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缩写modern economic theory and development Theories of the Ineffectiveness of Government…

  1. User

    缩写modern economic theory and development Theories of the Ineffectiveness of Government Intervention The issue raised by the public choice school is whether an adviser can influence policy. A second, distinct issue is whether, in a market economy, government intervention can promote good outcomes. There is a long tradition in economics that the only proper role for the government is to define and enforce property rights and to provide public goods. Beyond that, government interventions are likely to be—in the extreme versions, inevitably will be—ineffective, unnecessary, or counterproductive. The fact that most of the “success” cases of economic growth have involved heavy doses of government intervention provides a strong counterweight to these general allegations. For instance, in the United States the government has, since 1863, played a role in financial market regulation. Evidence that since World War II downturns have been shallower and shorter and expansions longer is consistent with the hypothesis that better macroeconomic management does work. Even in industrial policies, the United States has a credible history—from the founding of the telecommunications industry, with the first telegraph line between Baltimore and Washington in 1842, to its most recent contribution to that industry, the creation of the Internet; from the support of research and dissemination in the dominant sector of the 19th century, agriculture, to support of research in the dominant high-technology industries of today. Still, it is worth disposing quickly of the major theoretical arguments underlying the ineffectiveness of intervention. Government is unnecessary: anything the government can do, the private sector can do better. The fact is that government is endowed with powers which the private sector does not have, and these powers are essential in addressing the public good and externality problems that are rife throughout the economy. Coasians are simply wrong in arguing that private parties by themselves, with given, well-defined property rights, always resolve these issues. Anything government does will be undone by the private sector. Although there are specific models for which this assertion is true (see, for instance, Lucas 1973; Lucas and Prescott 1974), it is generally not true— for example, when government changes relative prices through taxation. Still, there is an important moral to these models: the actual consequences of government policies can be markedly different from the intended ones. Government is always captured by special-interest groups (Stigler 1971). To be sure, there are incentives for producer special-interest groups to try to capture, for instance, the regulatory process. But there are countervailing incentives for other groups. Stigler does not explain why in some states it is consumer groups that capture, say, electricity regulation, while in others it appears to be producer groups. In this, too, there is an important moral: political processes are critical, but the outcome of political processes is more complicated than simple theories of capture would suggest. A variety of interventions can affect outcomes. Below we consider several broad kinds of interventions: (a) interventions to solve coordination problems, (b) information as an intervention, (c) interventions to change the dynamics of the political process, and (d) interventions to change the distribution of wealth. Interventions to Solve a Coordination Problem Some of the multiple-equilibria models discussed above suggest interventions that can move an economy to a more favorable equilibrium. But just as the equilibrium set of behaviors in a decentralized economy may not be Pareto efficient, one cannot jump to the conclusion that Pareto improvements are likely to emerge from the political process. (At the end of this part we provide examples of cases in which they do not.) Moreover, to make the analysis of intervention precise requires a dynamic framework. For example, only in a dynamic framework can one ask whether an initial coordination failure will in fact transmit itself over time. Why would not forward-looking agents, with sufficiently low discount rates, adopt a path (which might include the option of changing their behavior several times) that would permit as an equilibrium a self-fulfilling move away from a bad equilibrium to a good one? Is there really any scope for policy? Adserà and Ray (1998) address these questions in a setting in which each agent makes a discrete choice between two activities (which could be interpreted as entry into a high-tech versus a low-tech sector). They obtain a striking result: if the positive externalities from moving to the more favorable set of activities appear with a time lag (that can be made arbitrarily short), then the final outcome depends entirely on initial conditions unless there is some gain to being the first to switch. To put it another way, unless there is some gain to being among the first to switch, each agent will rationally wait for others to switch first, and so no one will switch at all! Initial conditions will thus determine the entire equilibrium outcome. Adserà and Ray’s model shows that in a variety of circumstances there is a potential role for policy to enable an economy to break free of history. A temporary subsidy can “force” an equilibrium, and yet once the equilibrium is attained, the subsidy is no longer necessary to support it. We consider several such interventions below. 1.Affirmative Action and Anti-corruption Programs. A change in a legal statute may be able to force an equilibrium if the path to the new equilibrium entails a revision of beliefs and the revised beliefs sustain the new equilibrium. Stiglitz (1974b) shows how affirmative action programs can eliminate equilibria in which productivity is unequal between groups (e.g., races or ethnic groups) whose innate abilities are identical but whose histories are different. Productivity between groups may be unequal if, for example, individuals’ preferences for education depend on their parents’ education and if the resulting differences in education lead to differential expectations by employers regarding the payoffs to training workers. Decisions by employers may then lock different groups into different positions in the income distribution. An affirmative action program changes the behavior of employers, the new behavior creates a new “history” and reveals information about the discriminated-against group, and the revised information can lead to an equilibrium in which prospective employers no longer want to discriminate. Similarly, Tirole’s (1996) model of group reputation, discussed above, demonstrates the role that an anticorruption program of sufficient duration and severity can play in switching an economy from an equilibrium with high corruption—sustained by expectations of high corruption—to one with low corruption, sustained by expectations of low corruption. 2. Enactment of Social Norms into Law. Following Cooter (2000), suppose that a person who punishes someone for violating a social norm risks confrontation or revenge but that this risk falls as the proportion of people willing to punish increases. Suppose also that enactment into statutory law of the social norm (say, to use generally accepted accounting standards, or to send children to school) lowers the individual’s private cost of enforcement because it creates the possibility that violators of the norm will face civil punishment. In doing so, it may cause the individual to believe that other individuals will enforce the norm, and the expectation can be self-fulfilling. Enactment of the law can thus “pull in” private activity rather than “crowding it out” (as occurs in traditional analysis of government provision of public goods). By extension, a state governed by laws that mirror social norms (a “rule of law state”) tends to be one that is hard to corrupt, whereas a state in which law is imposed and enforced from above (the “rule of state law”) tends to be costly, ineffective, and easily corrupted (Cooter 1997). A related view of statutory law is developed by Basu (2000), who argues that the only way government-enacted law can influence an economy is to switch it from one equilibrium to another: if an outcome (including a set of norms consistent with that outcome) is not a candidate equilibrium absent the law, it is still not an equilibrium under any conceivable legal regime. 