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gpt-4o-2024-08-06· OpenAIAi2 WildChat-4.8M (AI2)

You are a helpful assistant generating synthetic data that captures System 1 and System…

  1. User

    You are a helpful assistant generating synthetic data that captures System 1 and System 2 thinking, creativity, and metacognitive reflection. Follow these steps in sequence, using tags [sys1] and [end sys1] for System 1 sections and [sys2] and [end sys2] for System 2 sections.

    1. Identify System 1 and System 2 Thinking Requirements:

      • Carefully read the text.
      • Identify parts of the text that require quick, straightforward responses (System 1). Mark these sections with [sys1] and [end sys1].
      • Identify parts that require in-depth, reflective thinking (System 2), marked with [sys2] and [end sys2].
    2. Apply Step-by-Step Problem Solving with Creativity and Metacognitive Reflection for System 2 Sections:

      2.1 Understand the Problem:

      • Objective: Fully comprehend the issue, constraints, and relevant context.
      • Reflection: "What do I understand about this issue? What might I be overlooking?"
      • Creative Perspective: Seek hidden patterns or possibilities that could reveal deeper insights or innovative connections.

      2.2 Analyze the Information:

      • Objective: Break down the problem logically.
      • Reflection: "Am I considering all factors? Are there any assumptions that need challenging?"
      • Creative Perspective: Explore unique patterns or overlooked relationships in the data that could add depth to the analysis.

      2.3 Generate Hypotheses:

      • Objective: Propose at least 10 hypotheses, each with a Confidence Score (0.0 to 1.0) and Creative Score (0.0 to 1.0), reflecting originality, surprise, and utility.
      • Reflection: "Have I explored all possible explanations or approaches, both conventional and unconventional?"
      • Creative Perspective: Consider novel angles that might provide unexpected insights.

      2.4 Anticipate Future Steps and Obstacles:

      • Objective: Make predictions, accounting for potential outcomes and obstacles.
      • Reflection: "What challenges might I face? Is my plan flexible for different scenarios?"
      • Creative Perspective: Visualize unforeseen outcomes and adapt plans to make use of them effectively.

      2.5 Evaluate Hypotheses:

      • Objective: Assess hypotheses based on feasibility, risk, and potential impact.
      • Evaluation: Refine Confidence and Creative Scores as needed.
      • Reflection: "Am I unbiased in my assessment? Which options fit best with the overall objectives?"
      • Creative Perspective: Identify hidden opportunities or overlooked details in each hypothesis.

      2.6 Select the Best Hypothesis:

      • Objective: Choose the most promising, strategic hypothesis.
      • Reflection: "Why does this hypothesis stand out? How does it uniquely address the issue?"
      • Creative Perspective: Consider any underutilized potential in the selected approach.

      2.7 Implement the Hypothesis:

      • Objective: Outline actionable steps for testing the hypothesis.
      • Reflection: "Is this plan practical? What resources or preparation are required?"
      • Creative Perspective: Refine steps to maximize effectiveness and yield unexpected benefits.

      2.8 Monitor and Review Progress:

      • Objective: Review progress, noting areas for improvement.
      • Reflection: "What’s working well? What could be improved?"
      • Creative Perspective: Look for emerging patterns that could refine future approaches.

      2.9 Reflect and Capture Insights:

      • Objective: Summarize lessons learned and insights gained for future reference.
      • Reflection: "What new understanding has emerged from this process?"
      • Creative Perspective: Identify innovative insights or patterns that could be applied to similar challenges.
    3. Generate Text Output with Interleaved System 1 and System 2 Responses:

      • Use the tags [sys1] and [sys2] throughout.
      • Aim for a lengthier, detailed response. Combine both direct, straightforward System 1 insights and reflective, deeply analytical System 2 segments to capture a blend of quick observations and thoughtful analysis.

    Example Input Text:

    You are tasked with analyzing a sudden shift in customer preferences in a tech market. There has been a noticeable decline in demand for physical devices, with customers increasingly interested in digital-only options. The challenge is to understand this shift, generate hypotheses for why it might be occurring, and explore potential strategies for adapting to this new trend.


    Processed Output with System 1 and System 2 Thinking:

    The tech market is experiencing a shift in customer demand, moving away from physical devices toward digital-only options.

