrived, nations would be driven by politics and morals to “share the goods created by nature and industry,” and thereby finally bring to an end those “national hatreds,” and in that distant epoch, “institutions, better conceived than those projects for perpetual peace which have occupied the leisure time and consoled the minds of certain philosophers, will accelerate the progress of this fraternity of nations.”59 Both Kant and Condorcet lived in the shadow the French Revolution. Kant thought that he had seen in it, despite the horrors of the Terror, proof of the apparent progress of the human will.60 Condorcet, who died in mysterious circumstances in a Jacobin cell in March 1794, despite being one of its most notable victims, believed it to be the culmination of “a revolution in the destinies of the human race.” Both recognized that the Revolution had changed the political landscape not only of France, but of the whole of Europe, if not of the entire world; that it had, in Condorcet’s words, embraced “the whole economy of society, to change all social relations, to penetrate to the smallest link of the political chain.” Both too believed, for very different reasons, that the French had, in effect, succeeded in creating the world’s first truly “representative republic,” that the revolutionaries had been, in Kant’s words: [the] first to dare, in a great nation…to maintain in the people their rights of sovereignty, that to obey only those laws whose mode of creation, even if it has been entrusted to their representatives, has been legitimated by their immediate approbation, and which, should [those representatives] threaten their rights or interests, they may always secure their reform, by a regular act of [their] sovereign will. 61 The creation of the French Republic in 1792 had done all that. Kant, however, insisted that Louis XVI’s decision to call the Estates General on May 5, 1789, so as to pass on the burden of an “embarrassment of large state debts” to his people had constituted a legitimate transfer of power, as a consequence of which the “monarch’s sovereignty wholly disappeared… and passed to the people.” The dissolution of the monarchy, the creation of the Republic, and all the revolutionary violence which followed had been a result of Louis’s unwarranted attempt to wage war on his own people in order to recover what he had freely and voluntarily contracted away. In this the French Revolution had, therefore, been no revolution at all, but the unintended consequence of Louis’s: “very serious error of judgment.” It had also, although this was not something Kant makes comment on, created the French nation, the idea of which the French would subsequently seek to export to the rest of Europe.62 France therefore had, in a few short years, created a model for the kind of state, united, democratic, and dependent upon a single source of shared political authority, out of which the future united Europe would eventually be built. What Kant had not foreseen, however (he died in1804), was that it would also be responsible for unleashing twenty-three years of warfare across most of Europe, as the new French Republic first fought off an alliance of European monarchies bent on its destruction and then, under Napoleon, set about uniting as much of Europe as it could conquer in order to transform the continent into a new French Empire. Like the Wars of Religion of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, these too were ideological wars, and they too would create a crisis, the response to which would also mark the beginning of a new project to unite the peoples of the “great republic of Europe.” It is a project that is still unfinished. But the European Union as it is today is not, as it has so often been represented, the haphazard outcome of a sometimes desperate bid to rescue the nations of the European continent from the consequences of the devastation inflicted upon them by World War II. The objectives, the aspirations, and the ideals which have driven its “founders” and their successors—those are the creation of a long historical process. This book is an attempt to tell their story.

    Give a long and comprehensive summary of the above text. Ensure your summary includes all necessary details and explains the main ideas and arguments of the passage without omitting any details.

  2. Assistant

    The text presents a comprehensive exploration of the historical and philosophical underpinnings of the concept of European unity, tracing its evolution from ancient times through the Enlightenment and into the present era. It highlights the ambition to unify diverse groups under a common identity without sacrificing their individuality, encapsulated in the phrase "We Europeans." The author stresses that Europe, while geographically defined, has been primarily an ideological construct shaped by historical narratives, cultural exchanges, and political aspirations.

    Main Themes and Historical Context

    1. The Nature of Europe: Europe is depicted as both a geographic entity and an ideal that transcends mere boundaries. The text references various historical figures, including Lucien Febvre, who articulated that Europe is more about cultural ideas and shared history than geographical confines. The importance of collective identity amid diversity is emphasized, echoing sentiments expressed during the Enlightenment.

    2. The Enlightenment and Political Philosophy: The Enlightenment period fostered the idea of a collective European identity, as thinkers like Montesquieu and Gibbon argued for a shared European space that recognized common interests while allowing for both national and individual identities. Montesquieu famously contended that European states are interdependent, and Gibbon referenced the cultural and legal similarities among European nations that informed a collective European identity.