3. Temporary Wage Floors. There are situations in which an economy is characterized by multiple equilibria, some preferred by a policymaker over others, but in which the equilibria cannot be Pareto ranked. In those cases there may be interventions that switch an economy to the better equilibrium by forcing a change in the distribution of income. The classic example of multiple equilibria in the neoclassical model arises when the labor supply curve is backward-bending. Then there may exist one market equilibrium with low wages, high labor supply, and high profits and another with high wages, low labor supply, and low profits. The low-wage equilibrium is more favorable to capitalists, the other to workers. In such a setting, minimum wage legislation could serve to “rule out” the low-wage equilibrium. Once the high-wage equilibrium was attained, the minimum wage law would not be a binding constraint. That is, no effort would need to be expended to enforce the wage because, starting from the high-wage equilibrium, there is no supply of workers at the lower wage. Information as an Intervention Although by itself information often is not sufficient to ensure that more efficient equilibria predominate, it can be an effective intervention in many cases, for it does change the behavior of participants (see, for example, Dixit 1996). Rules concerning the disclosure of information and standards of accounting change behavior, if only by drawing attention to certain relevant “facts.” Disclosure of information can also make possible informal enforcement of community standards. In the area of pollution control, for instance, there is evidence that informal enforcement has had significant effects (see Pargal and Wheeler’s 1996 study of pollution levels across Indonesian districts). It is precisely because information does affect the behavior of voters that governments often work so hard to keep it secret (Stiglitz 1998b). Although there is no general theorem ensuring that private parties will engage in the socially desirable level of disclosure, there are strong reasons to believe that incumbents in the political process will work hard to suppress relevant information. Indeed, information about the importance of information has even affected the amount of information that is disclosed and the form in which it is disclosed. While it is true that different disclosure rules may induce behavior to try to circumvent the requirements, typically these are imperfect, particularly if the disclosure requirements are well designed. Interventions That Affect the Dynamics of the Political Process Public choice theory has provided considerable insights into the nature of political processes, including the problems associated with the formation of interest groups (Olson 1965; Becker 1983). For instance, free-rider problems play an important role in determining which interest-groups form, just as they play an important role in the provision of public goods more generally. Public actions affect the costs and benefits associated with interest-group formation. Since the costs of interestgroup formation are, to some extent at least, fixed costs, interventions that affect the dynamics of the political process—thereby affecting subsequent outcomes—can be thought of as deep interventions. They entail irreversibilities. An example of the dynamics of the political process may help illustrate what we have in mind. Assume that the government is contemplating privatizing a monopoly. There are several potential buyers. Each has an interest in ensuring that the regulations that prevail after privatization allow him to continue to enjoy the monopoly profits and perhaps even leverage the monopoly power further. But each, thinking that he has a small probability of winning, is unwilling to spend much to ensure this “collective” good (or bad, depending on one’s perspective). Moreover, each may face large costs of identifying who the other potential buyers are. Even if a potential buyer succeeds in identifying the others, if they are numerous there will still be a free-rider problem, each claiming publicly that he himself will obtain high profits through increased efficiency rather than by exploiting monopoly power. But once the privatization has occurred, there is a single party who is the “winner.” There no longer is a collective-action problem, and the winner has the incentive and resources to fight legislation imposing regulation or competition. Thus, before the privatization, it may be possible to pass rules to promote competition (since there is no organized resistance in the private sector) and there may be (admittedly weak) public interest groups pushing for it. The sequencing of reforms—that is, whether regulatory policies precede or follow privatization—matters. In one sequence, the result may be a competitive or regulated industry, where the benefits of privatization in terms of lower consumer prices are realized. In the other sequence, one may end up with an unregulated monopoly, which, to be sure, may be more efficient than it was as a public sector producer but which may be more efficient not only in producing goods but also in exploiting consumers. Deep interventions need to be distinguished from the shallow interventions that typically make up a part of “reform” packages in negotiations between borrower countries and international financial organizations. Consider measures to lower tariffs. Interventions that impose such tariff reforms as part of conditionality or as part of a World Trade Organization (wto) agreement do not necessarily change the underlying political forces. If they do not, a process that Finger (1998) calls political fungibility occurs: the political forces that generated the initial trade barriers simply look for other, wto-legal, interventions. These may have the same protective effect but may be more distortionary. The increased use of nontariff barriers, including antidumping measures, in developing countries is consistent with this theory. It is precisely because history matters that interventions can be effective in the long run. A perturbation to the system at one date can have permanent effects. (By contrast, in neoclassical and related theories, it is fundamentals—including those associated with the political process— that determine long-run outcomes.) A particular set of circumstances in which history can matter is when there are multiple equilibria and an historical shock “selects” the equilibrium. A large enough disturbance can move an economy in a direction that converges to a different steadystate equilibrium. Interventions to Change the Distribution of Wealth Among the most important sets of interventions are those that change the distribution of wealth. Such interventions can lead to a new steadystate distribution of wealth, W*, defined by W* = A(W*)W* where A is the transition matrix and W is the vector of wealth levels. We write A = A(W) to emphasize that the transition matrix depends on the distribution of wealth, the vector W. As was discussed in Part I, the wealth distribution affects economic performance through many channels. It affects the severity of agency problems (for example, access to financial markets), vulnerability to risk, and the institutions that arise to cope with agency problems and risk (such as sharecropping). These factors affect outcomes directly and also indirectly through the effect on prices, wages, interest rates, and the distribution of wealth in succeeding generations. The wealth distribution also affects political support for institutions that, by facilitating or impeding individuals’ participation in commercial activity, influence growth. Ongoing research explores the empirical relationship between the distribution of wealth and institutional development in New World economies beginning in the 1700s (see Engerman and Sokoloff 1997; Engerman, Haber, and Sokoloff 1999). These authors find that societies which began with greater inequality tended to place greater restrictions on access to primary schooling, access to land, the franchise, the right to vote in secret, the right to create a company, and the right to patent an invention and to protect that right in the courts. In Latin America these restrictions tended to perpetuate inequality and limit growth.