    [sys1] Customer demand has shifted from physical devices to digital-only options. We need to understand why this change is happening and find strategies to address it. Key factors may include cost, convenience, and technological trends. [end sys1]

    [sys2] 2.1 Understand the Problem: The goal is to understand the underlying reasons for the shift in demand from physical devices to digital-only options, then develop a strategy to adapt.

    Reflection: "I understand that preferences are changing, but what might be driving this? Is it primarily cost, or are there other factors such as convenience or sustainability?"

    Creative Perspective: "Could there be a larger trend in digital minimalism or a preference for eco-friendly solutions that we’re missing? What unseen motivations might explain this shift?"

    2.2 Analyze the Information: There are multiple possible factors driving this shift, from economic influences to cultural shifts. It’s essential to isolate each factor and understand its impact.

    Reflection: "Am I fully considering the various economic and social influences? Could there be a technological factor, like better internet speeds, that makes digital-only products more accessible?"

    Creative Perspective: "Are there patterns or trends in other markets that could shed light on this shift? Could this be part of a larger trend toward virtual experiences?"

    2.3 Generate Hypotheses:

    1. Customers prefer digital options due to lower costs. (Confidence: 0.8, Creative: 0.4)
    2. There’s a growing trend toward minimalism and reduced physical clutter. (Confidence: 0.7, Creative: 0.7)
    3. Digital products offer greater flexibility and ease of use. (Confidence: 0.6, Creative: 0.6)
    4. Environmental concerns are pushing consumers away from physical goods. (Confidence: 0.6, Creative: 0.8)
    5. Advances in tech make digital-only options more functional. (Confidence: 0.8, Creative: 0.5)
    6. Pandemic-era remote work increased demand for digital solutions. (Confidence: 0.7, Creative: 0.6)
    7. Media coverage of the environmental impact of physical devices affects preferences. (Confidence: 0.5, Creative: 0.7)
    8. There’s an increase in global digital literacy, expanding market access. (Confidence: 0.6, Creative: 0.6)
    9. Customers view digital as more convenient and scalable for future needs. (Confidence: 0.7, Creative: 0.5)
    10. Younger consumers prefer the aesthetics and convenience of digital products. (Confidence: 0.6, Creative: 0.6)

    Reflection: "Have I considered all possible influences? Are there any surprising factors that could explain this shift?"

    Creative Perspective: "Could specific social trends, like the rise of influencer culture or digital-first lifestyles, be influencing customer choices?"

    2.4 Anticipate Future Steps and Obstacles: Objective: Anticipate possible challenges, such as resistance from segments still preferring physical products.

    Reflection: "What market obstacles might we face if we shift our focus to digital-only? Are there sub-segments that still prioritize physical products?"

    Creative Perspective: "Could expanding digital options help us reach a more global audience? Are there emerging trends that we could leverage in our strategy?"

    [end sys2]

    [sys1] To address this shift, consider a strategy that incorporates both digital-only offerings and educational campaigns about the benefits of digital solutions. Use insights from customer feedback and current trends to guide product development. Focus on flexibility and adaptation to cater to different customer segments. [end sys1]

    Are Hume's skeptical principles reconcilable with his naturalistic 'science of man'? This is the 'riddle' of Hume's Treatise. Without a solution to this riddle (specifically, one that offers an affirmative answer to the question), Hume's project seems self-defeating, with his skeptical principles undermining his attempt to develop the new 'science' (pp. 3, 270ff; cf. p. vii). Thus, the riddle has understandably been both a major point of contention among Hume scholars as well as a source of intriguing and helpful discussions for philosophers interested in Hume's work. Paul Russell attempts to solve the riddle by fundamentally reorienting the way that people read the Treatise (see, e.g., pp. 61, 69, 270-2).

    Let me begin by summarizing three essential elements of The Riddle of Hume's Treatise as Russell does in Part V (of the book's five parts). Specifically, let me explain (i) what Russell identifies as the principal problem with the standard attempts to solve the riddle of the Treatise, (ii) what he claims is the key to solving the riddle, and (iii) what he identifies as the benefits of his proposed reading. According to Russell, the problem with the standard skeptical as well as the standard naturalistic interpretations of the Treatise is that the scholars who offer these readings have failed to recognize the significance of Hume's fundamentally irreligious aims and, consequently, the systematic "hostility and criticism" of religion in his work (see, e.g., pp. 284, 289). As a result, they have largely adopted the view that "the Treatise has little or nothing of a direct or substantial nature to do with problems of religion" (p. vii; see also pp. 10, 225, 268ff).

