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    Cybercriminals have developed an innovative tactic that exploits extended attributes (EAs) of macOS files to deploy a new trojan, dubbed RustyAttr by researchers. This strategy involves concealing harmful code within custom file metadata and employing decoy PDF documents to dodge detection efforts.

    This approach mirrors the tactics used by Bundlore adware in 2020, which concealed its payloads within resource forks on macOS. This new tactic was identified in several malware samples by cybersecurity experts at Group-IB.

    The researchers have tentatively linked these samples to the North Korean threat group Lazarus, albeit with moderate confidence, as they have not yet identified any affected victims. They suggest that the attackers might be testing a novel malware distribution technique.

    This method remains rare but has proven effective against current detection measures, as none of the security engines on the VirusTotal platform identified the malicious files.

    In macOS, extended attributes are hidden metadata typically linked to files and directories, not readily accessible via Finder or the terminal but can be viewed, edited, or removed using the 'xattr' command.

    In the RustyAttr attacks, the EA named 'test' contains a shell script.

    The malicious applications utilizing the EA are constructed using the Tauri framework, which integrates a web frontend (HTML, JavaScript) capable of invoking functions on a Rust backend.

    Upon execution, the application loads a webpage with JavaScript ('preload.js'), retrieves content from the location specified in the "test" EA, and channels it to the 'run_command' function to execute the shell script.

    To minimize user suspicion during this process, some variants may launch decoy PDF files or display error messages. These PDFs are obtained from a pCloud file-sharing instance, featuring names linked to cryptocurrency investment themes, reflecting Lazarus's typical targets and objectives.

    The few RustyAttr samples identified by Group-IB passed all detection tests on VirusTotal and were signed with a leaked certificate, which has since been revoked by Apple but were not notarized.

    Although Group-IB could not recover and analyze the subsequent malware stages, they found that the staging server attempts to connect to a known endpoint within Lazarus's network to retrieve further payloads.

    This case bears a resemblance to a recent report by SentinelLabs, which observed the North Korean threat actor BlueNoroff employing similar but distinct evasion techniques on macOS.

    BlueNoroff used cryptocurrency-themed phishing attacks to entice targets into downloading a malicious app that was both signed and notarized. These apps featured a modified 'Info.plist' file to covertly initiate a malicious connection to a domain controlled by the attacker, from which the second-stage payload was delivered.

    While it remains unclear if the campaigns are interconnected, it's typical for independent activity clusters to share insights on bypassing macOS defenses without setting off alerts.

  2. Assistant

    "Emerging macOS Trojan 'RustyAttr' Utilizes Hidden Metadata to Evade Detection, Linked to North Korean Lazarus Group"