  2. Assistant

    现代经济理论与发展概述

    政府干预的无效性理论 公众选择理论提出了两个主要问题:一是顾问在政策制定中是否有影响力,二是在市场经济中,政府干预是否能促进良好的经济结果。经济学的传统看法认为,政府的适当角色仅限于定义和执行财产权和提供公共物品。超出此范围的干预可能是无效、不必要或反效果的。

    尽管许多经济增长的成功案例都涉及政府强有力的干预,但这种一般性观点依然存在挑战。例如,美国自1863年以来对金融市场的监管表明,良好的宏观经济管理确实能带来积极效果。美国在产业政策方面也有成功的历史,从电信行业的创建到支持高科技产业的研究。然而,关于政府干预无效性的理论论点仍值得探讨和批判。

    1. 政府不必要论:政府所能做的,私营部门也能更好地完成。实际上,政府拥有解决公共物品和外部性问题的独特权力,这些问题在经济中普遍存在。

    2. 政府作用被私营部门抵消:虽然在某些特定模型中这一点成立,但通常并不适用。例如,政府通过税收改变相对价格时,其政策效果往往是显著的。

    3. 政府始终被特殊利益集团所捕获:确实,生产者的特殊利益集团有意通过监管过程来获取利益,但也存在其他团体的相互对抗。政治过程的结果复杂性超出了简单的理论捕获预设。

    干预类型及其效果

    1. 解决协调问题的干预:一些经济模型表明,政府干预可以引导经济朝向更有利的均衡。然而,政治过程不一定能产生帕累托改进。某些情况下,初始条件决定了均衡结果。

    2. 信息作为干预手段:信息的披露和会计标准可以改变参与者的行为,尽管单靠信息不足以确保高效均衡的主导地位。信息的不对称导致政府通常努力保留秘密信息。

    3. 影响政治过程的干预:公共选择理论深刻揭示了政治过程中的利益集团形成问题,干预措施可以改变形成利益集团的成本和收益。

    改变财富分配的干预

    改变财富分配的干预措施能够导致财富的新稳态分布,影响经济表现和机构发展。研究表明,社会的不平等会限制为商业活动的参与创造平等机会,进而影响经济增长。这表明财富分配的历史和结构因素在经济发展的长期结果中是至关重要的。

