fact check this works- I am fascinated by Tim May's crypto-anarchy. Unlike the…
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fact check this works- I am fascinated by Tim May's crypto-anarchy. Unlike the communities traditionally associated with the word "anarchy", in a crypto-anarchy the government is not temporarily destroyed but permanently forbidden and permanently unnecessary. It's a community where the threat of violence is impotent because violence is impossible, and violence is impossible because its participants cannot be linked to their true names or physical locations.
Until now it's not clear, even theoretically, how such a community could operate. A community is defined by the cooperation of its participants, and efficient cooperation requires a medium of exchange (money) and a way to enforce contracts. Traditionally these services have been provided by the government or government sponsored institutions and only to legal entities. In this article I describe a protocol by which these services can be provided to and by untraceable entities.
I will actually describe two protocols. The first one is impractical, because it makes heavy use of a synchronous and unjammable anonymous broadcast channel. However it will motivate the second, more practical protocol. In both cases I will assume the existence of an untraceable network, where senders and receivers are identified only by digital pseudonyms (i.e. public keys) and every messages is signed by its sender and encrypted to its receiver.
In the first protocol, every participant maintains a (seperate) database of how much money belongs to each pseudonym. These accounts collectively define the ownership of money, and how these accounts are updated is the subject of this protocol.
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The creation of money. Anyone can create money by broadcasting the solution to a previously unsolved computational problem. The only conditions are that it must be easy to determine how much computing effort it took to solve the problem and the solution must otherwise have no value, either practical or intellectual. The number of monetary units created is equal to the cost of the computing effort in terms of a standard basket of commodities. For example if a problem takes 100 hours to solve on the computer that solves it most economically, and it takes 3 standard baskets to purchase 100 hours of computing time on that computer on the open market, then upon the broadcast of the solution to that problem everyone credits the broadcaster's account by 3 units.
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The transfer of money. If Alice (owner of pseudonym K_A) wishes to transfer X units of money to Bob (owner of pseudonym K_B), she broadcasts the message "I give X units of money to K_B" signed by K_A. Upon the broadcast of this message, everyone debits K_A's account by X units and credits K_B's account by X units, unless this would create a negative balance in K_A's account in which case the message is ignored.
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The effecting of contracts. A valid contract must include a maximum reparation in case of default for each participant party to it. It should also include a party who will perform arbitration should there be a dispute. All parties to a contract including the arbitrator must broadcast their signatures of it before it becomes effective. Upon the broadcast of the contract and all signatures, every participant debits the account of each party by the amount of his maximum reparation and credits a special account identified by a secure hash of the contract by the sum the maximum reparations. The contract becomes effective if the debits succeed for every party without producing a negative balance, otherwise the contract is ignored and the accounts are rolled back. A sample contract might look like this:
K_A agrees to send K_B the solution to problem P before 0:0:0 1/1/2000. K_B agrees to pay K_A 100 MU (monetary units) before 0:0:0 1/1/2000. K_C agrees to perform arbitration in case of dispute. K_A agrees to pay a maximum of 1000 MU in case of default. K_B agrees to pay a maximum of 200 MU in case of default. K_C agrees to pay a maximum of 500 MU in case of default.
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The conclusion of contracts. If a contract concludes without dispute, each party broadcasts a signed message "The contract with SHA-1 hash H concludes without reparations." or possibly "The contract with SHA-1 hash H concludes with the following reparations: ..." Upon the broadcast of all signatures, every participant credits the account of each party by the amount of his maximum reparation, removes the contract account, then credits or debits the account of each party according to the reparation schedule if there is one.
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The enforcement of contracts. If the parties to a contract cannot agree on an appropriate conclusion even with the help of the arbitrator, each party broadcasts a suggested reparation/fine schedule and any arguments or evidence in his favor. Each participant makes a determination as to the actual reparations and/or fines, and modifies his accounts accordingly.
In the second protocol, the accounts of who has how much money are kept by a subset of the participants (called servers from now on) instead of everyone. These servers are linked by a Usenet-style broadcast channel. The format of transaction messages broadcasted on this channel remain the same as in the first protocol, but the affected participants of each transaction should verify that the message has been received and successfully processed by a randomly selected subset of the servers.
Since the servers must be trusted to a degree, some mechanism is needed to keep them honest. Each server is required to deposit a certain amount of money in a special account to be used as potential fines or rewards for proof of misconduct. Also, each server must periodically publish and commit to its current money creation and money ownership databases. Each participant should verify that his own account balances are correct and that the sum of the account balances is not greater than the total amount of money created. This prevents the servers, even in total collusion, from permanently and costlessly expanding the money supply. New servers can also use the published databases to synchronize with existing servers.
The protocol proposed in this article allows untraceable pseudonymous entities to cooperate with each other more efficiently, by providing them with a medium of exchange and a method of enforcing contracts. The protocol can probably be made more efficient and secure, but I hope this is a step toward making crypto-anarchy a practical as well as theoretical possibility.