    3. Historical Crises and Their Role in Unity: The passage suggests that every major attempt at establishing European unity has arisen in response to crises, particularly wars. The author discusses the context of severe conflicts, notably the religious wars of the 16th and 17th centuries, which prompted thinkers to propose plans for unification and perpetual peace.

    4. Pioneer Proposals for Unity: The text delves into the early modern proposals for European unity, such as the Grand Design by Duc de Sully and Éméric Crucé's New Cyneas. These plans foresaw the establishment of political systems that sought to mitigate conflict through cooperation. The Peace of Westphalia (1648) is highlighted as a pivotal moment that transitioned Europe towards modern nation-states, which ultimately necessitated new forms of political alliances and unions.

    5. The French Revolution and Its Impact: The author notes the significant political shifts resulting from the French Revolution, which created the first truly representative republic, inspiring a new form of governance that Kant would later argue was essential for achieving lasting peace. Kant’s vision posits that a league of nations founded on the principles of representative government could establish a new order of justice, transcending the conflicts among states.

    6. Immanuel Kant's Philosophical Contribution: Kant significantly shapes the discussion on European unity with his work "Toward Perpetual Peace." He advocates for a federated union of republics, emphasizing that enduring peace can only arise from states structured around the principles of consent and representation. His ideas suggest a transformation in international relations, laying the foundation for modern systems of governance, including institutions such as the United Nations and the European Union.

    7. A Legacy of Striving for Unity: The author reflects on the continuous quest for European unity that began historically and is ongoing today, with the European Union embodying these aspirations. Despite the challenges and complexities surrounding this unity, the vision of a collaborative Europe persists, fueled by cultural exchanges and shared values, despite having roots in ancient conflicts and crises.

    Conclusion

    In sum, the text chronicles the intricate interplay between European identity, historical events, and philosophical thought that have shaped ambitions for unity across the continent. It illustrates that the aspiration for a cohesive Europe is a long-held dream, fraught with challenges and marked by the recognition of diversity within common identity. This pursuit reflects a historical consciousness that acknowledges the lessons of the past while striving to create a more integrated and peaceful future among European nations.