    综上所述,在现代经济理论和发展中,政府干预的有效性、信息的作用、以及财富分配的影响等方面都具有重要的理论价值和应用意义。

  3. User

    用俄语缩写modern economic theory and development Theories of the Ineffectiveness of Government Intervention The issue raised by the public choice school is whether an adviser can influence policy. A second, distinct issue is whether, in a market economy, government intervention can promote good outcomes. There is a long tradition in economics that the only proper role for the government is to define and enforce property rights and to provide public goods. Beyond that, government interventions are likely to be—in the extreme versions, inevitably will be—ineffective, unnecessary, or counterproductive. The fact that most of the “success” cases of economic growth have involved heavy doses of government intervention provides a strong counterweight to these general allegations. For instance, in the United States the government has, since 1863, played a role in financial market regulation. Evidence that since World War II downturns have been shallower and shorter and expansions longer is consistent with the hypothesis that better macroeconomic management does work. Even in industrial policies, the United States has a credible history—from the founding of the telecommunications industry, with the first telegraph line between Baltimore and Washington in 1842, to its most recent contribution to that industry, the creation of the Internet; from the support of research and dissemination in the dominant sector of the 19th century, agriculture, to support of research in the dominant high-technology industries of today. Still, it is worth disposing quickly of the major theoretical arguments underlying the ineffectiveness of intervention. Government is unnecessary: anything the government can do, the private sector can do better. The fact is that government is endowed with powers which the private sector does not have, and these powers are essential in addressing the public good and externality problems that are rife throughout the economy. Coasians are simply wrong in arguing that private parties by themselves, with given, well-defined property rights, always resolve these issues. Anything government does will be undone by the private sector. Although there are specific models for which this assertion is true (see, for instance, Lucas 1973; Lucas and Prescott 1974), it is generally not true— for example, when government changes relative prices through taxation. Still, there is an important moral to these models: the actual consequences of government policies can be markedly different from the intended ones. Government is always captured by special-interest groups (Stigler 1971). To be sure, there are incentives for producer special-interest groups to try to capture, for instance, the regulatory process. But there are countervailing incentives for other groups. Stigler does not explain why in some states it is consumer groups that capture, say, electricity regulation, while in others it appears to be producer groups. In this, too, there is an important moral: political processes are critical, but the outcome of political processes is more complicated than simple theories of capture would suggest. A variety of interventions can affect outcomes. Below we consider several broad kinds of interventions: (a) interventions to solve coordination problems, (b) information as an intervention, (c) interventions to change the dynamics of the political process, and (d) interventions to change the distribution of wealth. Interventions to Solve a Coordination Problem Some of the multiple-equilibria models discussed above suggest interventions that can move an economy to a more favorable equilibrium. But just as the equilibrium set of behaviors in a decentralized economy may not be Pareto efficient, one cannot jump to the conclusion that Pareto improvements are likely to emerge from the political process. (At the end of this part we provide examples of cases in which they do not.) Moreover, to make the analysis of intervention precise requires a dynamic framework. For example, only in a dynamic framework can one ask whether an initial coordination failure will in fact transmit itself over time. Why would not forward-looking agents, with sufficiently low discount rates, adopt a path (which might include the option of changing their behavior several times) that would permit as an equilibrium a self-fulfilling move away from a bad equilibrium to a good one? Is there really any scope for policy? Adserà and Ray (1998) address these questions in a setting in which each agent makes a discrete choice between two activities (which could be interpreted as entry into a high-tech versus a low-tech sector). They obtain a striking result: if the positive externalities from moving to the more favorable set of activities appear with a time lag (that can be made arbitrarily short), then the final outcome depends entirely on initial conditions unless there is some gain to being the first to switch. To put it another way, unless there is some gain to being among the first to switch, each agent will rationally wait for others to switch first, and so no one will switch at all! Initial conditions will thus determine the entire equilibrium outcome. Adserà and Ray’s model shows that in a variety of circumstances there is a potential role for policy to enable an economy to break free of history. A temporary subsidy can “force” an equilibrium, and yet once the equilibrium is attained, the subsidy is no longer necessary to support it. We consider several such interventions below. 