phenomenal consciousness
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phenomenal consciousness
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Phenomenal consciousness refers to the subjective experience of being aware, the 'what it is like' aspect of consciousness. It encompasses the qualitative, first-person experiences that are often described as qualia. These include the sensation of colors, sounds, tastes, emotions, and other sensory perceptions that make up our subjective reality.
Philosopher Thomas Nagel famously articulated the concept in his 1974 paper "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?", arguing that there is something it is like to be a bat, which is inherently subjective and cannot be fully understood from a purely objective or third-person perspective. Similarly, Australian philosopher David Chalmers refers to the problem of explaining why and how we have these subjective experiences as the "hard problem of consciousness."
Phenomenal consciousness stands in contrast to access consciousness, which pertains to the availability of information to cognitive processes for reasoning, verbal report, and decision-making. While access consciousness can often be associated with objective measures and functions, phenomenal consciousness focuses on the intrinsic, experiential qualities that are more challenging to quantify or explain scientifically.