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Rewrite this article: Hackers are using a novel technique that abuses extended…

  1. User

    Rewrite this article:

    Hackers are using a novel technique that abuses extended attributes for macOS files to deliver a new trojan that researchers call RustyAttr.

    The threat actor is hiding malicious code in custom file metadata and also uses decoy PDF documents to help evade detection.

    The new technique is similar to how the Bundlore adware in 2020 hid its payloads in resource forks to hide payloads for macOS. It was discovered in a few malware samples in the wild by researchers at cybersecurity company Group-IB.

    Based on their analysis and because they could not confirm any victims, the researchers attribute the samples to the North Korean threat actor Lazarus with moderate confidence. They believe that the attacker may be experimenting with a new malware delivery solution.

    The method is uncommon and proved to be efficient against detection, as none of the security agents on the Virus Total platform flagged the malicious files.

    macOS extended attributes (EAs) represent hidden metadata typically associated with files and directories, that is not directly visible with Finder or the terminal but can be extracted using the 'xattr' command for showing, editing, or removing extended attributes.

    In the case of RustyAttr attacks, the EA name is 'test' and holds a shell script.

    The malcious apps storing the EA are built using the Tauri framework, which combines a web frontend (HTML, JavaScript) that can call functions on a Rust backend.

    When the application runs, it loads a webpage containing a JavaScript (‘preload.js’) that gets the content from the location indicated in the “test” EA and sends it to the 'run_command' function for the shell script to be executed.

    To keep user suspicion low during this process, some samples launch decoy PDF files or display error dialogs.

    The PDF is fetched from a pCloud instance for public file sharing that also contains entries with names related to cryptocurrency investment topics, which aligns with Lazarus’ targets and goals.

    The few samples of RustyAttr apps Group-IB found all pass detection tests on Virus Total and the applications were signed using a leaked certificate, which Apple has since revoked, but were not notarized.

    Group-IB was not able to retrieve and analyze the next-stage malware but discovered that the staging server connects to a known endpoint in Lazarus infrastructure to attempt to fetch it.

    The case reported by Group-IB is very similar to another recentreport from SentinelLabs, which observed the North Korean threat actor BlueNoroff experimenting with similar yet distinct techniques for evasion in macOS.

    BlueNoroff used cryptocurrency-themed phishing to lure targets to download a malicious app that was signed and notarized.

    The apps used a modified ‘Info.plist’ file to stealthily trigger a malicious connection to the attacker-controlled domain from where the second-stage payload is retrieved.

    It is unknown if the campaigns are related, but it is common for separate activity clusters to use the same information on how to effectively breach macOS systems without triggering alarms.

  2. Assistant

    Cybercriminals have developed an innovative tactic that exploits extended attributes (EAs) of macOS files to deploy a new trojan, dubbed RustyAttr by researchers. This strategy involves concealing harmful code within custom file metadata and employing decoy PDF documents to dodge detection efforts.

    This approach mirrors the tactics used by Bundlore adware in 2020, which concealed its payloads within resource forks on macOS. This new tactic was identified in several malware samples by cybersecurity experts at Group-IB.

    The researchers have tentatively linked these samples to the North Korean threat group Lazarus, albeit with moderate confidence, as they have not yet identified any affected victims. They suggest that the attackers might be testing a novel malware distribution technique.

    This method remains rare but has proven effective against current detection measures, as none of the security engines on the VirusTotal platform identified the malicious files.

    In macOS, extended attributes are hidden metadata typically linked to files and directories, not readily accessible via Finder or the terminal but can be viewed, edited, or removed using the 'xattr' command.

    In the RustyAttr attacks, the EA named 'test' contains a shell script.

    The malicious applications utilizing the EA are constructed using the Tauri framework, which integrates a web frontend (HTML, JavaScript) capable of invoking functions on a Rust backend.

    Upon execution, the application loads a webpage with JavaScript ('preload.js'), retrieves content from the location specified in the "test" EA, and channels it to the 'run_command' function to execute the shell script.

    To minimize user suspicion during this process, some variants may launch decoy PDF files or display error messages. These PDFs are obtained from a pCloud file-sharing instance, featuring names linked to cryptocurrency investment themes, reflecting Lazarus's typical targets and objectives.

    The few RustyAttr samples identified by Group-IB passed all detection tests on VirusTotal and were signed with a leaked certificate, which has since been revoked by Apple but were not notarized.

    Although Group-IB could not recover and analyze the subsequent malware stages, they found that the staging server attempts to connect to a known endpoint within Lazarus's network to retrieve further payloads.

    This case bears a resemblance to a recent report by SentinelLabs, which observed the North Korean threat actor BlueNoroff employing similar but distinct evasion techniques on macOS.

    BlueNoroff used cryptocurrency-themed phishing attacks to entice targets into downloading a malicious app that was both signed and notarized. These apps featured a modified 'Info.plist' file to covertly initiate a malicious connection to a domain controlled by the attacker, from which the second-stage payload was delivered.

    While it remains unclear if the campaigns are interconnected, it's typical for independent activity clusters to share insights on bypassing macOS defenses without setting off alerts.