SUMMARY We described a simple, unifying framework for inhibitory control that serves as…
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SUMMARY We described a simple, unifying framework for inhibitory control that serves as a comprehensive scaffold to integrate emotional influences on cognitive processes. In our view, emotion can be understood as additional context (e.g., interoceptive experience), which constrains and biases the computations in an “ideal observer model” of inhibitory control. That is, the role of affect in inhibitory control can be interpreted in terms of well-understood computational aspects of cognition such as beliefs, action valuation and choice. Thus, emotion may affect inhibitory behavior by biasing (a) prior expectations and associated changes in internal beliefs about various taskrelevant events, and (b) action/outcome valuation (see Figure 4). Importantly, on the basis of behavioral and neural data, the framework highlights a strong interdependence between the appetitive/aversive nature of emotional states and basic action tendencies that are intrinsic to inhibitory control. Thus, we surmise that the valence dimension may have primary influences on action parameters associated with approach and inhibition (action constraint), and exert valence congruent influences on outcome valuation and expectancies. In contrast, arousal may have a more selective role in biasing expectancies of action cancellation. In addition, we argue that higher levels of arousal may more indirectly modulate the computational processes supporting inhibitory function by redirecting attention away from task-relevant information and generally impairing prefrontal function and related computational mechanisms. Our theoretical framework has some limitations inherent to the challenge of testing these hypotheses. For instance, the separate effect of valence and arousal are difficult to disentangle in both experimental settings and affective disorders. The breadth of individual variability in the experience and regulation of emotion make these potential effects further difficult to pinpoint. With regard to the potential impact of emotion on sensory disambiguation, we have emphasized the contribution of outcome and action expectancies (i.e., prior distributions associated with valence congruent events and trial type). However, we should note that more downstream effects of emotion have been documented. For instance, valence and arousal have been shown to modulate visual processing style (i.e., global vs. detail) and selective attention (e.g., breadth of attentional focus; (Loftus et al., 1987; Basso et al., 1996; Gasper and Clore, 2002). Although outside the scope of this review, modeling potential biases in sensory input parameters (e.g., sensory input mixing factors) may capture additional aspects of the interaction between emotion and inhibitory control. Finally, an equally important aspect of such emotioncognition interactions is the iterative nature of any emotioncognitions interactions. That is behavioral performance and the dynamic feedback received when engaged in inhibitory control tasks are likely to modulate emotional state. As a consequence, the nature and types of biases impacting inhibitory control are likely to emerge from the dynamic interaction between Bayesian computation of response costs, selection of actions, and reception of outcomes, which subsequently affect the Bayesian updating of beliefs. These dynamic processes might be particularly relevant in psychopathological conditions, which emerge over longer periods of time. сократи, описывая от третьего лица, сохраняй термины, на английском языке
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In their framework, the authors describe how emotion acts as an additional context that influences and constrains computations within an "ideal observer model" used for understanding inhibitory control in cognitive processes. They propose that emotions impact inhibitory behavior by altering prior expectations and beliefs about task-relevant events, as well as action/outcome valuation. The framework suggests a strong link between the emotional state's appetitive or aversive nature and inherent action tendencies crucial for inhibitory control. It hypothesizes that emotional valence primarily affects approach and inhibition tendencies and influences outcome valuation and expectations. Arousal, on the other hand, is thought to selectively bias the expectancy of action cancellation and indirectly affect inhibitory functions through modifications in attention focus and prefrontal activity.
They also acknowledge the difficulty in experimentally disentangling the separate impacts of valence and arousal, particularly in studies involving affective disorders, due to individual variations in emotional experiences and regulation. Moreover, they mention that emotional states influence how sensory information is processed — affecting visual processing style and attentional focus — though these aspects were beyond the scope of their review.
The authors emphasize the cyclical nature of the interactions between emotion and cognition in tasks requiring inhibitory control. These interactions involve dynamic feedback from behavioral performance, which in turn modulates emotional states and influences the Bayesian computations underlying response selection and belief updating. They suggest that such dynamics are especially pertinent in understanding psychopathological conditions which develop over time.
