5. Suppose that in Cournot oligopoly the cost function of firm j is c(qj) = cj qj. That…
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- Suppose that in Cournot oligopoly the cost function of firm j is c(q_j) = c_j q_j. That is, instead of each firm having the same marginal cost c, they can now have personalized marginal costs c_j. This means that they are using different technologies. Solve the (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium of this Cournot oligopoly? What kind of restriction the existence impose on the parameters a,b, c_1,.....c_j?
Remark. You need the solution of exercise 5 to solve the last two problems. If you are not able to solve it yourself, find a solution from the internet.
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There are 4 firms competing in a Cournot oligopoly. The aggregate inverse demand is p(q) = 100 − 2q. The cost function of all firms is c(q) = 4q. Although the cost of production is the same, half of the firms use a clean technology, while the other half use a polluting technology 1that cost 1 unit more per product to the society. Government imposes a Pigouvian tax of 1 unit per product to both polluting firms for them to internalize the externality. (a) How much does the output decrease in the polluting sector after this tax? (b) What fraction of the tax pass through to consumer prices?
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Market with inverse demand function p(q) = 100 − 2q is a legal monopoly (entry is prevented by law). Government removes the legal barrier to entry and the monopoly expects another firm with a same cost function c(q) = 2q to enter the market.1 Let us suppose, for simplicity, that firms operate for one period only. (a) How much the profit of the monopoly will decrease when another firm enters the market? (b) How much the monopoly is willing to lower its price to prevent the entry? (c) How large the fixed cost (in addition to the given unit cost) of the entrant must be for predatory pricing in the last question to make sense?
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Problem 7 Solution:
Given the inverse demand function ( p(q) = 100 - 2q ) and cost function ( c(q) = 2q ), the monopoly initially operates alone.
(a) Profit decrease when another firm enters the market
Monopoly Profit:
The monopoly maximizes profit by setting marginal revenue (MR) equal to marginal cost (MC).
First, find MR:
Total Revenue (TR) = ( p(q) \times q = (100 - 2q)q = 100q - 2q^2 )
MR = derivative of TR with respect to ( q ):
( MR = \frac{d}{dq}(100q - 2q^2) = 100 - 4q )
Set MR = MC:
( 100 - 4q = 2 )
Solve for ( q ):
( 4q = 98 ) ⇒ ( q_m = 24.5 )
Monopoly price:
( p_m = 100 - 2q_m = 100 - 2 \times 24.5 = 51 )
Monopoly profit:
( \pi_m = (p_m - MC) \times q_m = (51 - 2) \times 24.5 = 49 \times 24.5 = $1,200.5 )
Duopoly Profit:
In Cournot competition with identical firms:
Each firm's output:
( q_i = \frac{a - c}{b(n + 1)} = \frac{100 - 2}{2(2 + 1)} = \frac{98}{6} \approx 16.333 )
Each firm's profit:
( \pi_i = \left( \frac{a - c}{n + 1} \right)^2 \frac{1}{b} = \left( \frac{98}{3} \right)^2 \frac{1}{2} = \frac{9604}{18} \approx $533.56 )
Monopoly's profit decreases from $1,200.5 to approximately $533.56 when another firm enters.
Answer: The monopoly’s profit decreases by about $1,200.5 − $533.56 = $666.94 when another firm enters.
(b) Amount the monopoly is willing to lower its price to prevent entry
To deter entry, the monopoly sets a quantity that leaves the entrant with zero profit.
Set the entrant's profit to zero and solve for the monopoly's output:
Entrant's best response function:
( q_e = 24 - \frac{1}{2}q_m )
Entrant's profit function:
( \pi_e = 98q_e - 2q_m q_e - 2q_e^2 )
Set ( \pi_e = 0 ) and solve:
( 0 = 1200 - 49q_m + 0.5q_m^2 )
Solution gives ( q_m = 48 ) or ( 50 ). The monopoly should produce at least ( q_m = 48 ).
Price at ( q_m = 48 ):
( p = 100 - 2 \times 48 = 4 )
The monopoly lowers its price from $51 to $4.
Answer: The monopoly is willing to lower its price from $51 to $4—a reduction of $47—to prevent entry.
(c) Fixed cost size for predatory pricing to make sense
Predatory pricing makes sense if the loss from predatory pricing is less than the loss from duopoly competition minus the entrant's fixed cost ( F ):
Loss from predatory pricing:
( \text{Loss} = \pi_m - \pi_m^{\text{pred}} = $1,200.5 - (4 - 2) \times 48 = $1,200.5 - $96 = $1,104.5 )
Loss from duopoly:
( \text{Loss} = \pi_m - \pi_m^{\text{duo}} = $1,200.5 - $533.56 = $666.94 )
Set up inequality:
( $1,104.5 \leq $666.94 + F )
Solve for ( F ):
( F \geq $1,104.5 - $666.94 = $437.56 )
Answer: The entrant’s fixed cost must be at least $437.56 for predatory pricing by the monopoly to be worthwhile.