请将“For Abensour, the distinction is significant enough to reflect a change of paradigms.…
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请将“For Abensour, the distinction is significant enough to reflect a change of paradigms. In 1843, true democracy is a dialectic in which “the disappearance of the State” stands at the pinnacle of an almost cumulative process of mediations. In 1871, a more temporal, agonistic and immediately political dynamic of democracy is outlined, with the emphasis falling on “action that consists in smashing modern State power” (pp. 87 and 96). In .ways analogous to Pierre Clastres’ anthropology of society against the State, Marx’s writings on the Commune indeed detail a “collection of mechanisms whose function is to impede the sudden rise of a separate power, and whose aim is to block, at the site of the political, the advent of a division between power and society.”36 Rather than pointing to the millenarian disappearance of the State, Marx therefore reveals the working existence of the Commune as actively engaging, from within its own political bounds, an opposition between non-coercive and coercive modalities of power. True democracy, far from representing a quixotic escape from the universality of political power, would provide a new figure of emancipation by proving that the conflict between democracy and the State can be given body and meaning in the invention of an unprecedented political relation. Marx’s specification in 1871 that the “State-machine” is not to be appropriated but smashed is all the more suggestive as this action now forms the “rational medium” for class struggle. It is as though the fight against exploitation would henceforth gain its rational structure from the fight against domination, rather than vice versa. The emphasis on the struggle against the State as the “rational medium” for class struggle establishes again - as with the 1843 Critique, and as against the 1859 Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy - the formal and practical primacy of the political over the economic: or better, it highlights the nuance of the analysis of the State that now makes the primacy explicit. Rather than designating an essentially neutral mechanism, a form of governmental institution that owes its liberating or oppressive character to the class that gives it its stamp, the State signifies as ever an irreducible relation of domination. If the bourgeois State is mediated by the economic base, by the progress of industry and the national power of capital over labor, and is in this sense the clearinghouse of bourgeois interests, its internal logic is nonetheless consistent with the “State-machine” of every epoch. Social domination is the embryonic structure of the State. As such, far from representing the “main booty” of proletarian revolution, the “temporary” appropriation of this structure toward revolutionary ends is seen as only delivering that revolution’s death sentence. Every revolution that sets out to annihilate class differences, while centralizing power in the hands of the State, only serves to bring out the autonomy of the “State machine” in broad relief at the same time as it fetters the emancipation of the working classes anew. The State, therefore, can only constitute for Marx “the great and single object of attack to the revolution.”37 The emblematic breakthrough of the 1871 Commune, Marx writes, is “revolution against the State itself,” revolution against the very movement of power’s separation from society, which is now identified with the “machinery of class domination itself.”38 The primacy of smashing modern State power - as the primacy of creating a political liberty that would provide the “rational medium” for class struggles - is thereby made coextensive with the primacy of neutralizing the force of domination through the force of democratic action. And again, the question of domination does indeed become central as the failure to confront politically the self-separation of social power appears, in Marx’s view, to condemn every revolution in advance of emancipation turning into its opposite. The historical breakthrough of the Commune is to have turned self-government into a living critique of social domination - domination as something radical, as socially diffuse and ubiquitous - and to have thus established the “rational medium” for multiplying the fields of class struggle in the ongoing test of a people to initiate themselves to “social revolution.” Thus, smashing the State refers less to the particular locus of negation - as if the power of domination and the power of its centralization/formalization were not consubstantial - than to the double-edged movement of negation itself. The Commune brings into view a struggle of the people to “form their own force instead of the organized force of their suppression.”39 Or more explicitly, the smashing of the State now signals for Marx the eruption of a “rational medium” which awakens a people’s vigilance and force against “their own force opposed to and organized against them.”40 Without pushing matters too far, we can nonetheless see how, beyond Machiavelli, Marx glimpses in the Commune an attempt to grapple with the difficult truth stressed by Etienne de La Boétie: “no real or empirical foundation, that is, nothing positive is capable of accounting for servitude.”41 It is as though the enigma of democracy were entirely contained in the enigma of servitude, and the Machiavellian division between the powerful and the weak, the dominating few and the dominated many, were for Marx revealed in the ineradicable division of a people’s power itself. To the non-localizable dynamic of the State would thus correspond the interminable movement of true democracy. Rather than “resolve” social division, democratic society in its “truth” would constitute itself reflexively. As Abensour has suggested by reference to Etienne de la Boétie, such a political society would establish itself in an “incessant self-return that would tend toward a continuous self-institution, recognizing in the political realm, which would have become the nodal-point of contention, the very space of an. inextinguishable questioning of its social being.”42 For this reason, we may agree with Alain Badiou when he makes the Commune of Paris the emblem of an “unknown capacity, a power without precedence ... a subversion of the rules of political appearance.”43 In effect, the world of politics is confronted with that which does not, in this world, count as politics: a government (the “Communal Constitution”) based not on the laws of State power, but on those formulated by the direct initiative of workers (precisely, the uncounted of politics). The members of the Communal government are directly elected and revocable; the separation of representative powers is terminated and replaced by delegations that are directly deliberative and executive; the professional army is banned in favor of the direct arming of the people - coincidentally, a move not far from the aims of civic humanism according to Pocock44 - and so on. Yet we may also go beyond Badiou by recognizing how the logic of dual power, as an embryonic power contesting the property of the old, is immediately radicalized, internalized, and as it were self-consciously redoubled. Starting with the proclamation distributed over the entire city on 19 March - “the proletarians of the capital, in the midst of the weakness and treason of the governing classes, have understood that the moment has come to save the situation by taking the direction of public affairs in their own hands” (Comité central de la garde nationale} - representational treason ceases to index the regrettable, but unavoidable, everyday state of political affairs. Instead, such treason is the turn of events the Communards struggle actively to prevent by instituting popular accountability over their own political powers. In Abensour’s reading of Marx, the Communards constitute, from within the Commune’s own political terrain, a methodic intensification of dual power. That is, the Communal form institutes itself and perseveres in time as “an agonistic relation that aims to forestall the State’s return [. . .] thus mobilizing a critical knowledge and a thumos where desire for liberty and hate of servitude are mixed indistinctly” (p. 88). Or more precisely, the revolutionary situation of the Commune is played out in “a multifaceted arena of conflict at the heart of which the struggle for democracy is confronted by at least two adversaries: it rises against not only the State of the ‘Old Regime,’ but also against the one that is in statu nascendi during the course of the revolution itself” (p. 96). The problem, then, becomes how to read Marx when he presents the Commune as the “political form at last discovered” of emancipation.45 Is the enigma of emancipation resolved? Is it to be found in the regime of the Commune? Or is true democracy instead revealed in the political movement of the Commune, which succeeded for a time in destabilizing the very idea of the “good regime”? Is it really possible to locate this moment and body: “When the Paris Commune took the management of the revolution in its own hands”?46 Or is the fluidity of the verbal adjunct the whole point, as though Marx were connecting the “hands” of revolution to the rise of an anomalous managing body - the Commune as the self-government of the popular masses - in order to emphasize how the count of the uncounted reinvents the political realm as a permanent object of dispute? If we maintain the perspective of “reflective judgment,” the Commune in effect has an exemplary, as opposed to determinant, signification for true democracy. Indeed, could any political “model” incorporate the body of the people as a power, or configure the utopian body of true democracy?”翻译为中文
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对于Abensour来说,这种区别足以反映出一种范式的变化。在1843年,真正的民主是一种辩证法,其中“国家的消失”是一个几乎是累积性过程的顶峰。到了1871年,民主展现出了一种更具时效性、对抗性和直接政治性的动态,强调的是“打碎现代国家权力”的行动(第87和96页)。以与皮埃尔·克拉斯特(Pierre Clastres)的国家对抗社会的人类学相类似的方式,马克思对公社的著述确实详细说明了“一系列机制,其功能是阻碍一个独立权力的突然崛起,其目标是在政治现场阻止权力与社会之间划分的到来”。因此,与其指向国家的千年消失,不如说马克思揭示了公社的运作实践,它在自己的政治范畴内积极参与非强制与强制权力方式之间的对立。真正的民主,远非代表从政治权力普遍性中逃避的堂吉诃德式幻想,它提供了一种通过证明民主与国家之间的冲突可以在前所未有的政治关系的发明中具体化和赋予意义的新型解放形象。
马克思在1871年明确指出,“国家机器”不是要被占有,而是要被打碎,这一行动现在构成了阶级斗争的“理性媒介”,更具有启发性。好像反对剥削的斗争从此获得其理性结构是源于反对统治的斗争,而不是反过来。强调作为阶级斗争“理性媒介”的反对国家的斗争,再次确认了-与1843年的批判相对,以及与1859年《政治经济学批判》的贡献相抗衡-政治对经济的形式和实践原则的重要性:或者更好地说,它突出了现在使这种原则明确化的国家分析的细微差别。国家不再被指定为一个基本中立的机制,一个政府机构的形式,其解放或压迫的特征取决于赋予其印记的阶级,国家如同以往一样意味着不可减少的统治关系。如果资产阶级国家是由经济基础、工业的进步以及资本对劳动的国家力量的垄断来中介的,从这个意义上说,它是资产阶级利益的交易所,它的内在逻辑仍然与每一个时代的“国家机器”一致。社会统治是国家的胚胎结构。因此,远非代表无产阶级革命的“主要战利品”,这个结构向革命目的的“临时”占有只会宣告该革命的死刑。每一个旨在消灭阶级差别的革命,同时又将权力集中于国家手中,都只会同时突显出“国家机器”的自主性,并以新的形式束缚工人阶级的解放。因此,对于马克思而言,国家只能构成“革命攻击的伟大而唯一目标”。1871年的公社的标志性突破,马克思写道,是“反对国家本身的革命”,反对权力与社会分离的运动本身,这现在与“阶级统治机器本身”的运作相认同。
打碎现代国家权力的原则 - 作为创造政治自由的原则,以提供阶级斗争的“理性媒介” - 因此与通过民主行动的力量中和统治力量的原则变得共存。再次地,统治的问题确实成为中心,因为马克思认为,政治上未能面对社会权力的自我分离,在解放前注定每一场革命都会变成其相反。公社的历史性突破在于将自治转化为生动的社会统治批判 - 即作为某种根本性的、社会上普遍存在的统治 - 因此建立了在持续检验人民开启“社会革命”的过程中,在阶级斗争领域乘数增加的“理性媒介”。因此,打碎国家不太指向否定的特定地点 - 好像统治的力量与其集中化/形式化的力量不是本质相关 - 而是指向否定自身的双重运动。公社展现了一场人民的斗争,要“形成自己的力量,而不是他们压迫的有组织的力量”。或者更明确地说,对于马克思而言,打碎国家现在标志着“理性媒介”的爆发,这唤醒了人民的警觉性和力量对抗“他们自己的力量,这力量与他们对立并有组织”。
不过太过深入考虑,我们仍然可以看到,越过马基雅维利,马克思在公社中瞥见了一次尝试,要应对埃蒂安·德·拉·波埃蒂(Etienne de La Boétie)强调的困难真相:“没有真实或经验的基础,即没有任何积极的东西能够解释奴役。”好像民主的谜团完全包含在奴役的谜团中,而对于马克思来说,马基雅维利强调的强大者与弱者、统治者与被统治者之间的分裂,在人民权力自身不可消除的分裂中被揭示。因此,对应于国家非定位动态的,将是真正民主的无休止运动。与其“解决”社会分裂,民主社会在其“真理”中将以反思性方式构成自身。正如Abensour通过引用埃蒂安·德·拉·波埃蒂的话所建议的,这样一个政治社会将在“不断的自我回归中建立自身,倾向于连续的自我建立,认识到在政治领域中,这将成为争论的焦点,是其社会存在不灭的质问的空间。”
因此,我们可能会同意阿兰·巴迪欧(Alain Badiou),当他将巴黎公社作为“未知能力,一种前所未有的力量……政治表象规则的颠覆”的象征。实际上,政治世界面临着在这个世界中不被视为政治的东西:一个政府(“公社宪法”)基于的不是国家权力的法律,而是工人(确切地说,政治中未被计算的)的直接倡议制定的法律。公社政府的成员直接选举并可撤销;代表权力的分离被终止,并被直接的议事和执行代表取代;专业军队被禁止,转而直接武装人民 - 顺便说一句,这一举措与波科克(Pocock)所说的公民人文主义的目标不谋而合 - 等等。
然而,我们也可以通过认识到双重权力的逻辑,作为一种胚胎性的权力,挑战旧的财产权,立即被激进化、内化、可以说是自觉地加倍,从而超越巴迪欧。从3月19日分发到整个城市的宣言开始 - “在统治阶级的软弱和背叛中,首都的无产者们已经明白,现在是通过自己的手将公共事务的方向掌握在手中来拯救局势的时刻”(国民警卫队中央委员会)- 代表性的背叛不再标志着遗憾,但不可避免的,日常政治事务状态。相反,这种背叛是公社成员积极防止的转折,通过建立对自己政治权力的民众问责。在Abensour对马克思的阅读中,公社成员构成了公社自身政治领域内双重权力的方法论强化。也就是说,公社形式作为“一种旨在防止国家回归的对抗性关系[...]从而动员一种批判性知识和热情,其中自由的渴望和对奴役的仇恨含糊不清地混合在一起”(第88页)。或者更准确地说,公社的革命形势在“一个多层面的冲突舞台上展开,在这个舞台的核心,民主斗争至少面临两个对手:它不仅反对‘旧制度’的国家,还反对在革命过程中处于新生状态的那个国家”(第96页)。
然后,问题变成了如何阅读马克思,当他呈现公社为解放的“最终发现的政治形式”。解放的谜题解决了吗?它能在公社制度中找到吗?或者真正的民主是否在公社的政治运动中被揭示,这场运动一度成功地破坏了“好政体”这个概念的稳定性?是否真的可能定位这一时刻和主体:“当巴黎公社将革命的管理掌握在自己手中”?或者,动词附加物的流动性是整个要点,好像马克思将革命的“手”与一种异常的管理主体的崛起连接起来 - 公社作为人民大众的自我政府 - 以强调未被计算的计数如何重新发明政治领域作为永久争议的对象?