1.Affirmative Action and Anti-corruption Programs. A change in a legal statute may be able to force an equilibrium if the path to the new equilibrium entails a revision of beliefs and the revised beliefs sustain the new equilibrium. Stiglitz (1974b) shows how affirmative action programs can eliminate equilibria in which productivity is unequal between groups (e.g., races or ethnic groups) whose innate abilities are identical but whose histories are different. Productivity between groups may be unequal if, for example, individuals’ preferences for education depend on their parents’ education and if the resulting differences in education lead to differential expectations by employers regarding the payoffs to training workers. Decisions by employers may then lock different groups into different positions in the income distribution. An affirmative action program changes the behavior of employers, the new behavior creates a new “history” and reveals information about the discriminated-against group, and the revised information can lead to an equilibrium in which prospective employers no longer want to discriminate. Similarly, Tirole’s (1996) model of group reputation, discussed above, demonstrates the role that an anticorruption program of sufficient duration and severity can play in switching an economy from an equilibrium with high corruption—sustained by expectations of high corruption—to one with low corruption, sustained by expectations of low corruption. 2. Enactment of Social Norms into Law. Following Cooter (2000), suppose that a person who punishes someone for violating a social norm risks confrontation or revenge but that this risk falls as the proportion of people willing to punish increases. Suppose also that enactment into statutory law of the social norm (say, to use generally accepted accounting standards, or to send children to school) lowers the individual’s private cost of enforcement because it creates the possibility that violators of the norm will face civil punishment. In doing so, it may cause the individual to believe that other individuals will enforce the norm, and the expectation can be self-fulfilling. Enactment of the law can thus “pull in” private activity rather than “crowding it out” (as occurs in traditional analysis of government provision of public goods). By extension, a state governed by laws that mirror social norms (a “rule of law state”) tends to be one that is hard to corrupt, whereas a state in which law is imposed and enforced from above (the “rule of state law”) tends to be costly, ineffective, and easily corrupted (Cooter 1997). A related view of statutory law is developed by Basu (2000), who argues that the only way government-enacted law can influence an economy is to switch it from one equilibrium to another: if an outcome (including a set of norms consistent with that outcome) is not a candidate equilibrium absent the law, it is still not an equilibrium under any conceivable legal regime. 3. Temporary Wage Floors. There are situations in which an economy is characterized by multiple equilibria, some preferred by a policymaker over others, but in which the equilibria cannot be Pareto ranked. In those cases there may be interventions that switch an economy to the better equilibrium by forcing a change in the distribution of income. The classic example of multiple equilibria in the neoclassical model arises when the labor supply curve is backward-bending. Then there may exist one market equilibrium with low wages, high labor supply, and high profits and another with high wages, low labor supply, and low profits. The low-wage equilibrium is more favorable to capitalists, the other to workers. In such a setting, minimum wage legislation could serve to “rule out” the low-wage equilibrium. Once the high-wage equilibrium was attained, the minimum wage law would not be a binding constraint. That is, no effort would need to be expended to enforce the wage because, starting from the high-wage equilibrium, there is no supply of workers at the lower wage. Information as an Intervention Although by itself information often is not sufficient to ensure that more efficient equilibria predominate, it can be an effective intervention in many cases, for it does change the behavior of participants (see, for example, Dixit 1996). Rules concerning the disclosure of information and standards of accounting change behavior, if only by drawing attention to certain relevant “facts.” Disclosure of information can also make possible informal enforcement of community standards. In the area of pollution control, for instance, there is evidence that informal enforcement has had significant effects (see Pargal and Wheeler’s 1996 study of pollution levels across Indonesian districts). It is precisely because information does affect the behavior of voters that governments often work so hard to keep it secret (Stiglitz 1998b). Although there is no general theorem ensuring that private parties will engage in the socially desirable level of disclosure, there are strong reasons to believe that incumbents in the political process will work hard to suppress relevant information. Indeed, information about the importance of information has even affected the amount of information that is disclosed and the form in which it is disclosed. While it is true that different disclosure rules may induce behavior to try to circumvent the requirements, typically these are imperfect, particularly if the disclosure requirements are well designed. Interventions That Affect the Dynamics of the Political Process Public choice theory has provided considerable insights into the nature of political