  3. User

    Euro State of Mind by Robert Darnton | The New York Review of Books 13/2/14 3:32 PM Font Size: A A Euro State of Mind A February 28, 2002 Issue Robert Darnton The advent of the euro raises fundamental questions: Will the new currency unify Europe? What holds Europe together? How can Europe cohere as a community? One thinks first of conquerors: Caesar, Charlemagne, Napoleon, Hitler. But their empires crumbled, and the geography kept changing. Europe ended in the Germanic forests at one time and in the Urals at another. It had no natural boundaries, not even in the West, where the British still say they are setting off for Europe when they drive their cars to France. Europe is actually a state of mind. It began as a myth, the abduction of Europa, daughter of Agenor in Tyre, and it evolved into a way of life based on the sense of belonging to a common civilization. This mentalité collective developed through the civilizing process itself, the shared experience of living under Roman law, Christian religion, and the secular culture developed in the Age of Enlightenment. That common culture fell apart in the nineteenth century, when Europe broke up into nation-states; but its principles endured. Having been articulated by philosophers everywhere, from Kant in Königsberg to Filangieri in Naples, they were proclaimed in 1789 by the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen: “Men are born and remain free and equal in rights…. These rights are liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression.” They were reaffirmed by the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man adopted by the United Nations in 1948. They still stand as the foundation of the Europe that has risen again at the end of the twentieth century. Henry Kissinger’s famous boutade—“If I call Europe, what number do I call?”—misses the point, because Europe corresponds to a set of symbols and a system of values. The euro is one of them, but its value will fluctuate erratically, whereas the values of the Enlightenment are rooted deeply in the past. Which past? Whose past? For the last two centuries, Europe tore itself in pieces; and it is still coming apart at the edges, in Ireland, Russia, and the Balkans. Many things contributed to its dissolution, industrial revolutions and class struggles among them. But the most destructive force, the only one capable of mobilizing masses and hurling them against each other, was nationalism. The quarter century of warfare that began in 1792 put an end to Europe as a way of life and a mode of thinking shared by everyone in the educated elite. To make contact with their common past, Europeans must therefore take a great leap backward over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and reconsider the European dimension of life in the age of the Enlightenment. Not that anyone would want to revive the eighteenth century. At that time, the vast majority of Europeans lived in misery. Most of them east of the Elbe were serfs; most to the west lived in a state of intellectual serf-dom, unable to read or to assert the rational maturity (Mündigkeit) that Kant identified with Enlightenment. The Enlightenment itself was a complex movement, full of contradictions and countercurrents. It never commanded the allegiance of a majority among the elite, and it cannot be equated with all of intellectual life in the eighteenth century. But it championed the values that lie at the heart of the European Community today, and it did so in a way that offers an alternative to nationalism—that is, it developed a pan-European mode of existence known at the time as cosmopolitanism. So much of the modern sense of self derives from identification with the nation that we can hardly imagine cosmopolitanism as a way of life. The eighteenth century provides instruction about that experience. Consider Prince Eugene of Savoy, for example. An Italian Frenchman who fought for Austria, he combined three languages in the signature of his name: Eugenio von Savoie. Frederick II of Prussia said that he spoke French to gentlemen and German to horses, while George I spoke German to his British subjects. Nationality had little meaning for such monarchs or for anyone else who commanded troops and directed diplomacy in the eighteenth century. War belonged to the game of balance of power, a matter of sieges and seasonal campaigns aimed at the capture of strategic positions rather than the conquest of nations. It was a royal game, played in the name of dynasties: hence the Wars of the Spanish Succession (1701–1714), the Polish Succession (1733–1738), and the Austrian Succession (1740–1748). Armies had no common uniform or flag. The foot soldiers included large proportions of foreigners, and the officers identified more with their opposite numbers among the enemy than with the men who fought under them. If captured, they were often swapped for prisoners of the same rank on the other side and returned home at the end of the summer, when the fighting stopped and the opera season began. http://www.nybooks.com.eproxy2.lib.hku.hk/articles/archives/2002/feb/28/euro-state-of-mind/?pagination=false&printpage=true Page 1 of 5 Euro State of Mind by Robert Darnton | The New York Review of Books 13/2/14 3:32 PM Of course, soldiers often suffered: 34,000 men lay dead or wounded in ten square miles after the Battle of Malplaquet (1709), the bloodiest engagement before Borodino in 1812 (75,000 casualties). But they did not fight for a cause or to annihilate an enemy, and civilians sometimes cheered for the other side. Voltaire congratulated Frederick II for defeating the French at Rossbach (1757), and Sterne remarked in his Sentimental Journey (1768), “I had left London [for Paris] with so much precipitation that it never entered my mind we were at war with France.” The first stirrings of national sentiment can be detected in Britain and France during the Seven Years’ War (1756–1763), but Samuel Johnson expressed a common view when he defined patriotism in his Dictionary (1747–1755) as “the last refuge of a scoundrel.” An ideological interlude in the history of war took place between 1648, when the Peace of Westphalia marked the end of religion as a crucial element in international relations, and 1792, when the