如果我们保持“反思性判断”的视角,公社实际上对真正的民主具有示范性,而不是决定性的意义。的确,任何政治“模型”都能包含人民作为力量的身体,或配置真正民主的乌托邦身体吗?
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请将“In this light, Marx’s line of enquiry appears to undercut the matrix of the model no less than the portraiture of the Commune as the harbinger of the “dictatorship of the proletariat” (Engels, Lenin, Mao, etc.). The node of disagreement would now be Marx’s own estimation that the social measures of the Commune “could but betoken the tendency of a government of the people.”47 Either the “weakness” of the Commune in its inability to localize, to stabilize, in a word, to centralize power in a vanguard of revolutionary transformation is what forces the measures to an emblematic status, and the nonidentity of the Commune reveals the Communards as caught, despite themselves, in the immature stages of proletarian class-consciousness. Or to the contrary, as Abensour seems to suggest, Marx takes the nonidentity and unstable structures of the Commune as the strength and motor of its exemplary working existence. In this case, the finitude of the Commune begets exemplarity in the unfulfillment inherent to such self-government. In other words, it is quite precisely the “lack” of the Commune as a self-governing tendency that drives its “more” as a historical breakthrough in political organization. Or again, the Commune experiences an ongoing indetermination between subject and object (between the betokening measures realized and the self-government from which these measures are realized) only as democracy appears all the better in its truth. In any case, we are compelled to note that for Marx the social measures of the Commune were not simply the sign of democracy but the sign of the movement toward democracy (“could but betoken the tendency of a government of the people”). The negativity of the Commune in relation to the promise of its form is therefore double. Or to the contrary, the Commune’s measures are doubly negative - merely signifying a government of the people, and signifying a government that in turn is not the thing itself but its tendency - because the form of the Commune is the breach of this political movement, the sign of self-government as it appears in actuality. To borrow the terms of Etienne Tassin, we could say that Marx contrasts the technical arrangement of egalitarian society with a society of equality in action.48 That is, Marx vindicates the Commune as a public space in which each political action awakens the general organizing principle at its heart. Marx would thus have in view a circuitous relation such that democracy is referred to each action that brings here and now the “government of the people” to existence. For the point is to make political self-determination presently actual, with all the risks this entails, instead of erecting a model of equality that, by subordinating political action to an extraneous organizing form, destroys the plurality and unpredictability on which political equality in truth depends. The Commune cannot delineate a political model, then, because such delineation contradicts the subject of the model - the very working existence of the Commune - which itself had made a virtue of rejecting the ready-made systems of government then on offer. When Marx calls attention to the unique political existence of the Commune, he therefore has in mind what Abensour aptly names the “collective will in search of its very own political expression” (p. 86). By instituting this quest as its own working existence, a political form that acts as the State’s living antithesis is created. To the uniqueness of the Commune’s political experiment there would answer the uniqueness of the form of emancipation exemplified in it. 49 Everything hinges on what Abensour calls “the distinctive trait of the Communal Constitution qua political form” (p. 87). On the one hand, the point is clearly to break with the Jacobin tradition. With the primacy of the fight against domination, emancipation aims not to appropriate but to undermine the State, not to impose political form but to deliver it to democratic indetermination. On the other, the anarchist rejection of the political realm is itself rejected, since at stake is not rediscovering a spontaneous sociality deformed by politics but regenerating a political sociality against the State. Against Jacobinism and with a thus qualified anarchism, the “distinctive trait” of the democratic constitution is again interposed - this is the continuity of the 1871 texts with the 1843 Critique - as the “weapon” of the reduction (p. 94). Once political sovereignty is short-circuited by the power of the people, or more precisely, once the State is unmasked as a dynamic form that transforms the power between human beings into a power over them, the political realm is restricted to its essential content and principle: “the position against” that must ever be renewed. Contrary to the lore of the “democratic State” - for Abensour, an oxymoron if ever there were one - liberty and equality do not flourish on the firm ground of juridical right. Instead, they proliferate in the political movement that “affirms in actu the possibility of annihilating the division between governors and governed, or of reducing it to almost nothing, inventing a public space and political space under the banner of isonomy” (p. 96). The “truth” of democracy would thus gather its forces from what Lefort has described as democracy’s “savage” character. The democratic institution of the social realm, and the incessant reinvention of politics it demands, are themselves fueled by the polymorphous struggles of democracy against its domestication in the State-form (p. 99, and the appendix essay to this book, “Savage Democracy and the Principle of Anarchy”). If we look forward from 1871 to the “wildcat” strikes of students and workers - strikes that break out of bureaucratic control and endure politically through coordinated councils of action - that shook Budapest in 1956, Paris in 1968, Gdansk in 1980-2 and that returned to haunt France in November-December 1995, the “position against” Abensour distills from Marx may arguably be raised to a principle of democratic modernity. Indeed, Abensour’s hypothesis of a contemporary Machiavellian moment gains salience against this backdrop, just as the hypothesis of a Machiavellian moment in Marx is informed by the “libertarian spirit” Abensour takes as Marx’s ongoing contemporaneity (p. 100). We may then speak of democracy as “intractable,” in the sense Jean-François Lyotard gives to this term.50 The people in democracy appear, when they there appear, as politically refractory, as conscious of being both above the “nothing” the State would have them be and below the “everything” they in truth are, and in reality ought to be. And just as this excédent of the people, this utopian identity, underscores the irreducibility of democracy to the State, so too the situation of democracy corresponds almost exactly to that of the proletariat which, according to the Marx of 1843, was both inside and outside civil society. PREFACE TO THE ITALIAN EDITION (2008): "INSURGENT DEMOCRACY AND INSTITUTION" At a time when the term “democracy” is associated with bloody wars, the crusade of good against evil, and torture, it has become necessary, indeed urgent, to delineate democracy so as to dissociate it from these obviously anti-democratic undertakings, which P. Vidal-Naquet describes as the “cancer of democracy.” Thus, already some time ago, in order to counteract the neutralization and trivi- alization of democracy, qualifiers were chosen to allow it to retrieve its difference, its separateness from the phenomena of domination trying to hide behind its name. Among the many qualifiers proposed, Claude Lefort’s “savage democracy” stands out, along with radical democracy. In any case, if left undelineated, democracy would risk losing any identifiable features, and would be swept away into the greyness of universal trivialization. Is it not constantly confused in the everyday language of contemporary society with the rule of law or representative government? For my part, I propose the expression “insurgent democracy,” which has the advantage of conveying two particularities. First, that democracy is not a political regime but primarily an action, a modality of political agency, characterized by the irruption of the demos, or the people, onto the political stage in their struggle against those whom Machiavelli calls the grandees and for the establishment in the city of a state of non-domination. Second, that this political action is not confined to a particular moment but continues through time, always ready to spring up due to the obstacles encountered. It involves the birth of a complex process, where the social is instituted and the institution directed at non-domination, one permanently inventing itself to better perpetuate its existence and to defeat the counter-movements that threaten to annihilate it and to effect a return to a state of domination. Insurgent democracy in contrast to insurrectionary democracy, which, though evoking a mode of action of the people, does not incorporate its ongoing insertion in time. Hence, if we examine the revolutionary days that punctuated the course of the French Revolution - their succession and rhythm - the Revolution could be defined as an insurgent democracy that arose and continued from 1789 to 1799, once Babeufs “Conspiracy of Equals” is taken into account. For during those ten years the people were compelled a number of times to irrupt onto the revolutionary stage to proclaim their mission to act against both the state of the Old Regime and its remnants, as well as the new State, the “revolutionary government,” and thereby to reaffirm their commitment to a mode of being of the political bearing the stamp of non-domination. Historian Sophie Wahnich’s latest work, La Longue Patience Du Peuple, tends in this direction. Seen in this light, the last insurrections of Year III, of Germinal (April 1795) and especially of Prairial (May 1795) are remarkable. The people - that is, whät was left of the Parisian sections - invaded the Convention with a double agenda, “Bread” and “The Constitution of 1793,” which was clearly articulated in a leaflet published prior to the event: Insurrection du peuple pour obtenir du pain, reconquérir ses droits (“Insurrection of the people to obtain bread and regain their rights”). By linking the constitution with the demand for bread, what else were the people doing but insisting on, among other things, their right to insurrection recognized in the Constitution of 1793? What else were they doing but fighting to regain the sovereignty, in other words, the constituent power, that belonged to them? Amid the general turmoil of the two first days of Prairial, one can recognize the hallmark of democracy in the process of being instituted: brutal opposition between the people and the grandees of the day.”翻译为中文
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在这种情况下,马克思的探究线索似乎既削弱了模型的基础,也削弱了将公社视为“无产阶级专政”的先驱(恩格斯、列宁、毛等)的描绘。分歧的节点现在是马克思自己的估计,即公社的社会措施“只能标志着人民政府的趋势”。要么是公社的“弱点”,在于其无法定位、稳定,一言以蔽之,无法将权力集中于革命转型的先锋中,这迫使措施具有象征性地位,公社的非同一性揭示了在无产阶级阶级意识的不成熟阶段,公社成员尽管不愿意也被捕获。或者相反,如Abensour似乎建议的,马克思将公社的非同一性和不稳定结构视为其示范性工作存在的力量和动力。在这种情况下,公社的有限性导致了其自我治理固有的不满足中的示范性。换句话说,正是公社作为自我治理倾向的“缺乏”,推动了其作为政治组织历史突破的“更多”。或者再次,公社在主体和客体之间(在实现的标志性措施与实现这些措施的自我治理之间)经历了持续的不确定性,只有当民主在其真理中更好地显现时。
无论如何,我们不得不注意,对于马克思来说,公社的社会措施不仅仅是民主的标志,而是向民主运动的标志(“只能标志着人民政府的趋势”)。因此,相对于公社形式的承诺,公社的消极性是双重的。或者相反,公社的措施是双重消极的 - 仅标志着人民的政府,且标志着反过来不是事物本身而是其趋势的政府 - 因为公社的形式是这一政治运动的突破,是自我治理在实际中呈现的标志。借用Etienne Tassin的话,我们可以说,马克思将平等社会的技术安排与行动中的平等社会对比。也就是说,马克思肯定了公社作为一个公共空间,在这个空间中,每一个政治行动都唤醒了它核心的一般组织原则。因此,马克思视为一个循环关系,即民主被引用为每一个行动,这些行动在此时此地将“人民的政府”带入现实。关键是要实现当前的政治自决,承担这所带来的所有风险,而不是建立一个平等模型,通过将政治行动从外来的组织形式中亚属化,破坏政治平等实际上所依赖的多样性和不可预测性。
因此,公社不能勾画出一个政治模型,因为这样的勾画与模型的主体 - 即公社的实际工作存在 - 本身就是拒绝当时提供的现成政府系统的美德的矛盾。当马克思关注公社的独特政治存在时,因此他考虑的是Abensour恰当命名的“寻求自己独特政治表达的集体意志”(第86页)。通过将这一探索作为其自身的工作存在来建立,就创建了一个充当国家活生生对立面的政治形式。对于公社政治实验的独特性,将回应其所体现的解放形式的独特性。关键取决于Abensour所称的“公社宪法作为政治形式的独特特征”(第87页)。一方面,明确的目标是要打破与雅各宾主义的联系。随着对抗统治斗争的优先地位,解放的目标不是占有而是破坏国家,不是强加政治形式而是将其交付给民主的不确定性。另一方面,拒绝政治领域的无政府主义本身被拒绝,因为关键不是重新发现被政治变形的自发社会性,而是反对国家再生政治社会性。
反对雅各宾主义,有了这样定性的无政府主义,民主宪法的“独特特征”再次被插入 - 这是1871年文本与1843年批判的连续性 - 作为“削减的武器”(第94页)。一旦通过人民的力量短路了政治主权,或者更准确地说,一旦国家被揭示为一种将人与人之间的力量转化为对他们的力量的动态形式,政治领域就被限制在其本质内容和原则上:“反对的立场”必须不断更新。与“民主国家”的传统相反 - 对于Abensour来说,如果说过有什么是矛盾修饰语的话,那就是 - 自由和平等不是在法律权利的坚实基础上繁荣。相反,它们在政治运动中繁殖,“在行动中肯定消灭统治者与被统治者之间的分裂的可能性,或几乎将其减少到无,发明一个在伊索诺米旗帜下的公共空间和政治空间”(第96页)。民主的“真理”因此将从Lefort所描述的民主的“野性”特征中汲取力量。社会领域的民主制度及其所需的政治不断创新本身,被民主对抗其在国家形式中的驯化的多样化斗争所推动(第99页,以及本书附录论文“野性民主和无政府原则”)。
如果我们从1871年向前看,到了1956年发生在布达佩斯、1968年的巴黎、1980-1982年的格但斯克,以及1995年11月-12月再度困扰法国的学生和工人的“野猫式”罢工 - 这些罢工突破了官僚控制,并通过协调的行动委员会在政治上持续下去 - 那么,Abensour从马克思那里提炼出的“反对立场”可以被合理地提升为民主现代性的原则。实际上,鉴于这一背景,Abensour关于当代马基雅维利时刻的假设变得更加突出,正如马克思的马基雅维利时刻假设是由Abensour认为的马克思持续的当代性的“自由精神”所通知的(第100页)。然后,我们可以谈论“棘手的”民主,用让-弗朗索瓦·利奥塔(Jean-François Lyotard)赋予这个术语的意义。民主中的人民出现时,他们在政治上难以驾驭,意识到自己既高于国家想要的“无物”,也低于他们实际上应当是的“一切”。正如这些人民的过剩、这个乌托邦的身份,强调了民主无法还原为国家的不可还原性,因此民主的情境几乎完全对应于1843年的马克思所说的无产阶级的情境,即无产阶级既在市民社会内部也在外部。
《给意大利版的序言》 (2008年):“起义民主 与制度” 在“民主”一词与血腥战争、善与恶的十字军东征和酷刑联系在一起的时候,勾画出民主的轮廓,以将其与这些明显的反民主活动区分开来,变得非常必要,事实上也迫在眉睫,正如P. Vidal-Naquet所描述的“民主的癌症”。因此,不久前,为了抵制民主的中和化和平凡化,选择了一些定语来让它恢复其差异性,其与试图隐藏在其名字背后的统治现象的分离性。在提议的许多定语中,克劳德·勒福尔(Claude Lefort)的“野性民主”脱颖而出,还有激进民主。
无论如何,如果不加以勾画,民主将冒着失去任何可识别特征的风险,将被卷入普遍平凡化的灰色中。它在当代社会的日常语言中不是经常与法治或代议制政府混淆吗?