processes, including the problems associated with the formation of interest groups (Olson 1965; Becker 1983). For instance, free-rider problems play an important role in determining which interest-groups form, just as they play an important role in the provision of public goods more generally. Public actions affect the costs and benefits associated with interest-group formation. Since the costs of interestgroup formation are, to some extent at least, fixed costs, interventions that affect the dynamics of the political process—thereby affecting subsequent outcomes—can be thought of as deep interventions. They entail irreversibilities. An example of the dynamics of the political process may help illustrate what we have in mind. Assume that the government is contemplating privatizing a monopoly. There are several potential buyers. Each has an interest in ensuring that the regulations that prevail after privatization allow him to continue to enjoy the monopoly profits and perhaps even leverage the monopoly power further. But each, thinking that he has a small probability of winning, is unwilling to spend much to ensure this “collective” good (or bad, depending on one’s perspective). Moreover, each may face large costs of identifying who the other potential buyers are. Even if a potential buyer succeeds in identifying the others, if they are numerous there will still be a free-rider problem, each claiming publicly that he himself will obtain high profits through increased efficiency rather than by exploiting monopoly power. But once the privatization has occurred, there is a single party who is the “winner.” There no longer is a collective-action problem, and the winner has the incentive and resources to fight legislation imposing regulation or competition. Thus, before the privatization, it may be possible to pass rules to promote competition (since there is no organized resistance in the private sector) and there may be (admittedly weak) public interest groups pushing for it. The sequencing of reforms—that is, whether regulatory policies precede or follow privatization—matters. In one sequence, the result may be a competitive or regulated industry, where the benefits of privatization in terms of lower consumer prices are realized. In the other sequence, one may end up with an unregulated monopoly, which, to be sure, may be more efficient than it was as a public sector producer but which may be more efficient not only in producing goods but also in exploiting consumers. Deep interventions need to be distinguished from the shallow interventions that typically make up a part of “reform” packages in negotiations between borrower countries and international financial organizations. Consider measures to lower tariffs. Interventions that impose such tariff reforms as part of conditionality or as part of a World Trade Organization (wto) agreement do not necessarily change the underlying political forces. If they do not, a process that Finger (1998) calls political fungibility occurs: the political forces that generated the initial trade barriers simply look for other, wto-legal, interventions. These may have the same protective effect but may be more distortionary. The increased use of nontariff barriers, including antidumping measures, in developing countries is consistent with this theory. It is precisely because history matters that interventions can be effective in the long run. A perturbation to the system at one date can have permanent effects. (By contrast, in neoclassical and related theories, it is fundamentals—including those associated with the political process— that determine long-run outcomes.) A particular set of circumstances in which history can matter is when there are multiple equilibria and an historical shock “selects” the equilibrium. A large enough disturbance can move an economy in a direction that converges to a different steadystate equilibrium. Interventions to Change the Distribution of Wealth Among the most important sets of interventions are those that change the distribution of wealth. Such interventions can lead to a new steadystate distribution of wealth, W*, defined by W* = A(W*)W* where A is the transition matrix and W is the vector of wealth levels. We write A = A(W) to emphasize that the transition matrix depends on the distribution of wealth, the vector W. As was discussed in Part I, the wealth distribution affects economic performance through many channels. It affects the severity of agency problems (for example, access to financial markets), vulnerability to risk, and the institutions that arise to cope with agency problems and risk (such as sharecropping). These factors affect outcomes directly and also indirectly through the effect on prices, wages, interest rates, and the distribution of wealth in succeeding generations. The wealth distribution also affects political support for institutions that, by facilitating or impeding individuals’ participation in commercial activity, influence growth. Ongoing research explores the empirical relationship between the distribution of wealth and institutional development in New World economies beginning in the 1700s (see Engerman and Sokoloff 1997; Engerman, Haber, and Sokoloff 1999). These authors find that societies which began with greater inequality tended to place greater restrictions on access to primary schooling, access to land, the franchise, the right to vote in secret, the right to create a company, and the right to patent an invention and to protect that right in the courts. In Latin America these restrictions tended to perpetuate inequality and limit growth.