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One way to conceptualize the interaction of emotion and inhibitory control within a Bayesian framework relates to sensory disambiguation and belief formation (e.g., expectations about task relevant stimuli/outcomes). We suggest that the values and shape of the prior probability distributions associated with given events are the computational levels where such affective influences could be implemented. Such probabilistic computations represent an individual's prior knowledge of the environment in which he/she is operating, which is used to make predictions about upcoming events. For instance, a central assumption of the Bayesian ideal observer model is an iterative estimation of the likelihood of certain events as sensory disambiguation proceeds until certain probability thresholds that minimize the cost function are reached (at which point an action is selected). These probability distributions may also be updated over the course of multiple trial/response dyads (generating posterior distributions) based on the history of prior estimates and current trial outcome (Bayes rule; e.g., Equation 3b). Thus, prior distributions are often modeled as the combination of a fixed initial prior (representing pre-task frequency estimates) and the previous posterior distributions capturing the history of multiple trials in the task (Shenoy and Yu, 2011); see Equation 3a). While factors such as previous experience with the inhibitory task are likely to heavily influence these prior values, we propose that emotional attributes could be similarly used as heuristics to gauge how likely an event or upcoming action is, resulting in a general shift in values (i.e., mean change) or changes in the distribution shape (e.g., variance, skew; see Figure 4 top panel “Prior Distributions”). Supporting the plausibility of this hypothesis, there is robust evidence of similar biases in subjective probability estimation in healthy populations, typically reflecting underestimation of high probabilities and overestimation of low probabilities (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Loewenstein and Lerner, 2003).
Based on the reviewed literature and extensive evidence of interdependence between valence laden information and action tendencies (e.g., activation vs. inhibition; see (Huys et al., 2011; Dayan, 2012), we consider two mediating mechanisms by which valence and arousal could bias probabilistic computations, including outcome expectancies (see Figure 4 top panel, blue area), and action expectancies (see Figure 4 top panel, green area). Finally, given evidence of distinct functional and neurochemical systems involved in approach related actions (e.g., “go”), action cancellation (e.g., stopping an initiated action, “stop”), and inhibition (e.g., withholding an action, “no-go” (Frank, 2005; Eagle et al., 2008; Swick et al., 2011), our proposed model distinguishes these three types of action requirements when considering potential emotional influences. We note that approach-based activation in the context of standard inhibitory paradigms is most commonly associated with go actions, which could be in the context of gaining a reward or avoiding “miss” errors. The latter is more akin to a form of active avoidance (i.e., performing an action to avoid a negative outcome). In contrast, inhibition or action restraint in the present framework (e.g., “nogo” responses) is related to passive avoidance (e.g., not performing an action to avoid “false alarm” errors or other penalties). This is consistent with actor-critic models of reinforcement learning (Maia, 2010; Dayan, 2012) and neural evidence that learning of both approach actions and avoidant actions involve phasic firing of dopamine neurons (predominantly via D1 receptors) in the dorsal striatum (Montague et al., 2004; Samson et al., 2010). In contrast, dips in dopamine (via D2 receptors in the “no-go” indirect pathway) and serotonin may be primarily involved in mediating inhibition or action constraint (Frank et al., 2004; Dayan and Huys, 2008; Kravitz et al., 2012).
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The framework proposes that emotion influences inhibitory control within a Bayesian context by affecting the formation and adjustment of probabilistic beliefs about task-relevant stimuli and outcomes. Emotions may shift the values and shapes of prior probability distributions, which are critical for predicting and reacting to events. In this ideal observer model, prior distributions are continually refined through Bayesian updates, integrating the results of new trials with prior assessments to form posterior distributions. These updates rely on both a fixed initial prior and the influence of recent experiences during a task, reflecting an iterative process of expectation adjustment.
Emotion is thought to shape these updates by influencing how likely certain outcomes are perceived and how probable it is that an action will be carried out. The authors suggest that emotional attributes analogous to heuristics might adjust probability distributions, influencing their mean or altering distribution characteristics like variance and skew. This concept is supported by evidence indicating that people often miscalculate probabilities based on their emotional states, such as overestimating unlikely events and underestimating likely events.
From a neurobehavioral perspective, the interplay between valence (the positive or negative value assigned to a stimulus) and arousal (the physiological and psychological state of being awoken or alert) is considered to mediate these probabilistic biases. Valence and arousal are believed to influence two distinct aspects of Bayesian computations: outcome expectancies and action expectancies. These emotional dimensions inform both the anticipation of outcomes (affective forecasting) and the likelihood of executing specific actions (behavioral activation or inhibition).
The authors distinguish among three types of action requirements in their conceptual model: “go” actions associated with approach behaviors (e.g., pursuing rewards or avoiding errors), “stop” actions involving the cessation of an initiated action, and “no-go” responses, where actions are withheld to prevent undesired outcomes such as penalties. This differentiation aligns with actor-critic models of reinforcement learning, where approach behaviors are linked to reward-related dopamine activity, primarily through D1 receptors, and avoidant or inhibitory actions correlate with reductions in dopaminergic and serotonergic activity, often mediated by D2 receptors.
Overall, the model posits that emotional states are integral to shaping how inhibitory control is exerted, largely by biasing the probabilistic computations that guide decision-making and action selection.