就我个人而言,我提议使用“起义民主”的表达,这有助于传达两个特点。首先,民主不是一种政治制度,而主要是一种行动,一种政治行为的方式,其特点是人民或民众为了与马基雅维利所称的大人物作斗争,并在城市中建立非统治状态而闯入政治舞台。其次,这种政治行动不局限于特定时刻,而是随着时间的推移持续进行,总是准备好因遇到的障碍而蓄势待发。它涉及一个复杂过程的诞生,社会被制度化,制度旨在非统治,它不断自我发明以更好地持续其存在并击败可能将其消灭并导致回归统治状态的反动力量。起义民主与起义式民主形成对比,后者虽然唤起人民的行动模式,但并未包含其在时间中持续进行的因素。
因此,如果我们审视贯穿法国大革命进程的革命日,它们的连续性和节奏 - 大革命可以被定义为从1789年到1799年持续出现并持续的起义民主,一旦考虑到巴贝夫的“平等者阴谋”。因为在那十年中,人民被迫多次闯入革命舞台,宣布他们的任务,反对旧制度的状态及其残余,以及新的国家,“革命政府”,从而重新确认他们对非统治印记的政治生存方式的承诺。历史学家Sophie Wahnich最近的作品《人民的长期耐心》,正朝这个方向发展。
从这个角度看,第三年的最后起义、日耳曼得月(1795年4月)尤其是普瑞利亚尔月(1795年5月)起义令人瞩目。人民 - 也就是巴黎各区的剩余部分 - 带着双重议程闯入了国民公会,“面包”和“1793年宪法”,在事件发生前发布的传单中被清楚地表达了:“Insurrection du peuple pour obtenir du pain, reconquérir ses droits”(人民起义以获取面包并重新获得他们的权利)。通过将宪法与对面包的需求联系起来,人民除了坚持1793年宪法中承认的起义权利等诉求之外,还做了什么?他们除了争取重新获得属于他们的主权,换句话说,他们的制宪权利之外,还做了什么?在普瑞利亚尔的头两天的总体动荡中,可以认出正在被制定的民主的标志:人民与当时的大人物之间的激烈对立。
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请将“According to K. D. Tonnesson, the historian of these insurrections, they amounted to a breach between the two components of the urban Third Estate, the bourgeoisie and the people. The Insurrections of Year III were carried out almost entirely by the people and gave rise to a dual power: the power of the Parisian Sans-Culottes whose aim was to replace the other power, that of the government. Indeed, the explicit political goals of the insurrections were the abolition of the revolutionary government, the immediate establishment of the Constitution of 1793, and the destitution and arrest of the current rulers. On a deeper level, the underlying principle of the insurrection can be discerned: the search for a political relationship, for a vital, intense, non-hierarchical political bond distinct from order, the struggle to preserve the people’s ability to act and to prevent the bonds among citizens from degenerating once again into a restrictive, vertical, hierarchical, top-down order. The contrast between “bond” and “order” stands out in sharp relief in this excerpt from the pamphlet “ L’ insurrection du people ...” The citizens of all sections without distinction will leave from all points in fraternal disorder, without waiting for the movement of neighbouring sections; they will march with them, so that the shrewd and treacherous government will no longer be able to gag the people as it usually does and cause them to be led, like a herd, by leaders who are sellouts and who deceive us.1 "Fraternal disorder” is in opposition to the power of the leaders. In sum, non-domination, a non-restrictive and egalitarian political bond, is in opposition to order. One of the most frequent criticisms of my work is that insurgent democracy, above all a negativity anchored in the present of the insurrectional event, ignores the institution or, at least, makes little room for it. Insurgent democracy retreats upon the passage from negativity to institution, the “positive model of action,” as though there were a necessary antagonism between insurgence and institution. Admittedly, this critique does point to an essential difficulty. But to represent the relationship between insurgent democracy and institution solely in terms of antagonism would be an egregious oversimplification, as if the former were always deployed in a momentary ferment and the latter, inevitably in the grip of a marble-like stasis. An initial tentative reply is called for: The potential for compatibility between insurgent democracy and institution exists, so long as the constitutional act, the fundamental norm, recognizes the people’s right to insurrection, as did the Constitution of 1793. Hence, to demand its reinstatement was to insist on the legitimacy of the insurrection. Yet the defeat of the insurrection of Prairial had precisely the effect that the new constitution of Year III, which entrenched the rule of private property, suppressed the right to insurrection, thus dealing an irreparable blow to the political imagination. Decades of strong government, totalitarian experiences, and authoritarian practices have rendered the enshrinement of a right to insurrection in a constitutional act almost inconceivable, as if constituent power were faced with an “impassable horizon,” as the defenders of the established order like to say. And yet, if democracy seeks to institute a political community that holds domination at bay, to institute the social under the banner of non-domination, which device is best suited to preserve this principle if not the right to insurrection, which is the appropriate recourse every time the grandees’ desire to dominate threatens to prevail over the people’s desire for liberty? This is a difficult truth to hear, but the difficulty stems more from the spirit of the times than from the thing itself. To solve the problem, however, it is not enough for insurgent democracy to be tied to the institution of the right to insurrection. It must furthermore be acknowledged that the democracy of non-domination is not deployed in a politically empty and undifferentiated zone of space-time. There must be no illusion about its relation to ferment; ferment is not momentariness. Nor does it belong to the present alone. For to safeguard the people’s capacity to act politically it can turn to institutions that, at their inception, were meant to foster the exercise of that capacity. Thus, during the events of Prairial, the insurrection depended on the Parisian sections, and the Montagnard deputies who supported it initiated a vote, on the first of Prairial in the invaded Convention, to make the sections, abolished by decree on 9 September 1793, permanent. Just as insurgent democracy can bring about an interaction between insurgence and institution, it can also set in motion a circular flow between the present of the event and the past, insofar as this involves encounters among emancipatory institutions holding out a promise of liberty. Here, the people rose up against the liberating institutions’ lack of a present, demanding that these institutions be respected. We therefore arrive at a more nuanced formulation: insurgent democracy, far from being hostile as a matter of principle to all institutions or connections to the past, is selective. Because it tends, like any political movement, toward enduring through time, it distinguishes between institutions that promote the people’s political action and those that do not, with non-domination serving as the criterion. There is no systematic antagonism between insurgent democracy and institutions as long as the latter work to preserve this state of non-domination and act as dikes stemming the grandee's desire to dominate and thereby allowing the people to experience liberty. Conversely, all institutions, governmental or otherwise, that are apt to encourage a new situation where new grandees hold sway, can only arouse the hostility of insurgent democracy. A comparable level of complexity emerges if we approach the problem from an “institutional” perspective. To this end it may be appropriate to follow the trail that Saint-Just blazed in Institutions républicaines, that is, of opposing institutions and laws, with institutions being granted primacy while laws are mistrusted, as evidenced in the text: “A law that conflicts with institutions is tyrannical ... To obey laws is problematic, because the law is often nothing but the will of he who imposes it. We have the right to resist oppressive laws.”2 Without reviewing Saint-Just’s reasoning in its entirety, we can see that the Republic must, first, be constituted out of an institutional fabric, a kind of primary foundation, distinct from both government, the “governing machine,” and laws, always liable to conceal acts of arbitrary power. The institutions whose purpose is to connect citizens through generous relationships must incorporate, in their form as well as their content, something like an essence of the republic, of the republican principle, and of its préfiguration in the form of a dynamic totality. It is in this capacity that institutions are deemed to be the “soul of the republic.” Even though Saint-Just’s thoughts on the subject were not fully developed, he was nevertheless able to bring to light a specificity of institutions, which cannot be reduced to laws or the governing machine. That specificity was moreover recognized by Marx in The Class Struggles in France, where he points out that the Republic of February 1848, a bourgeois republic, under pressure from the pro-letariat, was forced to create “social institutions” in which Marx discerns, if only to criticize its meekness, a movement that involved outdoing the bourgeois republic “m ideas, in imagination.”3 The institution, more a matrix than a framework, encompasses an imaginative dimension, one of anticipation, which in itself has the potential to engender customs, or rather attitudes and behaviours, consistent with the emancipation it announces. It is in this sense that for Gilles Deleuze the institution is a “system of anticipation” opposed to the law, insofar as it bears within itself an appeal - the appeal of one freedom to other freedoms - that radically differentiates it from the obligation characteristic of the law, which entails a penalty when an infraction is committed. Hence Deleuze’s definition of the difference between institution and law: “the latter is a limitation of action, the former, a positive model of action.”4 One objection remains. Is there not an incompatibility, a contradiction, between, on the one hand, insurgence taking place in a present in ferment, affected by extreme mobility, and institution on the other? For one thing, the extent of the ferment would make it difficult for the institution to carve out a place for itself. In addition, the institution would tend perhaps not toward stasis but at the very least toward a stability resistant to change, to the temporality of democracy. On the first point, as already noted, it is possible that, due to a circulation between present and past, certain institutions informing a given political context serve to underpin insurgence. It is even possible that insurgent democracy, in order to endure and not be reduced to a flash in the pan, summons or in some way gives rise to the institution, for the purpose in this case of articulating the principle of nondomination and a certain anchorage in time, in the confrontation of two temporalities. On the second point, we must guard against hasty conclusions. According to Merleau-Ponty, the institution endows experience with a sustainable dimension.5 But this sustainable character, which goes on in time, is even less like a stasis inasmuch as the sustainability reveals a creative, innovative (in the Bergsonian sense) duration. This then raises the question as to whether the anticipatory character of the institution, its relation to the imagination, to the social project, does not operate from inside the “sustainability,” such that the sustainable dimension, instead of being a resistance, an obstacle to change, is transformed into a launch pad, a base whose relative stability allows invention and innovation to be enacted. Within this “anticipatory” conception of institution, the creative duration must be privileged over the slow and uniform duration at the source of deceleration and equilibrium. We owe the distinction between these two forms of duration, from the institution’s viewpoint, to jurist Maurice Hauriou, who writes, “The institution is, in all respects, the category of movement.”6 In this case, the institution could easily acclimatize to democratic temporality.”翻译为中文