  4. Assistant

    Современная экономическая теория и развитие

    Теории неэффективности государственного вмешательства Вопрос, поднятый школой публичного выбора, касается того, может ли советник влиять на политику. Второй, отдельный вопрос — может ли государственное вмешательство в рыночной экономике привести к хорошим результатам. Долгая традиция в экономике утверждает, что единственной правильной ролью государства является определение и обеспечение прав собственности, а также предоставление общественных благ. Вне этого, государственное вмешательство, вероятно, будет неэффективным, ненужным или контрпродуктивным.

    Тем не менее, большинство успешных случаев экономического роста включали значительные объемы государственного вмешательства, что служит сильным контраргументом к таким общим утверждениям. Например, с 1863 года правительство США играет роль в регулировании финансовых рынков. Доказательства того, что с момента Второй мировой войны экономические спады были менее болезненными и короткими, а расширения — более длительными, подтверждают гипотезу о том, что лучшее макроэкономическое управление действительно работает.

    Основные теоретические аргументы, underpinning неэффективность вмешательства, являются:

    1. Государство ненужно: Все, что может сделать государство, может сделать и частный сектор. На самом деле у правительства есть полномочия, которых нет у частного сектора. Эти полномочия необходимы для решения проблем общественных благ и внешних эффектов.

    2. Все, что делает государство, будет разрушено частным сектором: Хотя в некоторых моделях это может быть верно, в большинстве случаев — нет. Напр., когда государство изменяет относительные цены через налогообложение.

    3. Государство всегда захвачено группами интересов: Это утверждение имеет свои основания, но политические процессы более сложны, чем простые теории захвата.

    Виды вмешательства и их влияние

    1. Вмешательства для решения координационных проблем: Некоторые модели множественных равновесий предполагают вмешательства, которые могут перевести экономику к более благоприятному равновесию.

    2. Информация как вмешательство: Раскрытие информации и стандарты бухгалтерского учета могут изменить поведение участников, хотя само по себе оно не всегда достаточно.

    3. Вмешательства, влияющие на динамику политического процесса: Теория публичного выбора предлагает важные инсайты о формации групп интересов. Вмешательства, воздействующие на динамику политического процесса, могут рассматриваться как глубокие вмешательства, поскольку они ведут к необратимым изменениям.

    Изменение распределения богатства

    Наиболее значительные вмешательства — те, которые меняют распределение богатства. Такие вмешательства могут приводить к новой стационарной распределению богатства, что влияет на экономическое развитие и институциональные структуры. Исследования показывают, что более неравные общества имеют больше ограничений на доступ к образованию и экономическим возможностям, что ограничивает рост.

    Эти эффекты подчеркивают важность роли государства и возможных вмешательств в экономическое развитие, а также сложность взаимодействия между историческими условиями, политическими структурами и экономическими результатами.

  5. User

    用俄语缩写### Современная экономическая теория и развитие

    Теории неэффективности государственного вмешательства Вопрос, поднятый школой публичного выбора, касается того, может ли советник влиять на политику. Второй, отдельный вопрос — может ли государственное вмешательство в рыночной экономике привести к хорошим результатам. Долгая традиция в экономике утверждает, что единственной правильной ролью государства является определение и обеспечение прав собственности, а также предоставление общественных благ. Вне этого, государственное вмешательство, вероятно, будет неэффективным, ненужным или контрпродуктивным.