outbreak of the revolutionary wars signaled the beginning of wars between nations. During this period of relative civility, the most civilized people thought of themselves as European and did not worry about national boundaries or even carry passports. They took grand tours, which led from London to Paris and Rome or through Amsterdam to Vienna or points north. Along the way they stopped in châteaux and town houses, where they received hospitality from other “persons of quality” who spoke the same language (French) and shared the same code of conduct—a matter of mastering not only the art of conversation but also body language: how to sit a horse, walk through a garden, enter a room, take a place at a table (no easy feat if you were wearing a sword), raise a glass of wine (by the stem with the thumb and two fingers, not three), and take tea (from the saucer, not the cup in some refined circles). C osmopolitanism belonged to this social code. It set off persons of quality from the unwashed masses, whose mental horizon did not extend beyond the territory that could be viewed from the tower of their church: hence l’esprit de clocher and campanilismo to denote the narrow-minded. The cosmopolitan took in all of Europe, sometimes even all humanity, in his view of the world. The term could be used pejoratively, as indicated by the dictionary of the Académie Française: “COSMOPOLITAN. Someone who does not adopt any fatherland. A cosmopolitan is not a good citizen.” Even the Encyclopédie noted that “One sometimes uses this term in joking, to signify a man who has no fixed abode or a man who is not a foreigner anywhere.” Adventurers like Casanova, Cagliostro, and Mesmer gave it a bad name, for they took grand tours of their own, living by their wits and the gullibility of their victims. Having tramped around Europe with these chevaliers d’industrie in his youth, Rousseau condemned the cosmopolitan in The Social Contract as someone who “pretends to love the whole world in order to have the right to love no one.” By contrast in this as in so many other things, Voltaire embodied the positive variety of cosmopolitanism. His estate at Ferney on the border between France and Geneva was the grandest stop on the grand tour. Flanked by busts of Locke and Newton, he received visitors from every corner of the Continent—and at least three hundred from Britain—so many secular pilgrims hungry for a meal or a bon mot that he described himself as “the innkeeper of Europe.” He was described by others as “the uncrowned king of Europe,” because he exerted a new kind of power, the ability to command public opinion on a European scale. Voltaire’s kingdom was actually a republic, the Republic of Letters. It extended everywhere and was open to everyone, or at least everyone connected with literature. With Pierre Bayle’s Nouvelles de la République des lettres (1684–1687), it took on a tincture that distinguished it from its ancestor, the Gelehrtenrepublik (republic of learning) of the sixteenth century. Under Bayle, it promoted the critical use of reason. Under Voltaire, it became engaged in the crusade against l’infâme—that is, against intolerance and injustice in general and the abuses of the Roman Catholic Church in particular. Not that everyone paid allegiance to Voltaire. Pietists in Germany, Josephinists in Austria, Jansenists in Italy, Lockeans in Eng-land all subscribed to different versions of enlightenment. But enlightenment everywhere became identified with a cosmopolitan Republic of Letters. This republic had institutions: coffeehouses, Masonic lodges, salons, and academies, dozens of them, extending all the way to St. Petersburg and bound together by correspondence networks. Writers located at nodal points in the system, like Samuel Formey, secretary of the Berlin Academy, spread messages on a vast scale and at remarkable speed. (Letters sometimes traveled faster in the eighteenth century than they do today.) Voltaire himself commanded one of the most powerful networks of all time, and he used it to pull strings everywhere in Europe. Artful doses of wit raised laughs in all the salons of Paris and all the courts of Germany. Carefully orchestrated denunciations of atrocities—the judicial mur-ders of Calas, La Barre, Lally-Tollendal, and Montbailli—turned laughter into indignation. And direct appeals to the great—Frederick the Great and Catherine the Great (187 letters exchanged with her alone) —sometimes brought direct results. T his kind of enlightenment worked from the top down, but it could not succeed at a lower level unless it had some affinity with the general culture of educated Europeans—culture in the broadest sense, a way of being in the world. Like Norbert Elias, Voltaire understood this culture as a civilizing process, which operated on a European scale: “Europeans are what the Greeks once were. They make war among themselves, but in the midst of these disputes, they conserve so much propriety and politeness that when a Frenchman, an Englishman, and a German meet, they seem to have been born in the same city.” http://www.nybooks.com.eproxy2.lib.hku.hk/articles/archives/2002/feb/28/euro-state-of-mind/?pagination=false&printpage=true Page 2 of 5 Euro State of Mind by Robert Darnton | The New York Review of Books 13/2/14 3:32 PM Politeness lay at the heart of the Enlightenment’s appeal to the general public. Hume, Lessing, Beccaria, nearly all the philosophes except Rousseau identified politeness with the conquest of superstition and barbarity. For the Voltaireans—but not their successors in the next generation, like the young Chateaubriand—Christianity was not merely unreasonable; it was also vulgar. It derived from the crude world of the ancient Hebrews. No gentleman, they thought, could take it seriously. It was an offense to taste. The appeal to taste, a key word in the treatises as well as the correspondence of the philosophes, complemented the appeal to reason. This dual strategy made the Enlightenment a force in eighteenth-century Europe, because at that time the gentleman was beginning to displace the aristocrat as an ideal social type. There was room for both in the genteel code of conduct, and both supplied demand for the new trade in luxury goods. Ladies in London, Stockholm, and Budapest learned the latest styles by studying dolls sent out every month from the couturiers of the rue Saint Honoré. Palates were educated everywhere, thanks to treatises on the new art of gastronomie and new foods, like pralines (from the table of the duc de Praslin) and mayonnaise (invented by the chef of the duc de Richelieu at the siege of Fort Mahon). New kinds of furniture—the commode, the secrétaire—new hair styles, porcelain, decorative arts of all kinds united the mixed elites of Europe in a common material culture. The well-to-do paid for their luxuries in different kinds of coins, but they frequently kept their books in the units of currency that went back to Carolingian times. In Britain, France, and Italy, the pound, livre, or libra equaled twenty shillings, sous, or soldi, which in turn were worth twelve pence, deniers, or denari—all abbreviated as L.