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根据K. D. Tonnesson,这些起义的历史学家的说法,这些起义导致了城市第三等级的两个组成部分,即资产阶级和人民之间的分裂。第三年的起义几乎完全由人民发动,并导致了双重权力的产生:巴黎无裤派的权力,其目标是取代另一个权力,即政府的权力。实际上,起义的明确政治目标是废除革命政府,立即实施1793年宪法,以及罢黜和逮捕当前的统治者。在更深层次上,可以辨识出起义的基本原则:寻求一种政治关系,寻求一种充满活力、紧张、非等级的政治纽带,这种纽带不同于秩序,是为了保护人民的行动能力,防止公民之间的联系再次退化为限制性的、垂直的、等级化的、自上而下的秩序。在这份传单“人民起义...”的摘录中,“纽带”与“秩序”之间的对比鲜明地凸显了出来。
所有区域的公民无区别地将从所有地点以兄弟般的混乱出发,不等待邻近区域的动作;他们将与之并行,以使狡猾和奸诈的政府不再能像往常一样堵住人民的嘴,并使他们像羊群一样被出卖我们的、欺骗我们的领导人所引导。1
“兄弟般的混乱”与领导者的权力相对立。总之,非统治、非限制性和平等的政治纽带与秩序对立。
我工作中最常见的批评之一是,起义民主,首先是一种植根于起义事件现在的否定性,忽略了制度,或者至少对制度留有很小的空间。起义民主在从否定性过渡到制度、到“行动的积极模型”的过程中退缩,好像在起义和制度之间存在必要的对立。诚然,这种批评确实指出了一个根本的难题。但是,仅以对立的角度来表现起义民主与制度之间的关系将是一个严重的过于简化,好像前者总是在瞬间的骚动中被部署,而后者则不可避免地陷入大理石般的静止状态中。
需要一个初步的尝试性回答:起义民主与制度之间的兼容性是存在的,只要宪法行为、基本准则承认人民的起义权利,正如1793年宪法所做的那样。因此,要求其重建是为了坚持起义的合法性。然而,普瑞利亚尔的起义失败正是导致了第三年新宪法的效果,该宪法巩固了私有财产的规则,取消了起义的权利,从而对政治想象力造成了不可弥补的打击。数十年的强力政府、极权主义经验和威权实践已经使得在宪法行为中确立起义权利几乎难以想象,好像制宪权力面临着“不可逾越的地平线”,正如既定秩序的捍卫者所喜欢说的那样。
然而,如果民主寻求建立一个将统治拒之门外的政治社区,建立在非统治旗帜下的社会,那么哪种设备最适合保护这一原则,如果不是起义的权利,每当贵族的统治欲望威胁到人民对自由的渴望时,起义就是适当的手段?这是一个难以接受的艰难真相,但这种困难更多地源于时代精神,而不是事物本身。
然而,仅仅将起义民主与起义权利的制度化联系起来是不够的。还必须承认,非统治民主不是在政治上空白和无差别的时空区域中展开的。关于它与骚动的关系,不能抱有幻想;骚动并非片刻之事。也不仅属于现在。为了保护人民的政治行动能力,它可以求助于一些在初始时就意味着促进该能力行使的制度。因此,在普瑞利亚尔事件期间,起义依赖于巴黎各区,支持它的山岳派代表在遭到入侵的国民公会上发起了投票,要求在1793年9月9日被法令废除的各区成为永久性的。就像起义民主可以促成起义与制度之间的互动,它也可以启动事件现在与过去之间的循环流动,因为这涉及到承诺自由的解放性制度之间的相遇。在这里,人民起来反对解放制度的缺席,并要求这些制度得到尊重。
因此,我们得出了一个更细致的表述:起义民主,原则上并不敌视所有制度或与过去的联系,而是有选择性的。因为它倾向于像任何政治运动一样随时间持续下去,它区分了促进人民政治行动的制度和那些不促进的制度,以非统治作为标准。只要后者努力保持这种非统治状态并作为阻止贵族统治欲望的堤坝而行动,从而允许人民体验自由,起义民主与制度之间就没有系统的对立。反之,所有可能鼓励新贵族主导的新局面的制度,无论是政府的还是其他的,都只能引起起义民主的敌意。
如果我们从“制度”角度来接近这个问题,同样的复杂性也会显现。为此,遵循圣贾斯特在《共和国制度》中开辟的道路可能是恰当的,即反对制度和法律,同时赋予制度优先地位,而对法律持怀疑态度,正如文本中所示:“与制度相冲突的法律是专制的...遵守法律是有问题的,因为法律往往不过是强加者的意愿。我们有权抵抗压迫性的法律。”2
不必完全回顾圣贾斯特的论述,我们可以看到,共和国必须首先从制度的织物中构建出来,这种织物是一种初级基础,不同于政府、“统治机器”和法律,后者总是可能隐藏任意权力的行为。旨在通过慷慨的关系连接公民的制度必须在其形式和内容中融入共和国的某种本质、共和原则,以及其以动态整体形式的预示。正是在这个能力上,制度被认为是“共和国的灵魂”。
尽管圣贾斯特关于这个主题的思考并未完全发展,他还是能够揭示出制度的特性,这种特性不能简单地归结于法律或统治机器。这种特性还被马克思在《法国阶级斗争》中认可,他指出,1848年2月的共和国,一个资产阶级共和国,在无产阶级的压力下,被迫创造“社会制度”,在这些制度中,马克思辨识出了一个运动,即使是为了批评其温和性,也涉及了超越资产阶级共和国的“观念、想象”。3制度,更像是一个矩阵而非一个框架,包含了一个想象维度,一种预见性,这本身就有潜力产生与它所宣告的解放一致的习惯,或者说态度和行为。正是在这个意义上,对于吉尔·德勒兹来说,制度是一个“预见性系统”,与法律相对立,因为它内含一个呼吁——一个自由对其他自由的呼吁——这与法律的特征义务根本不同,后者在犯罪时涉及惩罚。因此,德勒兹对制度和法律之间差异的定义是:“后者是行动的限制,前者是行动的积极模型。”4
仍有一个反对意见。在起义发生在动荡的现在,受到极端流动性影响的一方,与制度在另一方之间,是否存在不兼容性、矛盾?一方面,骚动的程度会使得制度难以为自己找到位置。此外,制度可能不会倾向于停滞,但至少会倾向于对变化具有抵抗性的稳定性,对民主的时间性。对于第一点,正如已经指出的,可能由于现在与过去之间的流通,某些通知给定政治背景的制度有助于支持起义。甚至可能起义民主,为了持续而不被简化为昙花一现,召唤或以某种方式催生制度,目的在这种情况下是为了阐明非统治原则和某种时间上的锚定,在两种时间性的对抗中。
对于第二点,我们必须警惕匆忙的结论。根据梅洛-庞蒂,制度赋予经验一个可持续的维度。5但是,这种可持续性,随着时间的推移而持续,甚至更不像是停滞,因为可持续性揭示了一个创造性的、创新性的(在柏格森意义上的)持续。这就引发了一个问题,即制度的预见性特征,它与想象、社会项目的关系,是否不是从“可持续性”内部运作,使得可持续性维度,而不是成为抵抗、变化的障碍,而是转化为发射台、基地,其相对稳定性允许创造和创新得以实现。
在这种“预见性”制度观念中,必须优先考虑创造性持续性而非源于减速和平衡的缓慢且均匀的持续性。我们将这两种持续性形式之间的区分,从制度的观点来看,归功于法学家莫里斯·奥里奥(Maurice Hauriou),他写道,“制度在各个方面都是运动的范畴。”6在这种情况下,制度可以很容易地适应民主的时间性。
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请将“But here an ambiguity arises: which element ought to be given precedence - dynamism or permanency and stability? Given the hypothesis of a democracy opposed to the State, of an insurgent democracy implying a distancing, in the name of the institution, from sovereignty and the law, the only avenue open to the institution is that of greater plasticity, more openness to events, and a stronger disposition to welcome the new. Contrary to the criticism levelled against us, what can be glimpsed through the exploration of these two complexities, insurgence and institution, is how insurgent democracy, having its own temporality, and institution can both be conceptualized together. Because, to the extent that institution - it too understood in its specific temporality - far from being alien to democratic ferment or from thwarting it, can in fact respond to it better, if institution, like democracy, can be perceived and applied against the State, particularly if it takes the form of non-state or even anti-state law, of social law. In fact, the theorization of institution often includes the thesis whereby the State is not the primary source of the law. Saint-Just and his invaluable distinctions - not unfamiliar to philosophers of institution - between law, institution, and governing machine make clear that conflict and incompatibility exist between the law and the governing machine on the one hand and insurgent democracy on the other, but not between insurgent democracy and institution. While taking care not to confuse State and government, let us turn to William Godwin, author of Enquiry concerning political justice (1793), who incisively described the irreparable conflict between government and the mobility of humanity: Government, under whatever point of view we examine this topic, is unfortunately pregnant with motives to censure and complain. Incessant change, everlasting innovation, seems to be dictated by the true interests of mankind. But government is the perpetual enemy of change (...) What was admirably observed of a particular system of government is in a great degree true of all: They lay their hand on the spring there is in society, and put a stop to its motion. Their tendency is to perpetuate abuse. (...) Man is in a state of perpetual mutation. (. . .) By its very nature positive institutions have a tendency to suspend the elasticity and progress of mind.7 FOREWORD TO THE SECOND FRENCH EDITION (2004) "OF INSURGENT DEMOCRACY" Are we condemned to the alternative of either moderate democracy or classical anti-democratism? Let us say that we were faced with the following choice: democracy as long as it’s practiced with moderation, reduced to an inescapable political framework for instance, or as an illusion and, as such, deserving neither to be preferred nor preserved if it were in peril, for its appearances of liberty would only make it an ever more pernicious form of domination. Yet, isn’t one of the many qualities of Marx’s 1843 text precisely to open the way beyond this alternative and its constraints by formulating the question of “real democracy”? As though, before democracy could be submitted to the requirement of moderation or else rejected without further consideration, one would have to turn to a prerequisite. That is to question democracy in its truth, to discover the characteristics that disqualify the remedy of moderation as much as that of denial. Not through an essentialist approach but by a reflection on the destiny of democracy in modernity. Exemplary research of Marx in 1843, which has the advantage of reminding us of an approach which has forgone our minds, busy as we are tallying the deficiencies of democracy or denouncing its illusions. Unless that, under the spell of the theme of the end of the political, we should consider with as much platitude as confidence that this form of political community is a “utopia” in the most vulgar sense of the word. Let us put aside the fatigue of reason and the acritical scepticism, which accompanies it. Let us return to the initial question: what is the truth of democracy? Relying on “the modern French,” the author of the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right comes to a surprising, enigmatic response, according to which the advent of democracy would go hand-in-hand with the disappearance of the political state. Moreover, instead of turning this thesis into a beautiful sunrise with no tomorrow, we might concede to recognize in it a latent, underlying, persistent dimension of Marx’s political interrogation. Wouldn’t we be led to perceive a shift, between the 1843 text and the 1871 address on the Commune, from a thought of process [pensée du processus) to a thought of conflict (pensée du conflit)? The coming into being of democracy wouldn’t so much take place through the withering of the State than it would be constituted in a struggle against the State. The onset alternative comes out discredited. Thus understood, the truth of democracy opposes itself to the formula of moderate transaction, which represents the familiar expression of “democratic State.” Be it in regard to the State or democracy, doesn’t this expression betray a lack of critical analysis? Likewise, the rejection of democracy in the name of a critique of domination is unfounded, inasmuch as democracy works, in its deepest sense, against the dominant/dominated relation and towards the advent of a state of non-domination. Thus oriented towards non-domination, wouldn’t true democracy reveal itself in the “deconstruction of the political field”? That is, following R. Shürmann’s analyses, in the caesurae between two political forms free action might emerge and deploy itself beyond all principial or referential influence. Relying on H. Arendt and her idea of the lost treasure of revolution, R. Shiirmann writes, in regard to these breaches of modern history belonging to the council or communalist tradition: “Thus, the princeps, the government and the principium, the system it imposes and on which it rests, are suspended for a while. In such caesurae, the political field fulfils its disclosing role entirely: it reveals for everyone to see that the origin of action ... is the simple coming into being of all that is present.”1 It deserves to be compared to Marx’s thesis according to which “democracy is the resolved enigma of all constitutions.” That is to say that to interpret a constitutional objectification correctly, it is always advisable to return to what produced it, to the demos and its free action. Isn’t it precisely to maintain and safeguard the contact, the connection with the “real people” that, at the very moment at which it is instituted, real democracy leads to the disappearance of the political state, as an organizing form susceptible of substituting itself to the will of the people and, in the end, to rise against it? In a way, “savage democracy,” in Claude Lefort’s terms, enlightened or rather resolved by the principle of anarchy could be a plausible figure, a name, for democracy against the State.2 Indeed, if savage democracy defines itself by the dissolution of the ultimate markers of certainty, by the repeated test of indeterminacy - which implies a way out of metaphysical derivation, an emancipation from a foundational principle - it appears hardly compatible with the State whose existence requires foundation, certainty, and reliance on a primary principle. Moreover, how could the plural effervescence of savage democracy, strengthened and fed by the innate indeterminacy of the human element, accommodate itself to integration in the totalizing system of the State? How could the test of indeterminacy consent to the domination of One, abdicate before One? But possibility is not necessity. The logic of savage democracy is not necessarily anti-statist. Isn’t the “savage” exposed to being confined and thus reduced to a mode of being, a mode of expression, to an epochal style characterized above all by a crisis of foundations, without drawing all the consequences from this crisis? Furthermore, isn’t there some danger in binding the idea of savage democracy to that of the law, to the struggle for the upholding of vested rights and the conquest of new rights? Even if it is legitimate to dissociate the law from the idea of domination and to associate it to that of resistance; wouldn’t this struggle for the law, which seeks ultimately the recognition and sanction of litigious rights by the State, come volens nolens to a strengthening of the State and, worse, to a permanent reconstruction of the State? It’s only in turning to the idea of social right that savage democracy could remain true to its anti-statist vocation. This is one of the paradoxes, and not the least, of contemporary progressivism which in its renewed invocation of the “right to” inescapably ends up asking the approbation of the State and, at the same time, comforts it, as if nothing could be done without the approval of the State. Finally, is it on the side of human rights, even interpreted in a political manner, that we must discover the live source of savage democracy? Is the nature of this source able to ward off State control?”翻译为中文