    Тем не менее, большинство успешных случаев экономического роста включали значительные объемы государственного вмешательства, что служит сильным контраргументом к таким общим утверждениям. Например, с 1863 года правительство США играет роль в регулировании финансовых рынков. Доказательства того, что с момента Второй мировой войны экономические спады были менее болезненными и короткими, а расширения — более длительными, подтверждают гипотезу о том, что лучшее макроэкономическое управление действительно работает.

    Основные теоретические аргументы, underpinning неэффективность вмешательства, являются:

    1. Государство ненужно: Все, что может сделать государство, может сделать и частный сектор. На самом деле у правительства есть полномочия, которых нет у частного сектора. Эти полномочия необходимы для решения проблем общественных благ и внешних эффектов.

    2. Все, что делает государство, будет разрушено частным сектором: Хотя в некоторых моделях это может быть верно, в большинстве случаев — нет. Напр., когда государство изменяет относительные цены через налогообложение.

    3. Государство всегда захвачено группами интересов: Это утверждение имеет свои основания, но политические процессы более сложны, чем простые теории захвата.

    Виды вмешательства и их влияние

    1. Вмешательства для решения координационных проблем: Некоторые модели множественных равновесий предполагают вмешательства, которые могут перевести экономику к более благоприятному равновесию.

    2. Информация как вмешательство: Раскрытие информации и стандарты бухгалтерского учета могут изменить поведение участников, хотя само по себе оно не всегда достаточно.

    3. Вмешательства, влияющие на динамику политического процесса: Теория публичного выбора предлагает важные инсайты о формации групп интересов. Вмешательства, воздействующие на динамику политического процесса, могут рассматриваться как глубокие вмешательства, поскольку они ведут к необратимым изменениям.

    Изменение распределения богатства

    Наиболее значительные вмешательства — те, которые меняют распределение богатства. Такие вмешательства могут приводить к новой стационарной распределению богатства, что влияет на экономическое развитие и институциональные структуры. Исследования показывают, что более неравные общества имеют больше ограничений на доступ к образованию и экономическим возможностям, что ограничивает рост.

    Эти эффекты подчеркивают важность роли государства и возможных вмешательств в экономическое развитие, а также сложность взаимодействия между историческими условиями, политическими структурами и экономическими результатами.

  6. Assistant

    Современная экономическая теория и развитие

    Теории неэффективности государственного вмешательства
    Школа публичного выбора поднимает вопрос о влиянии советников на политику и о том, может ли государственное вмешательство в рыночной экономике привести к положительным результатам. Традиционно считается, что единственной правильной ролью государства является защита прав собственности и предоставление общественных благ. За пределами этого вмешательство часто считается неэффективным и контрпродуктивным.

    Однако многие успешные примеры экономического роста включали значительное государственное вмешательство. Например, с 1863 года правительство США регулирует финансовые рынки. Данные свидетельствуют о том, что после Второй мировой войны экономические спады стали более кратковременными, а расширения — длительными, подтверждая эффективность макроэкономического управления.

    Основные аргументы, обосновывающие неэффективность вмешательства, включают:

    1. Государство ненужно: Всё, что может сделать государство, может сделать и частный сектор, но государство обладает полномочиями, необходимыми для решения проблем общественных благ и внешних эффектов.

    2. Разрушение вмешательства частным сектором: Хотя это верно для некоторых моделей, в большинстве случаев государственные действия могут изменять относительные цены.

    3. Захват группами интересов: Конечно, группы интересов могут влиять на политику, но результаты политических процессов зачастую сложнее.

    Виды вмешательства и их влияние

    1. Вмешательства для решения координационных проблем: Модели множественных равновесий предполагают, что вмешательства могут привести к более благоприятному равновесию.

    2. Информация как вмешательство: Раскрытие информации и бухгалтерские стандарты могут изменять поведение участников.

    3. Вмешательства в динамику политического процесса: Теория публичного выбора предлагает важные инсайты о группах интересов и показывает, что такие вмешательства могут привести к необратимым изменениям.

    Изменение распределения богатства

    Важнейшими являются те вмешательства, которые изменяют распределение богатства. Они могут приводить к новой стационарной модели распределения, что влияет на экономическое развитие и институциональные структуры. Исследования показывают, что неравные общества имеют больше ограничений на доступ к образованию и экономическим возможностям, что ограничивает рост.

    Эти аспекты подчеркивают значимость роли государства и вмешательства в экономическое развитие, а также сложность взаимодействия между историческими условиями, политическими структурами и экономическими результатами.