-s.-d. Merchants dealt in bills of exchange, essentially promissory notes, which functioned like paper money and were used to settle accounts over vast distances. For example, F. Courtener, a bookseller in Moscow, wrote the following bill of exchange authorizing his Parisian merchant banker to pay for a shipment of books that he had received from a Swiss publisher: Moscow, 1 June 1792 Good for L. 2539 tournois Twelve months from the date of the present, I will pay against this, my sole [bill] of exchange to the order of the Société Typographique de Neuchâtel the sum of Two Thousand, Five Hundred, Thirty-Nine livres tournois in specie at the current rate for value received in merchandise. T F. Courtener he elites of Europe also shared a common language. French replaced Latin for the first time as the lingua franca of diplomacy in the Treaty of Rastadt (1714). By 1774 even the Russians and the Turks used French when they agreed on the text of a treaty. French tutors spread the language among the rich everywhere from St. Petersburg to Naples, while the poor, even in France, remained divided by endless, mutually incomprehensible dialects. When Gibbon was a student in Lausanne, it seemed natural for him to begin writing history in French, “because I think in French.” The same consideration prompted Pushkin to write his first poetry in French, which he called “the language of Europe.” Frederick II, who perfected his French under the tutelage of Voltaire, ordered the Academy of Sciences in Berlin to publish its transactions in French, “la langue universelle,” in 1743. By 1782, when the academy sponsored its famous essay contest on the universality of the French language, Europe had been Frenchified. Linguistic cosmopolitanism meant that publishing and bookselling operated on a European scale. Printers turned out books in French from shops in London, Amsterdam, Hamburg, Dresden, Geneva, and many other cities outside France. The best French newspapers— La Gazette d’Amsterdam, La Gazette de Leyde, Le Courrier de l’Europe—also were produced outside the kingdom. If reading them resulted in what Benedict Anderson calls an “imagined community,” it was European before it was nationalistic. Voltaire’s readers probably echoed his own sentiments: “I belong to Europe.” All the media contributed to this collective consciousness, even word of mouth. The art of conversation had been perfected in the Parisian salons of the seventeenth century. It served as a model for small talk in elegant circles everywhere, as the Italo-French man of letters Louis Caraccioli explained in Paris le modèle des nations étrangères, ou l’Europe française. In it, a French marquis exclaims, “Italians, English, Germans, Spanish, Poles, Russians, Swedes, Portuguese…you are all my brothers.” Fraternity was a European-wide phenomenon before the Revolution incorporated it into the national culture of France. Of course, it did not extend below the elite: only gentlemen thought of themselves as united in a common way of life, and their participation in a European civilization did not preclude citizenship in a local community with its own culture expressed in an idiom of its own. Identity in the eighteenth century was segmental: a gentleman belonged to a family, a corporate body, a town or region, and a country as well as to Europe. Which segment took priority in his mind varied from person to person. Squire Western can hardly be equated with Western civilization. http://www.nybooks.com.eproxy2.lib.hku.hk/articles/archives/2002/feb/28/euro-state-of-mind/?pagination=false&printpage=true Page 3 of 5 Euro State of Mind by Robert Darnton | The New York Review of Books 13/2/14 3:32 PM Yet the elites were opening up and expanding throughout the West. The new rich rubbed elbows with the gentlefolk in shops where a new consumer culture was taking root. Even artisans occasionally bought watches and wore swords. Even servant girls owned several dresses, often made of calico and dyed in bright colors, unlike the heavy black and brown woolens worn by domestics in the seventeenth century. The common people consumed the new luxury products imported from abroad—coffee, tea, chocolate, sugar, and tobacco. Those from the middle ranks of society spent some of their new wealth and their new leisure in coffeehouses, an institution open to anyone who could pay the fare. A fter its creation in Constantinople in 1560, the coffeehouse proliferated in all European cities from the mid-seventeenth century. It first appeared in London in 1660. By 1663, London had 82 coffee houses; by 1734, 551. Because of their free talk and virtuosi, they became known as “tattling universities.” They also served as centers for political cabals, for they provided pamphlets and newspapers as well as drink. The first London daily began publication in 1702—long after the first daily newspaper in Germany (Leipzig, 1660) but long before the first in France (Paris, 1777). Print, talk, and coffee combined to create a powerful new force everywhere in Europe: public opinion, and public opinion took a radical turn in all the great cities. It took many forms, and came from many sources, but it converged around one idea that resonated everywhere: happiness. Europeans came to believe that they should enjoy life on earth instead of enduring it in order to win a place in paradise after death. Expanding economies brought the new consumer goods within the range