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但这里出现了一个模糊性:哪个元素应该被赋予优先权 - 动态性还是永久性和稳定性?鉴于民主与国家对立的假设,鉴于起义民主暗示着以制度的名义远离主权和法律,唯一对制度开放的途径是更大的可塑性,更多地对事件开放,以及更强烈的接纳新事物的倾向。 与针对我们的批评相反,通过探索这两个复杂性——起义和制度——可以瞥见的是,起义民主拥有自己的时间性,以及制度可以如何一起被概念化。因为,只要制度——它也在其特定的时间性中被理解——远非对民主的骚动感到陌生或阻碍它,实际上可以更好地响应它,如果制度像民主一样可以被感知和应用于对抗国家,尤其是如果它采取了非国家甚至反国家的法律形式,社会法律的形式。事实上,制度的理论化经常包括这样一个论点,即国家不是法律的主要来源。圣贾斯特及其珍贵的区分 —— 对制度哲学家来说并不陌生 —— 在法律、制度和执政机器之间,清楚地表明,法律和执政机器与起义民主之间存在冲突和不兼容,但起义民主与制度之间并不存在这样的冲突。 在不将国家和政府混淆的同时,让我们转向William Godwin,他是《政治正义探究》(1793年)的作者,他尖锐地描述了政府与人类流动性之间的不可修复冲突: 不管我们从哪个角度审视政府,不幸的是,它都充满了批评和抱怨的理由。不断的变化,永恒的创新,似乎是人类真正利益的指引。但政府却是变化的永恒敌人(……)对于一个特定的政府体系的卓越观察在很大程度上对所有政府都是真实的:它们抑制了社会中的活力,并使其停滞不前。它们的倾向是使滥用永久化。(……)人处于永久变化的状态。(……)凭借其本质,正面的制度倾向于暂停心智的弹性和进步。7 《第二版法语版序言》(2004年)"关于起义民主" 我们是否注定要在适度民主和经典反民主之间抉择?假设我们面临以下选择:只要以适度方式实践,民主就限制在不可避免的政治框架内,例如,或者作为一种幻觉,因此,如果它处于危险之中,既不值得偏爱也不值得保护,因为它的自由外表只会使其成为一种更加有害的统治形式。 然而,马克思1843年文本的众多优点之一是否正是通过提出“真正民主”的问题,超越了这一二分法及其限制?就好像,在民主被要求适度或被毫不考虑地拒绝之前,人们必须先转向一个前提条件。那就是质疑民主的真相,发现使适度和否认的解决方案都不合格的特征。不是通过本质主义方法,而是通过对现代性中民主命运的反思。 马克思在1843年的典范研究,其优势在于提醒我们一种我们已经忘记的方法,我们忙于计算民主的不足或揭露其幻觉。除非在政治终结的主题咒语下,我们应该像平庸一样自信地考虑,认为这种政治共同体形式是最庸俗意义上的“乌托邦”。让我们抛开理性的疲惫和随之而来的非批判性怀疑论。让我们回到最初的问题:民主的真相是什么?依靠“现代的法国人”,《黑格尔法哲学批判》的作者给出了一个惊人的、谜一般的回应,即民主的到来将与政治国家的消失并行。此外,我们不妨承认在其中看到马克思政治询问的一个潜在的、持续的维度,而不是将这一论断变成一个没有明天的美丽黎明。我们不会被引导去感知,从1843年的文本到1871年关于公社的讲话之间,从过程思维到冲突思维的转变吗?民主的产生不仅仅是通过国家的凋零,而是在与国家的斗争中被构建。这个起始的二分法被证明是站不住脚的。因此理解的民主真相反对“温和交易”的公式,这代表了“民主国家”的熟悉表达。无论是针对国家还是民主,这个表达不是暴露了缺乏批判性分析吗?同样,以统治批判的名义拒绝民主是没有根据的,因为民主在其最深层意义上反对统治者/被统治者关系,并朝着非统治状态的到来而努力。 因此,面向非统治,真正的民主是否会在“政治领域的解构”中显现出来?也就是说,遵循R. Shürmann的分析,在两种政治形态之间的断裂中,自由行动可能会出现,并在所有原则性或参考性影响之外展开自己。依靠H. Arendt及她对革命失落宝藏的观点,R. Shürmann在谈到属于议会或公社传统的现代历史中的这些断裂时写道:“因此,princeps、政府和principium、它强加的体系以及它所依赖的体系,暂时被悬停。在这样的断裂中,政治领域完全履行了其揭示作用:它向所有人揭示了行动的起源……是一切现存事物的简单出现。”这值得与马克思的论断相比较,即“民主是所有宪法已解决之谜。”换句话说,要正确理解宪法的客体化,总是有必要回归到产生它的东西,即民众及其自由行动。正是为了保持与“真实民众”的联系,连接,在它被制定的那一刻,真正的民主导致政治国家的消失,作为一种可能代替人民意志并最终反对它的组织形式? 在某种程度上,用克洛德·勒福特的话说,“野蛮民主”,通过无政府原则的启示或解决,可能是对抗国家的民主的一个合理形象,一个名字。事实上,如果野蛮民主通过解散终极确定性标志的定义,通过不断的不确定性测试 - 这意味着摆脱形而上学的衍生,从一个基础原理的解放 - 它似乎与国家几乎不相容,国家的存在需要基础、确定性和依靠一个初级原则。此外,野蛮民主的多元热情怎能适应国家的整体化系统?野蛮民主的不确定性测试怎能同意于一个的统治,在一个面前投降呢?但可能性并不意味着必然性。野蛮民主的逻辑不必然是反国家的。那个“野蛮”是否暴露于被限制,并因此被简化为一种存在方式、表达方式、特别是以基础危机为主要特征的时代风格,而没有从这场危机中吸取所有后果?此外,将野蛮民主的思想与法律,以及争取既定权利和征服新权利的斗争相联系,是否存在某种危险?即使将法律与统治思想分开并将其与抵抗联系起来是合法的,这种最终寻求国家承认和制裁有争议权利的法律斗争,是否不可避免地加强了国家,更糟糕的是,导致国家的永久重建?唯有转向社会权利的理念,野蛮民主才能忠实于其反国家的使命。这是当代进步主义的悖论之一,而不是最小的,它在其对“权利”的重新呼唤中不可避免地最终寻求国家的认可,同时也安慰了国家,好像没有国家的认可就什么都做不了。最后,是不是应该在人权方面,即使是以政治方式解读,我们必须发现野蛮民主的活泉?这个源泉的性质是否能够避免国家控制?
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请将“Considering these questions and difficulties, would it be advisable, instead of looking for the possible figures of democracy against the State, to return to this formula, to explore and make its dimensions and issues explicit? Without a doubt, this expression has the merit to revive Marx’s fruitful intuition in the 1843 manuscript, to invite its assessment; however it may have been neglected or rendered common by the epigones under the Saint-Simonian theme of the withering away of the State. The point, for Marx, is not to announce that the administration of things will replace the government of men, but to observe with the modern French that the advent of democracy signifies the disappearance of the political state; and, if we consider the path taken between 1843 and 1871, to affirm that democracy can only exist inasmuch as it rises against the State. The Marxian thesis relies on democracy’s exception, which expresses itself above all in the implementation of reduction. Modern democracy is democracy against the State because its specificity consists in practicing reduction. Without going into this complex mechanism, let us remember the essential, namely that reduction serves to block political objectification so that the latter doesn’t turn, in spite of itself, into alienation. In other words, in democracy, thanks to this blocking, political action remains what it is inasmuch as it resists transfiguration into an organizing, unifying form, in short, into a State. By bringing to light reduction and its consequences, Marx was able to show as clearly as possible that the struggle against the State, as a form, is inscribed in the heart of democratic logic. Democracy is anti-statist or else it is not. Given this fact, it is not difficult to understand that its usual eulogists, more or less conscious of this phenomenon, recommend a moderate use of democracy; the mechanism of reduction thus hindered, the democratic exception fades making room for the contradiction in terms that is the “democratic State,” understood as the rule of law or an inescapable framework. Let us add that the mechanism of reduction is paradoxical: the blocking that it produces and which forbids the transfiguration of political objectification into the State-form is at the same time, according to us, that which “makes possible the extension of what is at stake and shows in the political sphere - an experience of universality, its negation of domination, the constitution of an isonomie public space.” As if, thus resourced, democratic action could express itself in the public space, modulate itself in the life of the people. There are three stages therefore: reduction, blocking, extension. It is this latter stage which allows for the irrigation of all the other spheres of the life of a people, according to a democratic mode of being, in such a way that we can say that all holds to democracy. The stakes are high: the occultation of this impulsion against the State, the avoidance of reduction, the blocking of the blocking, can only thoroughly ruin the democratic institution of the social, void its logic, as much in its initial movement as in its effects. If such is the case, why not try another name, why not propose the name of insurgent democracy to those who continue to wonder about real democracy? Far beyond the souvenirs of the revolt of American settlers against England, during the war of Independence, the term clearly signifies that the advent of democracy is the opening of an agonistic scene which has the State as a “natural” and favoured target; or else that democracy is the play of a “permanent insurrection” against the State, against the unifying, integrating, organizing Stateform. It is from reduction and in its prolongation that this agonistic deploys itself, ever more destined to last that, in this war, it might be that reduction fails and that the State wins in its struggle to neutralize democracy, to incorporate it to the point of producing the “democratic State,” which will only keep from the initial reduction, a tendency to permanent contestation, a pale reflection of the original impulse. In contemporary thought, which wrongly identifies democracy with representative government or the rule of law, only Jacques Rancière seems to preserve Marx’s intuition as to the being, as to the anti-statist disposition, of democracy. Calling for a distinction between two logics of the community, the author of La Mésentente suggests to name police “all the processes by which the aggregation and consent of collectivities, the organization of powers, the distribution of ranks and functions and the legitimating systems of this distribution, operate.”3 This logic is opposed by another perturbing logic, namely that which relies on the presumption of the equality of anyone with anyone. On this side one finds democracy, a manner of being of the political: “more precisely, democracy is the name of a singular interruption of this order of distribution of groups in community that we have proposed to conceptualize under the extended word of police. This is the word for that which interrupts the good functioning of this order by a singular device of subjectivization.”4 The only difference with Marx would be that Rancière’s police order refers more to the government or governmentality than to the State; as such it would resemble more an instrumental machinery, or even a “thing” susceptible to inspection, than to the State as a system, a unifying totality, thus endowed with an incontestable symbolic dimension. Aware of the “sublimity” of the State, at the very least of its elevation, Marx wanted to get in the way of its presumptuousness by denouncing the deception of universality on which it pretends to be built. Not to reduce the State to an empirical set of functions and ranks, but to incite the real people to proceed to a reappropriation of this universality which the State claims to be bearer of, in order to irrigate democracy until it reaches its truth. Nevertheless, an opposition does exist, even though the terms which constitute it somewhat differ. According to J. Rancière, democracy institutes a “polemical community” which puts at stake “the opposition of two logics, the police logic of the distribution of ranks and the political logic of the egalitarian trait.”5 Regarding insurgent democracy, two comments must be made at once. Firstly, a question arises: against which state does democracy struggle? Upon closer inspection, insurgent democracy struggles on two fronts. As in the French Revolution, with the popular societies and les Enragés, it rises against the state of the Old Regime and at the same time against the new state in statu nascendi, the one which brings to power new “nobles” hoping to dominate the people in their turn. But beyond Revolution, all political communities experience a similar situation in a way: they are engaged in a struggle against a state of the Old Regime, with its burdens, its relics, and in a struggle against the new state, in prey to innovation, making or reconstructing itself under the name of reform, of modernization or of rationalization. It is to acknowledge that insurgent democracy installs itself paradoxically in a place which defies any installation, the very place of the caesura between two forms of state, one past, the other to come. Just consider the repeated insurrections of the people after the 1830 Revolution which rises against the Old Regime as well as against the new, the “liberal” monarchy, in