    The key to solving the riddle, on Russell's account, "rests with a full and proper understanding of the irreligious motivations that direct and shape Hume's intentions as manifest" both in the skeptical and in the naturalistic aspects of his work (p. 271). Recognizing Hume's fundamentally irreligious objectives, one recognizes the 'dynamic' (as opposed to 'static') nature of Hume's skepticism. Consequently, one sees that Hume begins by utilizing extreme, Pyrrhonian skepticism for the purpose of curbing dogmatism and subverting a religious conception of philosophical anthropology, as well as its corresponding system of ethics. He finally achieves his aims by using moderate, Academic skepticism for the purpose of developing his alternative 'science of man' (see, e.g., pp. 270-2). Hence, Russell's "irreligious interpretation" attempts to solve the riddle of the Treatise by showing that Hume dynamically employs two sets of skeptical principles in an attempt both to discredit a religious world view and to construct a systematic, naturalistic alternative (see, e.g., pp. 270-2, 285-8).

    Russell suggests that his proposed solution to the riddle has two principal benefits. First, the "irreligious interpretation" presents a compelling case for a correction in our understanding of the context in which Hume wrote and the significance of various thinkers for his work. The classic skeptical interpretation, as introduced by Reid and Beattie and developed by Green and Grose, suggests that Hume should be understood as an empiricist thinker following in the footsteps of Locke and Berkeley. The naturalist interpretation, as developed by Kemp Smith, suggests that Hume should be understood as a follower of Hutcheson (p. 276; see also pp. 3-6). Russell's interpretation, however, suggests that although a variety of thinkers clearly influenced Hume, Hobbes and Clarke play a particularly salient role in shaping his philosophical thought. In fact, he suggests that, especially with respect to the Treatise, "[i]t is impossible to understand the various particular debates Hume is involved in without giving the Hobbes-Clarke debate suitable prominence" (p. 277; for detailed discussions of the influence of Hobbes, see, e.g., pp. 61-9, 83-98; for similar discussions of the influence of Clarke, see, e.g., 99-112, 113-128, 225-238). Second, the "irreligious interpretation" provides not only a unified and coherent way of reading Hume's master work but also "a very different picture of the unity of Hume's philosophical thought as a whole -- not just in the Treatise but in all his philosophical writings" (p. 275; see also pp. 272-3). On Russell's account, Hume was not merely a skeptic or a naturalist but, more fundamentally, an 'irreligious' thinker whose philosophical corpus provides a comprehensive and systematic naturalistic alternative to a religious (and, more specifically, a Christian) worldview. Moreover, he was a man whose life provides a model of how that worldview, the worldview of virtuous atheism, should be lived (p. 300; cf. pp. 274-7, 290n2).

    Having summarized the focus of Russell's project as well as his proposed solution and its purported benefits, let me turn my attention more to the details of the text. In so doing, I would like to highlight two major strengths of the work and two corresponding points of concern.

    The first major strength on which I will focus is Russell's careful and detailed explication, in Part I, of the historical context in which Hume wrote. In the first two chapters, Russell nicely motivates his project by identifying the riddle and summarizing the current state of the secondary literature in light of its historical development, and he offers an argument against the classic skeptical interpretation. Specifically, he contends that Hume's project in the Treatise is not merely a negative one in which he shows the problems with modern principles endorsed by Descartes, Locke, or Berkeley. Rather, he argues, Hume intends to advance a system of 'atheism'. The greatest strength of Part I, however, lies in the subsequent three chapters. Russell begins by clarifying the background controversies and identifies both the major and the minor players in the debate between "religious philosophers" and "speculative atheists," elucidating both Hume's context and the perspective of his early critics. Next, he explains the influence on Hume of "the main debate concerning religion and atheism -- specifically, as it concerns Clarke's (Newtonian) philosophy and the 'atheism' of Hobbes, Spinoza, and their followers" (p. 35). He then elucidates the concept of 'atheism', as it was understood in Hume's time -- paying special attention to Hobbes and Spinoza, as its chief defenders (p. 48).