of many middle-class budgets. Even peasants enjoyed better conditions: a warmer climate succeeded the “little ice age” of the seventeenth century; new crops—turnips, potatoes, beets—produced relief from chronic famines; and life expectancy probably improved by about ten years between 1700 and 1800. Of course, ideas did not grow out of the ground like turnips, but improved conditions and a sunnier climate of opinion made the Enlightenment thinkable among the general public. Among the elite, notions of happiness had spread from daring thought experiments conducted by esprits forts and libertins in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The natural world appeared in the works of Giordano Bruno, René Descartes, and Baruch Spinoza as a rational order and a source of potential pleasure rather than a vale of tears. Libertinism became identified with free thought as well as free love. The greatest lover of the century embodied both principles and strutted them on the stage in Molière’s Don Juan. To be sure, Molière punished his hero with hell-fire, but the punishment looked less convincing in Mozart’s version of the story, an opera buffa. And when Goldoni reworked it, he made Don Juan die of natural causes: lightning rather than divine anger. In 1776, happiness ceased to be a privilege of the aristocracy. It became a right of man, proclaimed to the world in the American Declaration of Independence: “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” Happiness rather than property. The substitution of one term for another opened the way for the right of equal access to the good things in life. The French constitution of 1793 reaffirmed the rights of 1789, “equality, liberty, security, property”; but it subordinated them to a principle announced in its first article: “The purpose of society is the common happiness.” From social welfare to socialism, the distance was not great, and it was covered between 1793 and 1848. O f course 1848 looks impossibly remote in the age of the euro. Does the age of the Enlightenment have any relevance for the predicament of Europe in 2002? Not directly, but the eighteenth century can serve as a reminder that the nation was not always a fundamental unit of existence, and the principles of the Enlightenment are still alive today. What else can one invoke if one wants to protest against intolerance and torture, discrimination and censorship, abuses and injustice of all kinds? This argument, however, seems vulnerable to two objections. First, the elitist character of the Enlightenment may undercut commitment to its values. If the Republic of Letters was not democratic, why celebrate its cosmopolitanism as an inspiration for a democratic Europe? Answer: the Frenchified, aristocratic Europe of the eighteenth century does not provide a model for the European Community today. It merely shows that Europeans once felt united by a common way of life. But could not this sense of participation in a shared civilization spread to all segments of society? Could not English serve as a lingua franca today just as well as French did two centuries ago? It need not obliterate other languages. There is plenty of room for other varieties of culture to flourish between the extremes of cosmopolitanism and campanilismo. Elitism provided a strategy for Voltaire in his fight against l’infâme, but there were other strategies available at that time, some of them democratic, some revolutionary, as the French proved in 1789. Second, the Enlightenment may be accused of Eurocentrism, or worse—of perpetrating cultural hegemony in the guise of universalism. Answer: the Enlightenment certainly coincided with a second age of discovery, and enlightened explorers like Cook extended European empires. But philosophers like Raynal protested against the oppression of colonial peoples and especially against slavery. The colonized often turned European principles against their masters and found congruent principles within their own traditions. The rejection of human rights in the name of “Asiatic values” has served the purposes of Asiatic dictators, and the defenders of democracy in Asia have drawn on the Enlightenment heritage of Europe without compromising their commitment to values of their http://www.nybooks.com.eproxy2.lib.hku.hk/articles/archives/2002/feb/28/euro-state-of-mind/?pagination=false&printpage=true Page 4 of 5 Euro State of Mind by Robert Darnton | The New York Review of Books 13/2/14 3:32 PM own. President Kim Dae Jung of South Korea adopted this position when he accepted the Nobel Peace Prize in December 2000: In Asia, long before the West, the respect for hu-man dignity was written into systems of thought, and intellectual traditions upholding the concept of “demos” took root. “The people are heaven, the will of the people is the will of heaven, revere the people as you would heaven.” This was the central tenet in the political thoughts of China and Korea as early as three thousand years ago. Five centuries later in India, Buddhism rose to preach the supreme importance of one’s dignity and rights as a human being. There were also ruling ideologies and institutions that placed the people first. Mencius, disciple of Confucius, said: “The king is son of heaven. Heaven sent him to serve the people with just rule. If he fails and oppresses the people, the people have the right, on behalf of heaven, to dispose of him.” And this, two thousand years before John Locke expounded the theory of the social contract and civic sovereignty. To understand principles as rooted in history is not to deny their validity. To point out their cultural dimension is not to relativize them out of existence. On the contrary, Europeans can take heart from the fact that Europe existed as a cultural entity long be-fore it became a monetary zone. If they heed their history, they will find grounds for defending human rights—not that history teaches lessons, but rather that it shows how the civilizing process entailed a struggle against barbarism. That struggle still goes on, and Europeans still have cause to cry, Écrasons l’infâme! © 1963-2014 NYREV, Inc. All rights reserved. http://www.nybooks.com.eproxy2.lib.hku.hk/articles/archives/2002/feb/28/euro-state-of-mind/?pagination=false&printpage=true Page 5 of 5