the hands of the “high capacities,” as if it had been about opening the caesura of the July days each time. It is because it situates itself in this space in between that democracy is more apt to keep the way clear for the action of the people. More precisely, it is to safeguard this free action that insurgent democracy constitutes itself in a struggle on two fronts. A counterexample can help us better understand this strange situation. What was Trotsky doing in The New Course (1923), when he opposed the authoritarian logic of the State to that of the Party, but barring the way to another logic - that of democracy at war with the State as well as with the Party, the new figure of the State in formation? What is really sig-nificant rests at the micro-sociological level. An institution true to the logic of insurgent democracy constantly manoeuvres between two pitfalls: on the one hand, the relapse into inherited tradition, on the other, the hold of a form to come, that is in the making. Far from any state of grace, the caesura works to maintain itself in the opening to the action of the people. The temporality of such democracy wouldn’t rest so much in presence, in the concordance of the self with the self, than in discordance - repeated, even harboured - inasmuch as this struggle against the emergence of the State-form meant to, and would, preserve the non-identity of the people with itself. Admittedly, this is an exhausting temporality, even more so because it requires the systematic, the persistent practice of conflict - each conflict offering the possibility to maintain, better, to revive the caesura. All goes as if, thanks to this time of caesura, the question would be to interrupt the classic passage, described by G. Landauer in Revolution, from a utopia to a new topia and to make of our stay the nowhere of utopia, to open the greatest horizon of chances to the action of the people. Secondly, insurgent democracy is not the equivalent of a variant of the radical-liberal project - the citizen against the powers - but rather a plural formula - the citizens against the State, or better yet the community of citizens against the State. In the words of La Boétie, insurgent democracy means the community of “all ones” (tous uns) - what it specifically terms friendship - against the “all One” (tous Un); and more precisely, if we take in charge the dynamic dimension of the political, the resistance of the all ones to the shift into all One, as if insurgency had amongst other functions the one of blocking, eradicating the ever menacing slippage of the community of all ones towards the unifying form of the all One, denying the plurality, the ontological condition of plurality.”翻译为中文
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鉴于这些问题和困难,是否应该建议,而不是寻找民主对抗国家的可能形态,回到这个公式,探索和阐明其维度和议题?毫无疑问,这个表达有其优点,能够重新激活马克思在1843年手稿中的富有成效的直觉,邀请我们对其进行评估;尽管它可能被圣西门主义主题下的后继者忽略或看作是司空见惯的,即国家的消亡。对马克思来说,重点不是宣布事物的管理将取代人的治理,而是与现代的法国人一起观察,民主的到来意味着政治国家的消失;并且,如果我们考虑从1843年到1871年的道路,要肯定民主只有在它对国家发起挑战时才能存在。马克思的论点依赖于民主的例外,这一例外主要通过减法的实施来表达。现代民主之所以是反国家的民主,是因为它的特殊之处在于实践减法。不深入这一复杂机制,让我们记住最关键的一点,即减法服务于阻止政治客体化,以免后者不由自主地转变成异化。换言之,在民主中,得益于这一阻挡,政治行动保持其本质,因为它抵制了转化为组织化、统一化形态,简而言之,转化为国家。通过揭示减法及其后果,马克思能够尽可能清楚地展示,反对国家作为一种形式的斗争,被写在民主逻辑的核心。民主要么是反国家的,要么就不是民主。鉴于这一事实,不难理解,它的通常颂扬者,或多或少意识到这一现象,推荐民主的适度使用;从而阻碍了减法机制,民主的例外逐渐消失,为“民主国家”这一概念上的矛盾让路,被理解为法治或不可避免的框架。让我们补充说,减法机制是悖论的:它产生的阻塞禁止了政治客体化转化为国家形式,同时,根据我们的看法,这也是“使得政治领域内所涉及的事物扩展 - 体验普遍性、否定统治、构建等权公共空间——成为可能的原因。”就好像,因此得到资源支持的民主行动可以在公共空间中表达自己,在人民的生活中调整自己。因此有三个阶段:减法、阻塞、扩展。正是这最后一个阶段允许根据民主的生存方式灌溉人民生活的所有其他领域,以至于我们可以说一切都依赖于民主。 这个问题至关重要:这种反国家的冲动的隐藏,减法的避免,阻塞的阻塞,只会彻底破坏社会的民主制度,使其逻辑空虚,无论是在其初始动作还是在其效果上。如果这是情况,为什么不尝试另一个名字,为什么不向那些继续对真正民主感到好奇的人提议起义民主这个名字?远远超出了美国定居者反对英格兰的叛乱的回忆,在独立战争期间,这个术语清楚地表明,民主的到来是开启一个将国家作为“自然”和首选目标的对抗性场景的开端;或者说,民主是一场针对国家的“永久起义”的游戏,针对统一化、整合化、组织化的国家形式。正是从减法延伸出来,这种对抗性部署才能展开,更加注定持久,因为在这场战争中,减法可能失败,国家可能在其努力中性化民主,将其纳入以至于产生“民主国家”,它只保留了最初减法的倾向,即持续争议的倾向,这是最初冲动的淡化反映。 在当代思想中,错误地将民主与代议制政府或法治等同起来,只有雅克·兰西埃似乎保留了马克思关于民主的存在,关于民主的反国家倾向的直觉。兰西埃在呼吁区分两种社区逻辑时,将警察定义为“所有使集体聚合和同意、权力组织、等级和职能的分配以及这种分配合法化系统得以运作的过程。”3这一逻辑与另一种扰乱逻辑相对,即依赖于任何人与任何人平等的假设。在这一方面,我们找到了民主,一种政治的生存方式:“更准确地说,民主是对这种将群体分配到社群中的秩序的中断的名称,我们建议用扩展的警察一词来概念化。这个词是指打断这个秩序良好运作的特定主体化装置。”4与马克思的唯一区别是兰西埃的警察秩序更多地指的是政府或治理性,而不是国家;因此它更像是一种可检查的工具机械,甚至是“物”,而不是作为统一整体的国家,因而具有无可争辩的象征维度。马克思意识到国家的“崇高”性,至少是它的升华,想要通过揭露它假装建立在其上的普遍性欺骗来阻碍其狂妄。不是将国家简化为一组经验性的功能和等级,而是激励真正的人民重新占有这种普遍性,这种普遍性是国家声称的载体,以灌溉民主直至达到其真相。然而,即使构成它的术语略有不同,反对意见确实存在。根据J. 兰西埃,民主建立了一个“争议社群”,它把“两种逻辑的对立,警察逻辑的等级分配和平等特征的政治逻辑”置于危险之中。5 关于起义民主,必须立即做出两点评论。首先,一个问题出现了:民主在与哪个国家斗争?仔细观察,起义民主在两个战线上进行斗争。就像在法国革命中,伴随着民众社团和激进分子,它既反对旧制度的国家,同时也反对新生国家,这个国家把权力交给了希望轮流统治人民的新“贵族”。但超越革命,所有政治社群都以某种方式经历了类似的情形:他们在与旧制度的国家进行斗争,对抗其负担、遗物,同时也在与新生的国家进行斗争,这个国家猎取创新,在改革、现代化或合理化的名义下重建或构建自己。承认起义民主以一种悖论的方式安置在一个挑战任何安置的地方,正是两种国家形态之间的断裂之地,一种是过去的,另一种是即将到来的。只要考虑到1830年革命后人民的反复起义,它既反对旧制度,也反对新的“自由”君主制,掌握在“高能力”手中,就好像每次都是为了打开七月日的断裂。正是因为它位于这个中间空间,民主更有能力为人民的行动保持通道畅通。更准确地说,正是为了保护这种自由行动,起义民主在两个战线上形成斗争。一个反例可以帮助我们更好地理解这种奇怪的情况。托洛茨基在《新路线》(1923)中所做的是什么,当他将国家的威权逻辑与党的逻辑对立时,但却阻碍了另一种逻辑 - 即与国家以及党(新形成的国家的新面孔)作战的民主逻辑?真正有意义的是在微观社会学层面。忠于起义民主逻辑的机构不断在两个陷阱之间进行操作:一方面是回到继承的传统,另一方面是即将到来的形式的控制,即正在形成中。远离任何恩典状态,断裂的工作是在人民行动的开放中维持自己。这种民主的时间性不那么依赖于存在,在自我与自我一致中,而是在不和——反复的,甚至是被培养的——中,因为这场斗争反对国家形式的出现意味着,而且将会,保留人民与自己的非同一性。诚然,这是一种耗尽的时间性,尤其如此,因为它要求系统的、持续的冲突实践 - 每一次冲突都提供了保持,更好地,重新激活断裂的可能性。所有的一切好像都是因为,感谢这个断裂的时刻,问题将是打断传统路径,正如G. 兰道尔在《革命》中所描述的,从乌托邦到新的乌托邦的路径,并使我们的停留成为乌托邦的无处,为人民的行动开辟最大的机会视野。 其次,起义民主不等同于激进自由主义项目的一个变种 - 公民对抗权力 - 而更像是一个复数公式 - 公民对抗国家,或者更好地说,公民社群对抗国家。用拉·波埃蒂的话说,起义民主意味着“所有个体的社群”(tous uns) - 它特别用友谊这个词来描述 - 对抗“所有个体形成的统一”(tous Un);更准确地说,如果我们考虑政治的动态维度,所有个体抵抗转变为所有个体形成的统一的抵抗,就好像起义具有阻挡、根除社群中所有个体向所有个体形成的统一的统一形式滑落的威胁的其他功能之一,否认多样性,否认本体论上的多元条件。
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请将“Doesn’t this attempt at a definition call for an immediate critical revision of the notion of civil society, as it is professed by the doxa of the day? Let us say that the fundamental character of the expression lies in putting the political into brackets. The term aims to designate a social ensemble - of groups, relations, practices - which work towards the reproduction of a given historical community, in various fields: technical, scientific, industrial, cultural, ideological; and as such would represent the real basis of today’s states. This is where “it would happen,” as if civil society had the monopoly over seriousness and efficiency. It would come to civil society to assume the durability of the historical community beyond the vicissitudes of the political. In the long run, it would not suffice for civil society and those who claim it to put the political in brackets; it would rather be a question of moving away from it, of opposing it so as better to substitute it if need be, if there were obvious shortcomings to the political. The project seems able to concretize itself, for a society which functions by excellence would spontaneously produce “elites” susceptible of taking over the politics; even more suspect that they now pretend to practice a profession requiring a certain technical know-how. The reduction of the political to governance, namely to the application of the methods of business management to the political community, only increases the alleged legitimacy of the “representatives of civil society.” Ultimately, the notion of civil society, implicitly made up of a confused blend of anti-totalitarianism from the East, of anti-statism, of misunderstood liberalism, is an anti-political machine feeding more or less on the belief that politics has necessarily to do with evil. We can also wonder if the invocation of civil society doesn’t play, in our society of domination and exploitation, the role of a simulacrum of liberty. In the face of such a situation, wouldn’t it be advisable to repoliticize civil society?6 This is a complex operation that requires a range of critical interventions. In the first instance, to repoliticize civil society implies if not to return to the meaning of the term in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, at least to remember it. In seventeenthcentury England, the expression civil society was synonymous with political society. John Locke entitled chapter VII of the The Second Treatise of Government, “Of political or civil society.” Later, some of Rousseau’s texts, particularly the Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, refer to the political society with the expression “civil society.” Similarly, Diderot writes in the Encyclopédie: “Civil society signifies the body politic which the men from a same nation, state, city or else, form together and the political relations that unite them; it is the civil commerce of the world, the relations that men have, as subjects of a prince, as citizens of a same city and as subjects to the same law and participating to the rights and privileges shared by all who belong to this society.” With Kant, the term civil society keeps, in the Critique of the Faculty of Judgment, its political meaning in the sense that it signifies a whole under the influence of a legal power. In other texts, Kant insistently invites us to distinguish the judicial civil society from the ethical civil society, failing which the organization of the State might be disrupted. It is with Hegel, a careful reader of the English economists, that the concept of civil society shifts from the political to the economic, though preserving a political character. Civil society becomes the civil-bourgeois society, a system of needs resting on an antagonistic structure close, to some extent, to the war of all against all. Of course, mediating bodies mitigate these conflicts, but it is only at the level of the State, and because of the State, that the conflicts of the civil-bourgeois society could be overcome in such a way that the State manifests itself as an organic totality. The effect of the Hegelian shift is twofold: on the one hand, civil society having become economic, it is the political, in the Hegelian conception of the State, that has the responsibility for imposing its norm and foundation on the economic, rather than the opposite; on the other hand, Hegel historicizes the concept of civil society. With Hegelian philosophy, “the abstract notion of civil society takes on its true meaning: civil society is bourgeois.”7 Civil society cannot be its own end. Torn by its internal contradictions, it cannot accede to liberty, nor unity. The antagonism of wealth and poverty is the primary contradiction which divides it. In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel writes, 243: “. . . the accumulation of wealth grows on one side . . . while on the other, the specialization and limitation of particular work also grows and, with this, the dependency and destitution of the class which is bound to this work ...” or yet, 245: “It thus appears that, despite its excess of wealth, civil society is not rich enough, that is that it does not possess as its own enough resources to prevent the excess of poverty and the production of the masses.”8 Repoliticizing civil society therefore does not mean purely and simply to return to the political theorists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, before Hegel. The operation is more complex, more subtle. Against the reduction of civil society to the economic, the necessary acknowledgment of the political signification