Appendix A: alternative b-money creation
One of the more problematic parts in the b-money protocol is money creation. This part of the protocol requires that all of the account keepers decide and agree on the cost of particular computations. Unfortunately because computing technology tends to advance rapidly and not always publicly, this information may be unavailable, inaccurate, or outdated, all of which would cause serious problems for the protocol.
So I propose an alternative money creation subprotocol, in which account keepers (everyone in the first protocol, or the servers in the second protocol) instead decide and agree on the amount of b-money to be created each period, with the cost of creating that money determined by an auction. Each money creation period is divided up into four phases, as follows:
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Planning. The account keepers compute and negotiate with each other to determine an optimal increase in the money supply for the next period. Whether or not the account keepers can reach a consensus, they each broadcast their money creation quota and any macroeconomic calculations done to support the figures.
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Bidding. Anyone who wants to create b-money broadcasts a bid in the form of <x, y> where x is the amount of b-money he wants to create, and y is an unsolved problem from a predetermined problem class. Each problem in this class should have a nominal cost (in MIPS-years say) which is publicly agreed on.
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Computation. After seeing the bids, the ones who placed bids in the bidding phase may now solve the problems in their bids and broadcast the solutions.
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Money creation. Each account keeper accepts the highest bids (among those who actually broadcasted solutions) in terms of nominal cost per unit of b-money created and credits the bidders' accounts accordingly.
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- Assistant
Certainly! I'd be happy to help analyze and fact-check the protocol you've shared. The text you've provided outlines a proposal for a decentralized, anonymous digital currency system, reminiscent of early cryptocurrency concepts like Wei Dai's b-money and Nick Szabo's bit gold. These proposals were foundational in the development of blockchain technology and influenced the creation of Bitcoin.
Let's break down the key components of the proposed protocol and assess its practicality:
1. Untraceable Network of Pseudonyms
Summary: Participants operate under digital pseudonyms (public keys) without any link to their true identities or physical locations. Communication is secure and anonymous, with messages being signed and encrypted.
Assessment:
- Feasibility: Creating a network where participants are completely untraceable is challenging. While technologies like Tor and cryptographic techniques can enhance anonymity, they are not foolproof.
- Challenges: Adversaries might employ network analysis, timing attacks, or exploit vulnerabilities to de-anonymize participants.
Conclusion: While anonymity networks exist, guaranteeing absolute untraceability in practice is difficult.
2. Money Creation through Computational Problems
Summary: Money is created by solving computational problems that have no intrinsic value other than proving computational effort (similar to a proof-of-work system). The amount of money created is proportional to the cost of computation in terms of a standard basket of commodities.
Assessment:
- Similarities to Bitcoin: This concept is akin to Bitcoin's mining, where miners solve computational puzzles to earn rewards.
- Determining Cost: Measuring the exact cost of computation in terms of commodities is problematic. Costs vary by location, time, and access to resources.
- Inflation Control: Without a difficulty adjustment mechanism, increased computational power could lead to rapid money creation and inflation.
Conclusion: The idea is theoretically sound but requires mechanisms to accurately gauge costs and adjust difficulty to prevent economic instability.
3. Decentralized Account Management
Summary: Every participant independently maintains a database of account balances, updating them based on broadcasted transactions.
Assessment:
- Consensus Issues: Without a consensus mechanism, discrepancies between participants' databases can arise due to network delays, conflicting transactions, or malicious behavior.
- Double-Spending Risk: Without synchronization, the same funds could be spent multiple times before databases are updated.
Conclusion: A decentralized ledger requires a robust consensus protocol (like blockchain) to ensure consistency and prevent double-spending.
4. Transaction Processing via Broadcasts
Summary: To transfer money, a participant broadcasts a signed message indicating the transfer, and all participants update their databases accordingly.
Assessment:
- Scalability Concerns: Broadcasting every transaction to all participants is not scalable for a large network.
- Verification Overhead: Each participant must process and verify every transaction, leading to high computational and storage demands.
Conclusion: While functional for small networks, this approach doesn't scale well without optimizations like selective validation or layered network architectures.
5. Contract Enforcement Mechanism
Summary: Participants can enter into contracts specifying terms, maximum reparations, and an arbitrator. Funds are escrowed, and disputes are resolved through arbitration, with participants updating their databases based on broadcasted conclusions.
Assessment:
- Trust Issues: Requires trust in the arbitrator and the assumption that all parties will act in good faith.
- Enforcement: Lacks a mechanism to enforce decisions if participants disagree with the arbitrator or refuse to adjust balances.
- Subjectivity: Participants individually decide how to adjust balances during disputes, leading to potential inconsistencies.
Conclusion: Effective contract enforcement in a decentralized system necessitates enforceable smart contracts and automated consensus on outcomes.
6. Alternative Protocol with Servers
Summary: Introduces servers (a subset of participants) to maintain the accounts, linked via a broadcast channel. Servers deposit collateral to ensure honesty and periodically publish their account databases.
Assessment:
- Centralization Risk: Introducing servers centralizes part of the system, creating potential points of failure or control.