    Provide a summary of this above text in the same detailed and comprehensive manner as before.

  4. Assistant

    In "Euro State of Mind," Robert Darnton examines the impact of the euro on European unity and identity, questioning what fundamentally connects Europe’s diverse nations. He suggests that Europe is not defined by geography or conquest but is instead a "state of mind" rooted in a shared civilization and historical experiences.

    Main Themes and Arguments

    1. The Nature of European Identity: Darnton posits that the concept of Europe originated from myths, such as the legend of Europa, and evolved into a civilizational identity shaped by common experiences under Roman law, Christianity, and Enlightenment ideals. This shared cultural heritage has formed a collective mentality that persists despite the continent’s historical fragmentation into nation-states.

    2. Nationalism and Fragmentation: The author contends that the rise of nationalism in the 19th century, especially beginning in 1792, significantly disrupted the Enlightenment vision of a unified Europe. Nationalism became the most destructive force, inducing violence and upheaval that altered shared identities. The ensuing fragmentation and the conflicts it generated underscore the challenges of achieving unity in contemporary Europe.

    3. The Enlightenment's Legacy: Darnton highlights the Enlightenment as foundational to modern European values such as liberty, property, and equality, encapsulated in pivotal documents like the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. While the ideals arose in an elitist context, they remain essential for contemporary European identity and cohesion.

    4. Cosmopolitanism vs. Nationalism: He addresses the historical existence of cosmopolitanism— a mode of existence where individuals considered themselves part of a larger European identity transcending national boundaries. He contrasts this with the more segmented notions of identity that emerged later, emphasizing that Enlightenment cosmopolitanism fosters principles of shared humanity.

    5. Cultural Institutions and Connections: The article also surveys the cultural context of the 18th century, where institutions such as coffeehouses, salons, and the Republic of Letters facilitated the exchange of ideas and the development of a shared civilizing culture. Voltaire's influence and his command of public opinion illustrate how intellectual networks helped shape a cosmopolitan European identity.

    6. Public Opinion and the Pursuit of Happiness: The author notes that the emergence of public opinion, driven by literacy and a new consumer culture, shifted the focus of life from endurance to the pursuit of happiness. This transition is marked by the idea that happiness is a fundamental right, rather than a privilege reserved for the elite, as shown in both the American and French revolutions.

    7. Contemporary Relevance of Enlightenment Values: Darnton acknowledges objections regarding the elitism and Eurocentrism of Enlightenment ideals. However, he argues that the principles of individual dignity and rights continue to resonate across cultures—even outside of Europe—and can still inspire movements for democracy and human rights globally.

    8. Historical Reflection and Cultural Identity: The author concludes that understanding shared European history can foster a renewed commitment to the values of mutual respect and human rights, particularly in the face of modern challenges. Europe’s cultural memory serves as a resource and a reminder of the ongoing struggle against barbarism and injustice. He maintaining the rallying cry against these injustices, invoking the legacy of Enlightenment thinkers.