imposes itself; but in stating two complementary demands at once. Firstly, the return to the synonymy of civil society and political society could not mean to profess, as the pre-Hegelian theorists did, an equivalent synonymy between the political society and the State. Indeed, hasn’t the Hegelian fault line between civil society and the State revealed another possible fault line, which remained unacknowledged inasmuch as Hegelian statism had spontaneously concealed it, namely the one between the political community and the State? On this issue, critical work could demonstrate how the Hegelian concept of civil society holds within itself a political dimension that it tends to conceal, but that it can’t entirely suppress. While the State is a possible form of political community, it is not its necessary form. It is to recognize that there existed, that there exists, that there could exist political communities other than the State, ones which don’t find their accomplishment, their perfection, in the State. Non-statist, or even anti-statist, political communities. Forms of political communities which constitute themselves against the State, against the sudden appearance of a separate power, are indeed conceivable. Isn’t it one of the lessons of new political anthropology, of the Copernican revolution of Pierre Clastres, in the study of savage societies, not of societies without State, but of societies against the State?9 Isn’t it what Rousseau sought when he calls for distinguishing between the “body of the people” and the “body of the state” and isn’t it very precisely this body of the people which expresses itself in its opposition to the State, fighting against it to reappropriate political action as it deploys itself in the caesura between two forms of State? Isn’t it this kind of affirmation of the political which is inscribed in all modern revolutions, concerned with the in situ expression of the “political capacity” of the people in action, the political capacity of the all ones? Isn’t it what is at stake in the confrontation of the revolutionary positions, one, the Jacobin calling for a takeover of the State, the other, the communalist or councilist aspiring to break the State to give free rein to an anti-statist political community. For instance, is this not what Marx meant in regard to the Paris Commune with the mysterious wording “communal constitution”? This affirmation of a non-statist political community leads to a two-fold struggle. If it is obvious that it struggles against the identification of politics with the State to which Hegelianism proceeds which reduces all political possibilities to the State; it nevertheless also rejects a “vulgar” anarchism, that of Martin Buber in Utopie et Socialisme, for instance, which, content with inverting Hegel by playing the social against the political, concludes that the renaissance of the social fabric, the advent of the social, must immediately lead to the end, to the disappearance of the political assimilated to State domination. Repoliticizing civil society is thus to discover the possibility of a political community outside the State and against it. In light of this possibility, the bracketing of the political is better understood - the depolitization practiced by the current neutralization of political society - as the antechamber of consensual governance. Isn’t this neutralization about conjuring the “specter” of a non-statist, better yet, an anti-statist, political community? On the other hand, in this work of repolitization of civil society, one could not return to pre-Hegelian thought, since we are indebted to him for bringing the antagonisms tearing civil society apart to the fore, the opposition between wealth and poverty being the main one. If repoliticizing civil society leads to disclosure of the existence of a political community susceptible of rising against the State, it couldn’t evidently be conceived of according to the model of the State, an organic whole, a unified and reconciled political society. It is rather compelling to think of it as divided, either by reviving the Machiavellian tradition aware of the confrontation, in every human society, between the grandees and the people, or by considering this political community as an answer to the polemical question of equality. Upon reflection, doesn’t this choice to repoliticize civil society, that is to give back its political meaning, reproduce Marx’s gesture in the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, as long as one accepts the hypothesis proposed? Marx’s goal in 1843 would not have been, as he would assert it later in 1859, epistemological, the determination of the place and status of the political in the social totality, constitutive of a critical theory, but at once political and philosophical. It would be a question of substituting a democratic mode of thinking to a bureaucratic one, under the influence moreover of Hegelian logicism.”翻译为中文
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这种定义尝试是否要求我们立即对当今多克萨(doxa,即普遍观点或信仰)所宣扬的民间社会概念进行批判性修订?让我们说,这一表达的根本特征在于将政治置于括号之中。这个术语旨在指定一个社会集合——由团体、关系、实践组成——它们在各个领域努力复制给定的历史社群:技术、科学、工业、文化、意识形态;因此,它将代表如今国家的真实基础。这就是“它将要发生”的地方,好像民间社会拥有严肃性和效率的垄断。民间社会将承担历史社群超越政治变故的持久性。从长远来看,民间社会及其声称者将政治置于括号之中是不够的;相反,它将是一个远离政治的问题,以便在需要时更好地替代政治,特别是如果政治明显存在缺陷。这个项目似乎能够具体实现,因为一个优秀的社会将自发产生有能力接管政治的“精英”;更可疑的是,他们现在假装从事需要一定技术知识的职业。将政治简化为治理,即将商业管理方法应用于政治社群,只会增加“民间社会代表”的所谓合法性。最终,民间社会的概念,含蓄地由东欧反极权主义、反国家主义、误解的自由主义混合而成,是一台反政治机器,或多或少地依赖于政治必然与邪恶相关的信仰。我们也可以怀疑,提倡民间社会是否在我们的统治和剥削社会中扮演了自由幻影的角色。 面对这样的情况,重新赋予民间社会以政治性不是更为明智吗?这是一个需要一系列批判性干预的复杂操作。首先,重新赋予民间社会以政治性意味着,如果不是回到十七和十八世纪术语的含义,至少要记住它。在十七世纪的英国,民间社会一词与政治社会同义。约翰·洛克在《政府论》第七章的标题为“政治或民间社会。”后来,一些卢梭的文本,特别是《不平等的起源》中,用“民间社会”一词提到政治社会。类似地,狄德罗在《百科全书》中写道:“民间社会指的是同一国家、州、城市等的人们共同形成的政体及其团结他们的政治关系;它是世界的民事交往,是人们作为一位王子的臣民、一个城市的公民以及遵守相同法律并分享这个社会所有人共有的权利和特权的关系。”在康德那里,术语民间社会在《判断力批判》中保持了其政治含义,因为它意味着一个受法律权力影响的整体。在其他文本中,康德坚持邀请我们区分司法民间社会与伦理民间社会,否则国家的组织可能会受到破坏。 是黑格尔,一个细读英国经济学家作品的人,将民间社会的概念从政治转移到经济,尽管仍保留政治特征。民间社会变成了市民-资产阶级社会,一个建立在某种程度上接近于人人相争的对抗性结构之上的需求体系。当然,调解机构缓和了这些冲突,但只有在国家层面,因为国家的出现,市民-资产阶级社会的冲突才能以这样的方式被克服,从而国家表现为一个有机整体。黑格尔转变的效果是双重的:一方面,民间社会成为经济社会,根据黑格尔对国家的观念,政治有责任将其规范和基础强加于经济,而不是相反;另一方面,黑格尔将民间社会的概念历史化。通过黑格尔哲学,“民间社会的抽象概念获得了其真实含义:民间社会是资产阶级的。”民间社会不能是自身的目的。由于其内部矛盾,它无法获得自由,也无法获得统一。财富与贫困的对立是分裂它的主要矛盾。在《法权哲学》中,黑格尔写道,243:“……一方面,财富的积累增长……而另一方面,特定工作的专业化和限制也在增长,随之而来的是与这项工作相关的阶层的依赖和贫困……”或者,245:“因此,尽管财富过剩,民间社会并不富裕,即它作为自己的资源不足以阻止贫困的过剩和群体的产生。” 因此,重新赋予民间社会以政治性并不意味着纯粹而简单地回到黑格尔之前的政治理论家那里。这个操作更为复杂、更为微妙。反对将民间社会简化为经济,必须承认政治意义的必要性;但同时提出两个互补的要求。首先,回归民间社会与政治社会的同义并不意味着要像前黑格尔时代的理论家那样认同政治社会与国家之间的等同。事实上,黑格尔在民间社会与国家之间的分界线是不是揭示了另一个可能的分界线,这一分界线在黑格尔的国家主义自发隐藏下一直未被承认,即政治社群与国家之间的分界线?在这个问题上,批判性工作可以展示黑格尔的民间社会概念如何在其自身内部抱有政治维度,它倾向于隐藏,但不能完全抑制。虽然国家是政治社群的一种可能形式,但它不是其必要形式。这是承认存在其他非国家的,甚至反国家的政治社群,它们不在国家中找到自己的成就、完善。可以构想出反国家,反对突然出现的独立权力的政治社群形式。这不就是新政治人类学,皮埃尔·克拉斯特斯在对野蛮社会研究中的哥白尼革命的教训之一吗,不是没有国家的社会,而是反对国家的社会?这不就是卢梭在呼吁区分“人民之体”和“国家之体”时所寻求的吗,而这正是“人民之体”在反对国家时表达自己,反对它以重新占有政治行动,因为它在两种国家形式之间的断裂中展开自己?这种政治肯定不就是所有现代革命中所反映的,关心以原位表达“人民行动中的政治能力”,所有个体的政治能力?这不就是革命立场对抗中的所涉及的,一个是呼吁接管国家的雅各宾派,另一个是渴望打破国家给予反国家政治社群以自由发展空间的公社派或议会派?例如,这不是马克思在谈到巴黎公社时所意味着的“公社宪法”吗? 这种非国家政治社群的肯定导致了一场双重斗争。如果它与黑格尔主义所进行的将政治与国家等同起来的斗争显而易见,这一等同将所有政治可能性简化为国家;但它同样也拒绝了一种“粗俗”的无政府主义,比如马丁·布伯在《乌托邦与社会主义》中的那种,它满足于倒置黑格尔通过发挥社会对抗政治的结论,认为社会结构的复兴、社会的到来,必须立即导致政治的终结,即与国家统治同化的政治的消失。因此,重新赋予民间社会以政治性意味着发现国家之外和对抗国家的政治社群的可能性。从这个可能性的角度看,政治置于括号之中——通过当前的政治社会中立化实践的去政治化——被更好地理解为共识治理的前厅。这种中立化是否就是为了避免非国家的,更确切地说,反国家政治社群的“幽灵”? 另一方面,在这项重新赋予民间社会以政治性的工作中,我们不能回到前黑格尔的思想,因为我们欠他对撕裂民间社会的对立面的揭示,财富与贫困的对立是主要的。如果重新赋予民间社会以政治性意味着揭示抗击国家的政治社群的存在,它显然不能按照国家模型来构想,即一个有机整体,一个统一和和解的政治社会。相反,更有说服力的是将其视为被分裂的,要么通过复兴意识到每个人类社会都存在着贵族和人民之间对抗的马基雅维利传统,要么将这个政治社群视为对平等争议性问题的回应。 仔细想想,重新赋予民间社会以政治性的选择,即赋予其政治含义,是否重现了马克思在《黑格尔法哲学批判》中的举动,只要我们接受所提出的假设?马克思在1843年的目标不会是,正如他后来在1859年所断言的,认识论的,即政治在社会整体中的地位和状态的确定,构成了批判理论的基础,而是同时是政治和哲学的。这将是一个问题,即在黑格尔逻辑主义的影响下,用民主思维方式代替官僚思维方式。
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请将“For Marx, it wasn’t so much a case of defining civil society, following the English and Hegel, as the whole of the conditions of material life and to find its anatomy in political economy, than to search for the original subject from which family and civil society proceed, namely, the whole demos. “What is required is to start from the real subject and consider its objectification,” declares Marx. It is in this quest for the real subject that true democracy appears as a form of political objectification, of political community which goes hand-in-hand with the disappearance of the political State, understood as an organizing form. Isn’t it precisely to avoid the Hegelian shift that Marx envisions bourgeois-civil society, not in its materiality, nor in its facticity, but in its movement outside itself, in what he terms its “ecstasy,” as if the political community, in the form of true democracy, could emerge from this movement, of which civil society is the bearer, on the condition, thanks to the political act, of coming out of itself. Such are the broad outlines that allow for the tracing of the contours of what should be understood as insurgent democracy. In a Rousseauist vocabulary, insurgent democracy can be defined as an arising of the body of the people against the body of the State; in other words, the expression of the political rapport as it proceeds from the true subject, the “whole demos.” Still, one should specify that, in moving away from Marx and of this expression, in preferring all ones (oixAAoi), the body of the people is not to be considered as a substantial organism, turning inward, but as a divided, split, body, embarked on the never ending quest for a problematic identity. It is indeed in the test of multiple conflicts that the political community constitutes itself with the goal of bringing to all spheres, thanks to reduction, democratic universality, namely an experience of liberty offering itself as a rejection of domination, as non-domination. Three characteristics can be attributed to insurgent democracy:
- Insurgent democracy is not a variant of conflictual democracy, but its exact opposite. While conflictual democracy practices conflict within the State, a democratic State which in its very name presents itself as an avoidance of the original conflict, inclining as a result conflictuality towards permanent compromise, insurgent democracy situates conflict in another space, outside the State, against it, and far from practicing the avoidance of the major conflict, - democracy against the State - it does not shrink from rupture, if need be. Insurgent democracy is born out of the intuition that there is no true democracy without reactivating the anarchic impulse which first rises against the classic expression of arche - at once commencement and commandment - namely, the State. In this sense, insurgency is the live source of true democracy; as well as, according to Machiavelli, the permanent struggle between the plebs and the Senate, the tumults of the plebs were the source of Roman liberty.
- Insurgency corresponds to the time of the caesura between two State forms; it is to recognize that the democracy which is inspired by it works to preserve this time of caesura, in doing so maintaining action in the Arendtian sense of the term and to preserve it from its ongoing transformation. Insurgent democracy is continued struggle for action against fabrication.