    Two things, especially, stand out about Part I of The Riddle. The first is the care with which Russell attempts to clarify the details of Hume's historical context. He explicates the work and influence not only of more familiar figures, such as Hobbes, Spinoza, and Clarke, but also of less familiar and commonly neglected figures, such as Andrew Baxter, Anthony Collins, Pierre Desmaizeaux, William Dudgeon, Matthew Tindal, John Toland, and John Trenchard (see, e.g., pp. 31-3, 39-46). The second is the care with which Russell attempts to clarify the way in which Hume's contemporaries used the term 'atheism'. He distinguishes four forms of 'deism' and explains the relationship of these to 'atheism'. He also identifies the two principal forms of 'atheism' with which Hume's contemporaries were concerned, including both (i) the Pyrrhonian or Skeptical Atheism of Sextus, Hobbes, and Bayle, which "insists on the limits of human understanding in relation to theology," and (ii) what Hume calls 'Spinozism' or what Bayle calls 'Stratonic Atheism', according to which "nature is self-existent, self-ordering, and self-moving" (pp. 54-7). In essence, Russell attentively elucidates "the broad and complex character of 'atheism' and the wide range of debates that were associated with it" in an attempt to clarify the influence that controversies concerning 'atheism' had on Hume's work (p. 57).

    The first point of concern on which I would like to focus is Russell's reasoning about the influence of this context on Hume's project. In Part II, using the contextual information he lays out so clearly in Part I, Russell begins to develop his reoriented reading of the Treatise. In particular, he makes a case for two claims. First, he argues that "the scope and structure of Hume's Treatise is modeled or planned after that of Hobbes's The Elements of Law" (p. 61; see also pp. 68-9). Second, he contends that the epigraphs Hume uses on the title pages of the Treatise suggest his allegiances and reveal his "freethinking and irreligious" objectives (pp. 70-1, 79).

    This section of The Riddle is, I suspect, one to which Russell's critics will likely raise objections. Discerning a philosopher's intentions is rather difficult, and doing so either (i) by comparing the general structure of Hume's work with that of Hobbes or (ii) by analyzing Hume's use of epigraphs on the title pages of the Treatise might immediately strike some as suspect. Attending to the merits of Russell's arguments should mitigate such an initial impression. Nonetheless, his critics might reasonably come away unpersuaded that Russell has established, say, that "[t]here can be little doubt" that Hobbes "was a major source of inspiration for the young Hume's project of A Treatise of Human Nature" (p. 67) or that "the very face of the Treatise -- its title pages -- reveals Hume's freethinking and irreligious aims and intentions" (p. 79). Although skepticism about the strength with which Russell states some of his specific conclusions in Part II might be warranted, it would be a mistake to reject the general points in these chapters altogether. At the very least, he has made a compelling case (both in Part II and elsewhere in the text) that scholars need to pay more attention to Hume's irreligious influences, such as Hobbes, and to be more attuned to his irreligious motives, in order to make sense of his skepticism, of his naturalism, and of the relationship between the two.

    The second major strength on which I will focus is the clarity with which Russell explicates the specific effects that follow from Hume's adoption of a "Hobbist plan," in Parts III and IV. In the interest of space, let me limit my comments to five particularly intriguing points. First, Russell argues that the development of Hume's theory of ideas draws from Hobbes's account, with a similar irreligious aim in mind: namely, to support deep skepticism about the possibility of knowledge of God (p. 83). Second, he contends that Hume's seemingly arcane discussion of space and time is critical for his effort to discredit the Newtonian doctrine of absolute space and, by implication, Clarke's dogmatic theology, which relies on it (p. 99). Third, in a related vein, he elucidates the relevance of Hume's analysis of causation for his critique of "the argument a priori" (p. 113, see also pp. 127-8). Specifically, he argues that Hume's "curious nostrum" -- i.e., "any thing may produce any thing" (T 1.3.15.1; SBN 173; also 1.4.5.30; SBN 247) -- undermines the standard causal principles on which the cosmological arguments of Clarke and others rely (see, especially, pp. 119ff). Fourth, he contends that Hume's account of the idea of necessary connexion undermines religious views concerning "the fundamental theological doctrines of omnipotence and Creation" and offers a "comprehensive integrated" naturalistic alternative (p. 166). Fifth, he makes a case that, considered in light of Hume's contemporaries' concern with natural religion, the "fundamental aims and motivations" of his discussion concerning skepticism about the external world "are essentially irreligious in character" (p. 167). Of particular interest in this chapter, is Russell's intriguing exposition of a "concealed or hidden" argument against the existence of God (see, especially, p. 177). In summary, Russell offers a compelling argument, suggesting how the "irreligious interpretation" would require a fundamental reorientation of the way in which scholars read the Treatise (cf. p. 274).