    Summary of Insights

    The essay stresses that the current state of Europe and the euro as a currency should be viewed through the lens of historical and cultural development rather than mere economic considerations. Darnton asserts that while the continent has certainly faced divisive forces, the enduring values of the Enlightenment and the spirit of cosmopolitanism hold the potential to reforge a collective European identity capable of overcoming contemporary barriers. This involves navigating the complexities of national identities while reviving a sense of belonging to a broader European community. Through this historical understanding, Europeans can advocate for human rights that resonate beyond their own borders.

  5. User

    Compare and contrast the two works stated above. State their similarities and differences in ideas and ideals presented. Give a long and detailed explaination.

  6. Assistant

    The two texts, the excerpt from the book analyzing European unity and identity, and Robert Darnton's "Euro State of Mind," both grapple with the challenges and aspirations associated with a unified Europe. However, they do so from different historical contexts and perspectives, producing a nuanced discourse on European identity. Below is a comparative analysis that outlines the similarities and differences between the two works.

    Similarities

    1. The Concept of a Shared European Identity: Both works explore the idea of a collective European identity. The book excerpt discusses this through the lens of historical narratives, emphasizing the shared philosophical and cultural legacies dating back to the Enlightenment. Darnton echoes this sentiment by framing Europe as a "state of mind," suggesting that a common civilization has emerged through historical experiences.

    2. Historical Context: Each text acknowledges the significance of history in shaping contemporary European identity. The book's exploration of Enlightenment ideals, as articulated by thinkers like Kant, is paralleled by Darnton's discussion of the Enlightenment's influence on European values. Both works consider how the shared past can offer pathways to unity despite the historical fragmentation caused by nationalism.

    3. Critique of Nationalism: Both authors critique the divisive nature of nationalism. The book excerpt highlights how nationalism contributed to fragmentation in the 19th century and the ensuing conflicts, while Darnton emphasizes the destructive force of nationalism that emerged during the same period, leading to wars and reshaping identities across Europe.

    4. The Enlightenment as a Foundation: The Enlightenment is presented as a critical foundation for modern European ideals in both texts. The book excerpt discusses how Enlightenment values like liberty and equality serve as the basis for the European Union, while Darnton details how these values influenced a cosmopolitan Europe that transcended national boundaries.

    Differences

    1. Focus on Cultural vs. Political Dimensions: The book excerpt dives deeply into the philosophical and cultural dimensions of European identity, emphasizing the historical evolution of ideas, legal structures, and moral frameworks underpinning the continent's unity. In contrast, Darnton adopts a more sociocultural perspective, focusing on how a collective European mentality developed through shared experiences rather than through formal political structures.

    2. Historical Narrative vs. Contemporary Context: The book offers a historical narrative tracing the arc of European identity from antiquity through the Enlightenment and into the contemporary era of the European Union. It emphasizes the importance of acknowledging this history to understand current dynamics. Darnton, however, places a greater emphasis on contemporary implications, reflecting on the advent of the euro and its potential for unity, framing his analysis around the relevance of Enlightenment principles in addressing modern issues like intolerance and injustice.

    3. Views on Elitism and Cosmopolitanism: In discussing cosmopolitanism, the book excerpt indicates a more critical view by recognizing how the Enlightenment and its cultural elite often alienated broader segments of society. It questions the ability of cosmopolitan values to resonate universally. Darnton's treatment of cosmopolitanism contrasts with this critique. He celebrates it as a historical mode of existence and advocates for its revival, while also addressing concerns about elitism through the lens of public opinion and communication networks that broadened its appeal.

    4. Integration of Global Perspectives: Darnton’s work integrates global perspectives by relating Enlightenment principles to movements for democracy and human rights beyond Europe, such as those in Asia, linking the past and present in a more interconnected framework. The book excerpt, on the other hand, primarily focuses on European-centric narratives, with less emphasis on how these ideas might resonate globally outside of European historical contexts.

    Conclusion

    In summary, both works share a common aspiration toward understanding and fostering a European identity enriched by shared history and Enlightenment ideals, while critiquing the divisive nature of nationalism. However, they diverge significantly in their approaches: the book presents a historical and philosophical lens focused on the evolution of ideas that shape contemporary Europe, while Darnton captures a more cultural and sociopolitical understanding of Europe as a collective mentality aware of its historical struggles. Both contribute valuable insights toward the discourse of unity in Europe, reflecting the complexities that continue to define it in the modern era.