- Trust Model: Relies on the integrity of servers and the correct functioning of the collateral mechanism to deter misconduct.
- Collusion and Attacks: Servers could collude or be compromised, undermining the system's integrity.
Conclusion: While aiming to improve efficiency, this model reintroduces centralization risks that the protocol seeks to avoid.
7. Alternative Money Creation via Auction (Appendix A)
Summary: Money supply increases are predetermined, and participants bid for the right to create money by solving computational problems. The highest bidders (offering the most computational work per unit of money) are allowed to create currency.
Assessment:
- Supply Control: Provides a mechanism to control inflation by limiting the amount of new money.
- Complexity: Adds complexity to the system with additional phases (planning, bidding, computation, money creation).
- Fairness and Accessibility: May favor participants with more resources, potentially leading to centralization of wealth.
Conclusion: This approach attempts to balance money supply but may introduce inequities and complicate the currency creation process.
Overall Evaluation
Does the Protocol Work?
- Theoretically: The protocol presents innovative ideas for a decentralized, anonymous currency and prefigures crucial concepts used in modern cryptocurrencies.
- Practically: Several significant hurdles prevent it from being practical in its current form.
Key Challenges:
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Consensus Mechanism Absence:
- Without a robust consensus algorithm (like proof-of-work blockchain in Bitcoin), the network is vulnerable to inconsistencies and double-spending.
- Participants maintaining separate databases without synchronization cannot reliably agree on the state of accounts.
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Anonymity Limitations:
- Achieving complete anonymity is extremely difficult due to potential network vulnerabilities and sophisticated de-anonymization techniques.
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Trust Assumptions:
- The protocol often assumes honest behavior (e.g., in contract enforcement), which may not hold true in adversarial settings.
- Lacks mechanisms to handle dishonest or malicious participants effectively.
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Scalability Issues:
- Broadcasting all transactions and contract information to all participants does not scale efficiently.
- High computational and storage demands on participants hinder widespread adoption.
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Economic Considerations:
- Difficulties in accurately measuring computational costs and aligning them with currency value.
- Potential for wealth concentration and unfair advantages in money creation.
Influence on Modern Cryptocurrencies:
- Many ideas from this protocol have influenced modern cryptocurrencies:
- Decentralization and Anonymity: Central tenets in Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies.
- Proof-of-Work: Used in Bitcoin to secure the network and achieve consensus.
- Smart Contracts: Implemented in platforms like Ethereum, providing automated and enforceable contracts without intermediaries.
Advancements Addressing the Challenges:
- Blockchain Technology: Provides a shared, immutable ledger with consensus among participants.
- Consensus Algorithms: Proof-of-work, proof-of-stake, and other algorithms ensure network agreement and security.
- Privacy Enhancements: Technologies like zero-knowledge proofs (used in Zcash) and ring signatures (used in Monero) enhance participant privacy.
- Smart Contract Platforms: Allow for programmable, self-executing contracts with predefined rules and outcomes.
Conclusion
While the protocol you've shared is groundbreaking for its time and contains foundational ideas, it lacks several critical components necessary for practical implementation. Key issues include the absence of a consensus mechanism, challenges in maintaining anonymity, reliance on participant honesty, and scalability problems.
For a cryptocurrency system to work effectively, it must ensure:
- Consensus and Security: A reliable method for all participants to agree on the state of the ledger while preventing fraudulent activities.
- Scalability: The ability to handle a growing number of transactions and participants efficiently.
- Anonymity and Privacy: Robust privacy protections that withstand sophisticated attacks.
- Trustless Operations: Mechanisms that do not rely on trust in any single participant or small group.
Modern cryptocurrencies have evolved to address many of these challenges. If you're interested in how these problems have been tackled, studying Bitcoin's whitepaper and exploring blockchain technology advancements would be beneficial.
Further Exploration
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Bitcoin Whitepaper ("Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System" by Satoshi Nakamoto):
- Demonstrates a practical implementation of a decentralized cryptocurrency.
- Introduces a proof-of-work consensus mechanism to secure the network.
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Blockchain Consensus Mechanisms:
- Proof-of-Work (PoW): Secures the network through computational effort (used in Bitcoin).
- Proof-of-Stake (PoS): Validators stake currency to participate in consensus (used in Ethereum 2.0).
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Privacy-Focused Cryptocurrencies:
- Monero: Utilizes ring signatures and stealth addresses for anonymity.
- Zcash: Employs zero-knowledge proofs (zk-SNARKs) to enable private transactions.
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Smart Contracts and Decentralized Applications:
- Ethereum: Pioneered smart contracts, allowing for decentralized applications and automated agreements.
Final Thoughts
Your fascination with crypto-anarchy and early cryptocurrency proposals is well-founded, as these concepts have significantly influenced today's digital currency landscape. Understanding the limitations and challenges of early protocols like the one you've shared provides valuable insights into why certain design choices were made in successful cryptocurrencies.
If you have more questions or wish to delve deeper into specific aspects of cryptocurrency technology, feel free to ask!