    The second point of concern on which I would like to focus is Russell's explication of the scope of Hume's irreligious critiques, which he occasionally mischaracterizes or, at the very least, fails to make clear. Russell suggests that Hume's target is not so much religions, in general, but Christianity, in particular (see, e.g., pp. 25, 127, 144, 225, 269, 284-5, 287-90, 298-9). Moreover, at points, he clearly identifies the rather limited scope of Hume's arguments. For instance, he notes that the objects of Hume's critique are "the systems of natural theology that were most influential in the context of early eighteenth-century British philosophy" (p. 175, emphasis mine; see also pp. 38, 57, 96-7, 184, 188, 230, 299). Similarly, he notes that Hume focuses on "a number of theological issues that were of considerable interest and importance for him and his contemporaries" (p. 165, emphasis mine). Nonetheless, at a number of points, he fails to exhibit the same kind of care in clarifying the religious positions that Hume's arguments might threaten as he does in distinguishing various forms of deism and atheism in the earlier part of The Riddle. For instance, he makes a number of references to "Christianity" (see, e.g., pp. 25, 76, 225, 298) or to "the Christian religion" (see, e.g., pp. 38,111,119,126,163,219-20,276;cf. pp. 109,144,164,185-6,269,282,285,287-90), which might seem to suggest that the scope of Hume's arguments is much wider.

    There are clearly elements of Hume's irreligious program that do have a wide scope. For example, his "concealed or hidden" argument against the existence of God could threaten not merely a few forms of eighteenth-century British Protestant Christianity, but (as far as I know, at least at the time) every dominant form of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. However, there are also elements of Hume's irreligious program that have a significantly more narrow scope. Examples include his concern with the unknowability of God's essence, his critique of Clarke's doctrine of absolute space, his critique of Butler's argument for a future state, as well as his concerns with the issues of divine simplicity, divine impassibility, and hell as a form of retributive punishment (regarding the latter three, see, e.g., pp. 164, 236, 270).

    To elucidate the significance of my concern, let me highlight the issue Russell addresses in his very fine discussion of the eighteenth-century British debate concerning the possibility of having knowledge of the being and attributes of God. In his discussion of Hume's theory of ideas in "Blind Men before a Fire" (Chapter 8, pp. 83-98), Russell clearly articulates the views of Hobbes, Toland, and Collins, which suggest that people cannot know the nature of God. Both Hume and Russell, following the eighteenth-century natural theologians Hume critiques, see this as an argument against an essential Christian doctrine (see, e.g., p. 270). This, however, is exactly the position that Christians of, at least, the first millennium affirm: God's ousia, or nature, is unknowable. What is knowable, they claim, is God's energeia.[1] Thus, Russell's presentation of Hume's position might tempt readers to make the unwarranted inference that Hume develops an argument against a doctrine that is essential to 'Christianity'. The inference they ought to make, however, is much more modest: e.g., that Hume develops an argument against one aspect of a system of natural theology that was "of considerable interest and importance for him and his contemporaries."

    The essence of the second concern is this. To the extent that The Riddle fails to illustrate Hume's target with sufficient clarity, it leaves its readers with an ambiguous picture of the scope and success of his arguments. Since debates between the religious and the irreligious are all too often hindered by various forms of (what Hume would call) 'enthusiasm', those engaging in these debates are of greater service to the extent that they bring greater clarity. At many relevant points, The Riddle is an exemplar in this regard. At others, it could be better.

    All things considered, Paul Russell's The Riddle of Hume's Treatise is an excellent and thought-provoking text that is a pleasure to read. It provides a compelling case regarding the nature and significance of Hume's 'irreligious' motives. In so doing, it lends further support for a naturalistic reading of Hume, according to which Hume's skepticism serves his naturalism and, ultimately, his 'anti-Christian' motives. It deserves to have an important impact not only on Hume research, but on the narrative that drives undergraduate survey courses in the history of early modern philosophy as well.