- The distinctive characteristic of insurgent democracy is to change appreciably the stakes. Instead of conceiving of emancipation as the victory of the social (a civil society reconciled) over the political, leading at the same time to the disappearance of the political, this form of democracy gives rise, works steadily towards giving rise to, a political community against the State. To the opposition of the social and the political, it substitutes that of the political and the State. Dethroning the State, it erects the political against the State and opens the too often concealed abyss between the political and the State. The State is not the last word of the political, its accomplishment. On the contrary, it is only its systematic and destructive form of the all ones in the name of the One. PREFACE Of late, the tendency to treat Marx as a “dead horse” seems to be abating. Returns to Marx or comebacks of Marx are being announced and prepared all around us, though with clearly varied intentions. Have the obituaries played themselves out? Are we entering a new period in which Marx is “explained” in his own terms? There are, then, many different returns to Marx. But rather than distinguishing them according to their specific objectives, we might do better to begin by drawing a line between those who are in the Marxist camp, or who are aligned with a given form of Marxism, and those who take a distinctly neutral or even antagonistic stance toward Marxism; between those who continue to make Marx a catalyst for movements, parties and States, and those who, turning their backs on these ways of using Marx, are ready to examine Marx in his singularity and in his solitude. Marx frequently declared: “All I know is that I am not a Marxist.” It would be a great mistake to see in this declaration only a provocative witticism coming from someone who has falsely been erected into a founding father. Marx sufficiently denounced and attacked “utopian substitutionism” - whereby a utopian claims to substitute himself for the social movement - to make it plain that he would just as vehemently contest any “theoretical substitutionism” - the substitution of the patrimonial name of a “great theoretician” for anonymous emancipation, the self-emancipation of the dominated class. In this sense, Marxism represents the inversion of Marx’s thought - a thought that was in reality closer to Flora Tristan’s project of a Union Ouvrière than to the various partisan or statist revisions developed by his self-proclaimed disciples. From this perspective, the collapse of the Marxist regimes falsely claiming to be “socialist” may be seen as having, among other salutary effects, “returned” Marx to us - a Marx freed from the rigidified ideological layers that have constituted a barrier between him and us. But in truth the return to Marx, or more precisely the rediscovery of a Marx beyond Marxism, did not wait for this collapse. In their respective ways, Maximilien Rubel and Michel Henry have already helped us hear Marx’s voice again. For Michel Henry this voice is philosophical, and his sharp verdict could hardly be clearer: “Marxism is the collection of misinterpretations that have been made of Marx” - a long-standing misapprehension reinforced by the prolonged unavailability of Marx’s philosophical writings.1 As Henry insists repeatedly, the astonishing truth is that Marxism established and defined itself without drawing on Marx’s philosophical thought, and even in complete ignorance of it. It was, in fact, only in the 1920s that David Riazanov discovered Marx’s main philosophical writings. Starting from this simple observation, Henry offers a revolutionary reading of Marx. Marx’s historical and political writings are shown to rest on concepts that are not foundational and the essential concepts of Marxism are revealed as in no way Marx’s own, since for him they are neither realities, nor principles of explanation. In this way we are reintroduced to Marx’s philosophical enterprise, the quest for a reality overlooked by both Hegel and Feuerbach, a reality that is nothing other than practice, that is, pure activity as such. In the case of Maximilien Rubel, the voice is more explicitly political. Rubel’s rejection of any attempt to link Marx and Marxism is so emphatic that he actually winds up presenting Marx himself as the original and most essential critic of Marxism. Once the author of Capital is freed from his mythical role as the founding father of Marxism and as the progenitor of the October “Revolution” - the transformation of Marx’s critical thought into party and statist ideology - he reemerges as what he never ceased to be: the theorist of workers’ self-emancipation, responding to the double ethical exigency of utopia and revolution.2 As we observe the traditionalist form the return to political philosophy has taken in France, there is some concern that the return to a non-Marxist Marx may ultimately lead to a neutralization of his thought. Might the next step be Marx’s integration into the academic corpus, with his thought safely severed from its roots in revolt and messianism? This concern, expressed by Jacques Derrida, is understandable, but there is nothing inevitable about this neutralization, because the return to Marx at the same time raises once again the question and the necessity of emancipation.3 In what follows, I will side with this type of return, which in truth is more like a reactivation than a return. I will focus in particular on an outstanding essay of Marx’s that was published well after the establishment of Marxism: the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, written very likely in the summer of 1843 and published by David Riazanov in 1927. In this text Marx criticizes Hegel’s Philosophy of Right virtually line-by-line, specifically §§261-313 in the third section of part III devoted to the State. My goal is less to propose a new overall interpretation of Marx’s 1843 Critique than to find an answer to two essential questions: What status does Marx give to the political realm when he attempts to free the political logic specific to it from the grips of Hegelian logicality? And what type of society does Marx have in mind when he envisions a “true democracy,” a democracy that would develop in tandem with the disappearance of the State? It is as though Marx, by raising the question of true democracy, were at once taking over for himself and pushing to its extreme the enigma brought to the world with the French Revolution. This brings us back to the rift between Marx and Marxism. For it was by proposing an analysis of our contemporaneous Machiavellian moment - which may be considered as establishing itself through a critique of Marxism in order to rediscover a political realm lost either in philosophies of history or in scientistic projects - that I first became aware that an earlier Machiavellian moment already existed in Marx. And this moment was not unconnected with the adventure of the Young Hegelian movement, which is one of the sources, or testing grounds, of political modernity. We need only recall that in the span of just a few years, this movement gave birth to radical political liberalism (Rüge, Marx), socialism and communism (Moses Hess, Engels, Marx), anarchism (Bakunin, and perhaps also Stirner) and Zionism (Moses Hess). That said, my aim is not to provide yet another rereading of Marx in light of some external referent, but to reactivate his major concepts and insights by following his own line of thought. If we consider the relationship of Marx’s thinking to Machiavelli and Spinoza, we find an ongoing questioning of the political realm, a practical will to emancipate the res publica from the theological-political and from the vestiges of feudalism.”翻译为中文
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对于马克思来说,定义民间社会的问题并不像英国人和黑格尔那样将其看作是物质生活条件的总和,并在政治经济学中寻找其结构,而是要寻找家庭和民间社会的原始主体,即整个民众。“需要的是从真实的主体出发,考虑其客体化,”马克思声明。在对真实主体的寻求中,真正的民主作为一种政治客体化的形式、政治社群的形式出现,与政治国家的消失并行,后者被理解为一种组织形式。难道这不正是为了避免黑格尔的转变,马克思设想资产阶级-民间社会,不是以其物质性,也不是以其事实性,而是以其自身之外的运动,用他所说的“狂喜”来表达,仿佛政治社群以真正民主的形式,可以从这一运动中涌现,这一运动是民间社会所承载的,在政治行为的条件下,得以走出自身。
这些大致轮廓勾画出了应被理解为起义民主的轮廓。用卢梭的词汇来定义,起义民主可以被定义为人民之体反对国家之体的兴起;换句话说,是政治关系的表达,正如它来自于真实主体,即“整个民众”。然而,应该指出的是,在远离马克思和这一表达的过程中,偏爱所有人(oixAAoi),不应将人民之体视为一种向内的实质性有机体,而是作为一个被分裂、分离的主体,踏上对问题性身份的永无止境的寻求。确实,在多重冲突的考验中,政治社群以使所有领域实现民主普遍性——即自由的体验,作为对统治的拒绝,作为非统治——的目标而构建自身。
可以将三个特征归于起义民主:
- 起义民主不是冲突民主的一个变种,而是其确切的对立面。冲突民主在国家内部实践冲突,一个其名字本身就呈现出避免原始冲突的民主国家,倾向于将冲突性导向永久妥协,起义民主则将冲突置于另一个空间,国家之外,对抗国家,并且远离避免主要冲突的做法 - 对抗国家的民主 - 它不回避断裂,如果需要。起义民主源于没有激活反对阿尔克(开始和命令的双重含义)的经典表达的无政府冲动的直觉,即没有真正民主,即国家。从这个意义上讲,起义是真正民主的活水源;正如马基雅维利所说,平民和元老院之间的永久斗争,平民的骚乱是罗马自由的源泉。
- 起义对应于两种国家形式之间断裂的时刻;承认受其启发的民主致力于保护这个断裂的时刻,从而保持阿伦特意义上的行动,并使其免于持续转变。起义民主是持续为行动对抗制造而斗争。
- 起义民主的显著特征是显著改变了利害关系。与其将解放视为社会(和解的民间社会)对政治的胜利,并同时导致政治的消失,这种民主形式产生、持续产生反对国家的政治社群。它将社会与政治的对立替换为政治与国家的对立。废黜国家,它将政治对抗国家,并揭示了政治与国家之间常常被隐藏的深渊。 国家不是政治的最终话语,其成就。相反,它只是以一个之名破坏所有人的系统和破坏性形式。
序言 近来,将马克思视为“死马”的倾向似乎正在减弱。我们周围正在宣布和准备对马克思的重返,尽管意图明显不同。讣告是否已经发挥了它们的作用?我们是否进入了一个新时期,在这个时期中,马克思将“按照他自己的条款”被“解释”?
因此,对马克思的回归有很多不同的形式。但与其根据它们的具体目标来区分它们,我们或许更应该先划分那些处于马克思主义阵营的人,或者与某种形式的马克思主义站在一起的人,以及那些对马克思主义持明确中立甚至对立态度的人;区分那些继续将马克思作为运动、政党和国家的催化剂的人,以及那些转而背离这些使用马克思的方式,准备审视马克思的独特性和孤独的人。
马克思经常声明:“我所知道的是,我不是一个马克思主义者。”将这一声明仅视为来自被错误地树立为创始人的人的挑衅性俏皮话将是一个巨大的错误。马克思充分谴责并攻击了“乌托邦替代主义”——其中一位乌托邦主义者声称代替社会运动——以至于他也将同样激烈地反对任何“理论替代主义”——用一位“伟大理论家”的宗法式名字代替匿名解放,即受统治阶级的自我解放。从这个意义上讲,马克思主义代表了马克思思想的反转——实际上更接近于弗洛拉·特里斯坦的工人联盟项目,而不是他自封弟子们开发的各种党派或国家主义修正。从这个角度来看,错误声称为“社会主义”的马克思主义政权的崩溃可以被看作是具有其他许多有益效果之一的“归还”了马克思——一个从僵化的意识形态层面解放出来的马克思,这些层面构成了阻碍我们与他之间的屏障。但事实上,对马克思的回归,或更确切地说,对超越马克思主义的马克思的重新发现,并不是等待这个崩溃的。马克西米利安·鲁贝尔(Maximilien Rubel)和米歇尔·亨利(Michel Henry)以他们各自的方式已经帮助我们再次聆听马克思的声音。
对于米歇尔·亨利来说,这个声音是哲学的,他的尖锐判断几乎是毋庸置疑的:“马克思主义是对马克思的一系列误解的总和”——一个由于马克思的哲学著作长期无法获得而被加固的长期误解。正如亨利一再强调的,令人震惊的真相是,马克思主义在没有马克思的哲学思想的基础上确立和定义了自己,甚至对其一无所知。事实上,直到20世纪20年代,戴维·里亚诺夫(David Riazanov)才发现了马克思的主要哲学著作。从这一简单观察出发,亨利提供了对马克思的革命性阅读。马克思的历史和政治著作被展示为建立在非基础概念上,而马克思主义的基本概念被揭示为根本不属于马克思自己的,因为对他来说,它们既不是现实,也不是解释原则。通过这种方式,我们被重新介绍到马克思的哲学事业,对黑格尔和费尔巴哈都忽视的现实的追求,这一现实只不过是实践,即纯粹活动本身。
在马克西米利安·鲁贝尔的案例中,声音更明确地是政治的。鲁贝尔对任何企图将马克思和马克思主义联系起来的尝试的拒绝如此强烈,以至于他实际上最终将马克思本人呈现为对马克思主义最原始和最本质的批评者。一旦《资本论》的作者从他被神话化的马克思主义创始人和十月“革命”的始祖角色中解放出来——将马克思的批判思想转化为党派和国家主义意识形态——他重新出现为他从未停止过的身份:工人自我解放的理论家,回应乌托邦和革命的双重伦理要求。观察到法国政治哲学回归的传统形式,我们有些担心,对非马克思主义马克思的回归最终可能导致他的思想被中和。下一步可能是马克思被纳入学术语料库,他的思想安全地从起义和救世主原则的根源中割裂开来?雅克·德里达表达的这种担忧是可以理解的,但这种中和并非不可避免,因为对马克思的回归同时再次提出了解放的问题和必要性。
在后面的内容中,我将支持这种类型的回归,实际上这更像是一种激活而不是回归。我将特别关注马克思的一篇杰出论文,这篇论文在马克思主义确立之后很久才发表:《黑格尔法哲学批判》,很可能是在1843年夏天写成,并由大卫·里亚诺夫在1927年出版。在这篇文本中,马克思几乎逐行批判了黑格尔的《法哲学原理》,特别是第三部分第三章关于国家的§§261-313。我的目标不是提出马克思1843年批判的新的整体解释,而是找到两个基本问题的答案:马克思在试图从黑格尔的逻辑性中解放出特定于政治领域的政治逻辑时,赋予政治领域何种地位?当他设想一种“真正的民主”,一种与国家消失并行发展的民主时,他心中的社会是什么样的?好像马克思通过提出真正民主的问题,一方面为自己接过了这个谜题并将其推向极限,这个谜题是随着法国大革命带给世界的。
这让我们回到了马克思与马克思主义之间的裂痕。因为通过提出我们当代的马基雅维利时刻的分析——这可能被认为是通过批判马克思主义来重新发现在历史哲学或科学项目中丢失的政治领域——我首先意识到马克思已经存在于一个更早的马基雅维利时刻中。这一时刻与年轻黑格尔主义运动的冒险不无关系,这一运动是政治现代性的来源之一或试验场。我们只需要回想一下,短短几年内,这个运动孕育了激进政治自由主义(鲁格,马克思)、社会主义和共产主义(摩西·赫斯,恩格斯,马克思)、无政府主义(巴枯宁,也许还有斯蒂纳)和犹太复国主义(摩西·赫斯)。
话虽如此,我的目标不是再次从某个外部参照物来重新阅读马克思,而是通过遵循他自己的思想线索来激活他的主要概念和见解。如果我们考虑马克思的思想与马基雅维利和斯宾诺莎的关系,我们会发现对政治领域的持续质疑,一种从神学政治和封建主义残余中解放公共事务的实践意愿。