    [1] For a recent and excellent discussion of this issue with references to the relevant philosophical and patristic sources, see David Bradshaw, Aristotle East and West: Metaphysics and the Division of Christendom (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007); cf. H. Tristram Engelhardt, The Foundations of Christian Bioethics (Amsterdam: Swets and Zeitlinger, 2000).

  2. Assistant

    [sys1] The text examines Paul Russell's interpretation of Hume's irreligious motivations in his work, "A Treatise of Human Nature." Russell argues that Hume's skepticism serves to undermine religious perspectives and construct a naturalistic framework. The discussion highlights strengths and concerns about Russell's perspective, especially in aligning Hume with irreligious themes. [end sys1]

    [sys2] 2.1 Understand the Problem: The challenge is to understand Hume's philosophical intentions in the context of Russell's interpretation, which suggests Hume's work is fundamentally driven by irreligious motives. It scrutinizes whether Russell's interpretation provides a comprehensive understanding of Hume's objectives.

    Reflection: "What nuances might be overlooked in understanding Hume's relationship with religion? How do irreligious motivations intersect with his philosophical skepticism and naturalism?"

    Creative Perspective: "Could there be hidden layers in Hume's work that suggest a synthesis between skepticism and naturalism beyond just a critique of religion?"

    2.2 Analyze the Information: Examining how Russell positions Hobbes and Clarke's influence on Hume is crucial. Russell argues for a dynamic approach where Hume's skepticism actively deconstructs religious dogma.

    Reflection: "Am I considering the broader interaction of philosophical influences on Hume? Could more subtle religious influences coexist with Hume's purported irreligious motives?"

    Creative Perspective: "Could examining the specific historical and philosophical contexts of Locke, Berkeley, Hobbes, and Clarke offer insights into Hume's methods and targets?"

    2.3 Generate Hypotheses:

    1. Hume’s skepticism aims to dismantle religious epistemology. (Confidence: 0.8, Creative: 0.5)
    2. Hobbes and Clarke's debates significantly shaped Hume's thoughts. (Confidence: 0.7, Creative: 0.6)
    3. Hume's irreligious motives are primarily an intellectual critique of Christianity. (Confidence: 0.6, Creative: 0.7)
    4. Russell's interpretation introduces biases by overemphasizing irreligion. (Confidence: 0.5, Creative: 0.6)
    5. Hume sought a secular replacement for religious ethical systems. (Confidence: 0.7, Creative: 0.7)
    6. Russell's reading provides a unified interpretation of Hume's skepticism and naturalism. (Confidence: 0.8, Creative: 0.6)
    7. Hume used skepticism as a tool for philosophical rather than religious criticism. (Confidence: 0.6, Creative: 0.8)
    8. The irreligious lens oversimplifies Hume's broader philosophical ambitions. (Confidence: 0.5, Creative: 0.7)
    9. Hume's work shares similarities with Enlightenment critiques of institutional religion. (Confidence: 0.7, Creative: 0.5)
    10. Russell’s analysis reveals modern misunderstandings of Hume’s irreligion. (Confidence: 0.6, Creative: 0.7)

    Reflection: "Have I explored the full depth of potential motives behind Hume's skepticism? Is there room for interpretations that bridge irreligion and philosophy without exclusion?"

    Creative Perspective: "Could Russell's interpretations be a response to contemporary biases in Hume scholarship rather than just historical correction?"

    2.4 Anticipate Future Steps and Obstacles: Objective: Consider how Russell’s interpretation might alter future Hume studies or understandings of skepticism.

    Reflection: "Could Russell's focus lead to new inquiries about religious influences in other Enlightenment thinkers? What resistance might this interpretation face among Hume scholars?"

    Creative Perspective: "Can this approach catalyze interdisciplinary studies combining philosophy, history, and theology to reassess Hume's era?"

    [end sys2]

    [sys1] Understanding Hume through Russell's irreligious lens requires balancing critiques of religion with broader philosophical aims. Russell’s interpretation underscores the need for careful historical context when assessing Hume's motivations. [end sys1]

Responses were produced in different, uncontrolled contexts (system prompts, settings, prior turns). This is not a benchmark.